Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

THE TRAGEDY OF THE WEST 219
Croatia be recognized; in his view, this had given Tudjman hope that the EC
might, in collaboration with him, undertake “measures against the Serbs”. 59
All in all, the role played in the former Yugoslavia by the Dutch under Van
den Broek and his people at that time was negative. As of mid-September, one
could not identify any positive results, either on the basis of the conference at
The Hague or on the basis of local agreements in Yugoslavia. It seemed justified
already then to speak of an EC debacle, whereby the partiality and, in part,
naïveté with which the Dutch politicians, diplomats, and military observers had
worked, figured as a catalyst. 60 The fraternization of the military observers with
the army was not overlooked either in Slovenia or in Croatia. The Dutch General
Johan Kosters protested against the pillaging by Croats of military transports
leaving Slovenia, even though the matériel transported thus would be turned
against Croatian security forces only a few days later. Dutch representatives
demanded that Croatia supply the army and even Serbia with petroleum and
gasoline. They demanded of the Slovenes that they once more hoist the Yugoslav
flag on their borders. The Dutch diplomats, supported by diplomats from other
EC states, worked with all their might to extend the moratorium, even though de
Michelis had promised the Slovenes and Croats full freedom of action at its
expiration. I remember that the word was going around Slovenia that now that
they had freed themselves from the Serbs, they still had to free themselves from
the Dutch.
The appointment of Lord Carrington as European “commissar” for Yugoslavia
should have further secured the control of the EC’s policy in Yugoslavia by
those states and forces which stood for a restoration of Yugoslavia. The first
phase of talks produced no results since the European ministers rejected, on 19
September, Van den Broek’s idea of sending “lightly armed” European
peacekeeping troops into the combat zone. 61 This outcome signified, inter alia,
the definite end of efforts on the part of the EC as regards so-called
“peacekeeping”. The EC now turned to the UN. France, which at that time was
chairing the Security Council, proposed the dispatch of an “emergency force”
under Article 7 of the UN Charter. At the same time, France also proposed that
the UN Security Council impose an arms embargo on the entire Yugoslav area.
This was adopted in principle on 25 September 1991.
This embargo was to have enormous consequences for the subsequent course
of the war, in Croatia and especially in Bosnia. It may have sprung from the
notion that weapons deliveries could only inflame or prolong the conflict, but it
did not take into account the fact that, in practice, it was a one-sided embargo
aimed against those parties to the conflict who did not have (adequate) weaponry.
The Serbian side had succeeded in taking control of most of the Yugoslav
Army’s weapons arsenal, especially tanks, artillery, and mortars, as well as
practically the entire air force and the greater part of the navy. The weapons
embargo robbed first Croatia and later the Bosnian Muslims, as the legal
government of UN-member state Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the right to selfdefense
guaranteed in Article 51 of the UN Charter!