Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

WESTERN YUGOSLAVIA REACTS 113
The Slovenes could then see on their television screens with what antipathy
and hatred the Serbs replied to the Slovenian representatives. Trifunović, a close
collaborator of Milošević’s, said he was proud that Kučan was his enemy. Many
Slovenes told me that they finally realized, in the course of that night, that
Yugoslavia had nothing more to offer Slovenia. This realization was mixed with
satisfaction that the Slovenian leadership had resisted immense pressure. Late in
the night, Kučan defended Slovenia’s standpoint in detail once again, in a speech
lasting nearly an hour; he made it clear, beyond any possibility of
misunderstanding, that Slovenia would proceed with the adoption of its
constitutional amendments. 60 The Central Committee decided then, by a vote of
97 to 40, to call on the Slovenes to delay parliamentary ratification of their
constitutional amendments; there should be a chance, so the majority in the
Central Committee argued, to discuss further the problems which had arisen,
inter alia, within the framework of negotiations concerning a new reform of the
federal constitution. That was a partial victory for the Slovenes. A motion to
condemn the Slovenian constitutional amendments outright would probably not
have found a majority.
Kučan and other participants in the session later spoke of the “menacing
atmosphere” which they had encountered at the time in Belgrade. In an open
threat, Admiral Petar Simić, the army spokesman, said it would not be “good” if
Slovenia were to adopt its constitutional amendments. At any rate, after the end
of the session in the early morning hours of 27 September 1989, the Slovenian
delegates felt a pressing need to get out of Belgrade as quickly as possible; they
were happy when the Director of the Slovenian Airline, Janez Kocijančič,
himself a member of the CC LCY, succeeded in organizing a flight back at the
time needed.
The collision with the army at the CC session would have come about in any
case, but the intense emotional engagement of the Serbian leadership and the
Serbian media can be explained not only in terms of Milošević’s desire to
demonstrate solidarity with the army at any cost. There were real Serbian
interests at stake. The Slovenian constitutional amendments seriously threatened
the creation of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, Milošević’s first option. Slovenia,
with its opposition and its principled federalist commitment, stood in his way;
his goal was to isolate the Slovenian leadership and, if possible, to overthrow it.
Kučan thought that Milošević still subscribed to the slogan, “a unified Serbia and
a unified Yugoslavia”. It had not been Serbia’s aspiration from the beginning to
push Slovenia out of Yugoslavia, Kučan thought. 61
Kučan’s thesis is supported by the fact that during the deliberations in the
Slovenian parliament there were reactions in parts of the Serbian zone which
seemed to lose all hold on rationality. In Titograd local party chief Bulatović
demanded, at a “spontaneous” anti-Slovenian meeting, that the army be sent
against Slovenia, even though economically bankrupt Montenegro was one of
the chief beneficiaries of subsidies paid by Slovenia. “One should not take it
amiss when we demand weapons,” Bulatović shouted. “We have these weapons.