Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

IRRECONCILABLE POSITIONS 143
had opposed this decision, but he had been alone in his opposition; even Šuvar,
as Croatia’s representative, had sided with Jović.
On 17 May the Slovenian republic presidency characterized the decision of the
Yugoslav state presidency as unacceptable. This concerned an attempt to abort
democratization and to prepare repressive measures. From Jović’s action one
knew now what to expect from the federal presidency in the future. One would
have to mobilize the public and provide for good coordination between the
different organs of the republic.
The army had meanwhile already taken action. In the same session of the
Slovenian republic presidency, Kučan had to reveal that he had received
disquieting reports that the army had confiscated the weapons of the Slovenian
Territorial Defense forces in several districts and deposited them in army depots.
He hoped to obtain more information and to speak about this the next day. The
new Defense Minister, Janša, confirmed later 39 that he had likewise heard such
reports from various districts on the afternoon of 17 May. It was the day on
which the parliament was to swear in the new Slovenian government. Up to this
point, thus, Janša had not yet assumed the responsibilities of office. In an
informal talk, Kučan confirmed the state of affairs to him and said that the
Commander of the Slovenian Territorial Defense (TO, from the Slovenian
Teritorialna Obramba), the former Yugoslav Air Force General Ivan Hočevar,
had not informed him about the action, even though he had been required by law
to do so.
On the following day, 18 May 1990, the Slovenian republic presidency met
once more, this time in the presence of Janša and General Hočevar. 40 Kučan said
that Hočevar had told him the day before that it was only a technical question.
But something was going on. Hočevar replied that the TO was part of the combat
forces of Yugoslavia and not a Slovenian Army. It was of course legal for
Slovenia to purchase weapons for its Territorial Defense forces, but one would
have to secure them. To Kučan’s question as to what the ostensible order from
Belgrade signified, Hočevar tried to evade the issue; he said that the order was
secret and that it signified only that the weapons had to be “physically secured”.
With that, the Slovenian presidency adopted a decision not to give up any more
weapons. As Janša reports, 41 this decision was relayed to the districts by
confidential telegram the following day, 19 May, and was carried out. In spite of
that, 70 per cent of TO weaponry was, by then, in the hands of the army,
including that which had already been in army storehouses.
It soon became clear that this was a prepared operation which had been
planned the previous month 42 and which, while formally extending throughout
the entire country, in effect was carried out only in the three “unreliable”
republics—Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina—and here, exclusive of
Serb-inhabited regions. Moreover, in none of these republics had the civil
authorities been informed in advance. In Croatia, Tudjman was not yet formally
in office and was completely taken by surprise. Later he told me that the Croatian
Territorial Defense forces had, in any case, been under Serbian control; there had