Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

UNWANTED INDEPENDENCE 203
viewed the Posavina as a barter object to trade for a Serbian-Montenegrin
withdrawal from the area south of Dubrovnik. The “offer” was nonetheless only
taken up when Bosanski Brod was thrown into the bargain. A former close
collaborator of Tudjman’s told me in November 1994 that the Croatian president
had always said that as long as one left the Serbian corridor in peace, one could
“talk” with the Serbs. Tudjman seems, accordingly, to have seen his passivity in
northern Bosnia as a prepayment for an imagined, desired dialogue with
Milošević. He often spoke about the dangers of Islam and of an Islamic state in
Europe, even in moments when a firm alliance between Croats and Muslims was
especially necessary.
The referendum with which Bosnia-Herzegovina was supposed to decide about
its independence took place on 1 March 1992. It had been suggested by the socalled
Badinter Commission of the EC, as a precondition so to speak for the
recognition of the republic as an independent state. Through this intrusion of
foreign factors, the Bosnian question seemed to be on the way to
internationalization. This process was initiated as a result of a meeting, held in
Lisbon during February under American and European pressure, of the leaders of
the three Bosnian peoples concerning the future configuration of the common
state. The meeting brought about something approximating a”fundamental
agreement”. On the one hand, or so it was thought in all three camps, there was
an agreement on preserving the “integrity” of Bosnia-Herzegovina; on the other
hand, there was a consensus about a “regionalization”. A document was signed,
even if each party subsequently made of the “agreement” what it wanted. But it
is not at all the case, as Laura Silber and Allan Little have written, 69 that
Izetbegović “retracted” his assent after his return. What was important was what
the Serbian side was then preparing, openly or in secret: On 9 January 1992, the
Bosnian Serbs had proclaimed their own “republic” and at approximately the
same time, Milošević, Karadžić, and Kadijević decided to station in Bosnia, as
far as possible, troops of Bosnian Serb extraction, who were thus planted in
support of the Serbian leadership there for use in the coming conflict.
The referendum, as the Muslim and Croatian leaderships stressed, should
make international recognition of Bosnia’s independence possible; with this
international backing, Izetbegović and his team hoped it would then be easier to
establish the final internal configuration of the republic. 70
The question posed in the referendum read: “Are you in favor of a sovereign,
independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state of equal citizens and of the peoples of
Bosnia-Herzegovina—Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and others who live in it” The
Serbs boycotted the referendum; they had already conducted their own
plebiscite. But it seemed to politicians and observers alike, on that beautiful
sunny Sunday, that in view of the unavoidability of the collapse of Yugoslavia
and now thanks to Western support, the concept of independence would be
realized. Already in the midday hours, pennants and automobile decals appeared
everywhere, with the republic’s new coat of arms, six lilies on a divided field.
People in Sarajevo wanted to revive the medieval tradition of an independent and