Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

competent and responsible manner, the myth that England and France were
neutral in the conflict, and the myth that Germany was somehow “to blame” for
having advocated recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence. It strikes
me, personally, as I reflect on this book that, at least from my standpoint,
underlying all of these myths is a failure to grasp the essential difference between
legitimate governments (which respect human rights and promote tolerance
among the inhabitants of their societies) and illegitimate regimes (which do not
respect human rights and which, on the contrary, promote intolerance and hatred
among the members of their societies). In sketching the difference between
legitimate and illegitimate governments in this way, I am highlighting the moral
aspects of legitimacy. In my view, at least, legitimacy may be viewed triadically,
as consisting of moral, political, and economic aspects. Under moral legitimacy
we may consider whether a government respects natural rights, whether it
endeavors to frame its laws in accord with Natural Law (as translated, for
example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and whether it fosters
tolerance of difference, among other things. Under political legitimacy, we may
consider whether office-holders gain office in accord with procedures which are
widely accepted within the given society. Under economic legitimacy, we may
consider whether the system protects the weak against exploitation, whether
there is a commitment to social justice, whether, indeed, the economic system is,
in some sense, compatible with Natural Law. 1 Under the moral criteria entailed
in this vision—which lie at the heart of the classical liberal agenda outlined by
John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, J.S. Mill, and
Joseph Raz—Slovenia and Croatia had every right to bid for independence, not
because of some purported and self-contradictory “right of national selfdetermination”,
which is incapable of consistent application, but because all
people and peoples have the right to defend themselves against tyrannies and,
failing to overthrow tyrants, have the right to secede and to establish legitimate
governments. 2 To affirm this is to say no more than is enshrined in the American
Declaration of Independence.
Legitimate governments and illegitimate regimes do not act in the same way,
either internally or externally in relations with other states, because their internal
dynamics, needs, information, and support mechanisms are fundamentally
different. Nor should it come as any surprise that illegitimate regimes gravitate
toward other illegitimate regimes, following a pattern already identified by
Thucydides in his Peloponnesian Wars, even if the venerable Greek placed his
stress on forms of government, rather than on such differences in legitimacy as may
be associated with formal differences. Moreover, while legitimate governments
encourage their citizens to behave in responsible ways, illegitimate regimes do
the very opposite—as shown in the Serbian government’s encouragement of
ethnic Serbs to organize mass demonstrations against the 1974 constitution, even
while banning mass demonstrations in support of the then-still-valid 1974
constitution by ethnic Albanians. When it becomes illegal to support the
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