Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

WESTERN YUGOSLAVIA REACTS 103
interpreted as an endorsement of reform by the highest organ of state; it figured,
rather, as a political reaction to the coup in Montenegro. Milošević himself
realized, at the time, that he needed to back off temporarily. His behavior in
Vojvodina and Montenegro had awakened historical comparisons with the
fascist “conquest” of Italy in 1922. 24
Marković took office under an unlucky star, however. With the proclamation
of a state of emergency at the end of February 1989, the battle over the autonomy
of Kosovo went into its final phase; the now predominantly reactionary state
presidency proved, under Dizdarević’s leadership, to be little more than
Milošević’s executive assistant also in this last storm. Marković complained that
in his conversations about the construction of a new government he found the
politicians in the republics concerned with other matters. 25 The skepticism of the
Serbian leadership vis-à-vis Marković was well known. The two Deputy Prime
Ministers were Aleksandar Mitrović, a Serb from Croatia, and Živko Pregl, a
Slovene. Lončar remained Foreign Minister and Kadijević stayed on as Defense
Minister. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was headed by former General Petar
Gračanin, a firm Milošević loyalist.
The existing political constellation inclined Marković to make a cautious
beginning. He professed a solid reform policy under which the workers’
collectives should make their decisions largely independently, but he avoided the
expression “new socialism”. Cautiously he tried in his accession speech to
suggest to the army that its interests could best be secured through the success of
economic reform. Aside from that, Marković demanded above all a “new
morality”. But for all that he said he would base his policy, including the
establishment of an exchange rate, on “real values”.
The rather general character of this program and the lack of clearly outlined
measures at first met with understanding. One might suppose that the Prime
Minister would need time to set forth a clear policy. The inflation in the early
months of 1989 had so sharply increased that an annual inflation rate of 1000 per
cent was expected. 26 Marković replied to his critics that there was no sense in
decreeing anti-inflation measures unless they were linked to a total concept. In
the vicinity of the Prime Minister’s office one would hear, at the time, that the
whole policy of the government was concentrated on fighting inflation. The
strategy would have had to include a damming up of the disbursement of private
credit by banks and enterprises as well as a reduction of state outlays, including
those earmarked for the army. 27
28 March 1989, the day of the solemn proclamation of the new Serbian
constitution in the Belgrade Sava Center, found a smiling Marković cutting up a
holiday cake between Milošević and Trifunović. Only a few non-Serb politicians
took part in this triumphal celebration. Already in his programmatic speech,
Marković had said that “the acceptance of the Serbian constitutional
amendments [constitutes] the precondition for the stabilization of relations in
Kosovo”. His participation in the celebration of the Serbian constitution was a
gaffe, according to Predrag Tašić, Marković’s last press secretary in the federal