Nov - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1060 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009
designed for protection of his interest
against any arbitrary action by the
disciplinary authority.
35. The submission is that the level
of satisfaction at the time of grant of prior
approval by the District Inspector of
Schools would be different and would be
of a far lesser intensity, as at that point of
time, he has to simply accord his approval
and not enter into the validity or
otherwise of the merits of the charges for
punishment. He contends that if the
provision is read in this way, then there
would be no embarrassment to the
Committee of Management to hear an
appeal against an order of dismissal even
if there is a prior approval and the District
Inspector of Schools would not be
deprived of his authority to decide a
representation on merits, which he can do
uninfluenced by the prior approval
granted by him. It is urged that when an
appeal or representation is filed, then the
level of investigation and the scope of
power exercised would be entirely
different from that at the stage of prior
approval being granted at the time of
dismissal. He, therefore, submits that the
omission by the legislature and keeping in
view the provisions of Regulation 31, 37
and 100, this Court should interpret the
provisions so as to resolve the conflict by
pressing into service the recital in the title
heading of Section 16-G, which has
neither been considered or interpreted
from this angle in any of the decisions
which have been cited by the Bar.
36. Sri Harish Chandra Singh has
supported the same contentions and
submitted that the view expressed by this
Court in Daya Ram Tewari's (supra) case,
as upheld by the Division Bench later on
should be approved as laying down the
correct law.
37. Sri R.K. Ojha, Sri R.C. Dwivedi
and Sri Yadav, for the employers, namely
the Principal of the Institution have relied
their submissions in spite of only a couple
of decisions in their favour, to urge that
the entire Scheme of the Act is clear
enough to hold that prior approval of the
District Inspector of Schools is not
contemplated and any such interpretation
would be a violation of the provisions
resulting in absurdity. They contend that
this situation has arisen on account of the
decision in Principal, Shitladin Inter
College, (supra) having not been noticed
either in Daya Shankar Tewari's (supra)
case or any of the latter decisions. On the
strength of his written submissions, he
also invited the attention of the Court to
the fact that the Division Bench decision
in the case of Principal, Rashtriya Inter
College (supra) holding that prior
approval was necessary and approving the
decision of Daya Shankar Tewari's
(supra) case was put in jeopardy before
the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition
No.2337 of 2001, wherein initially the
judgment of the Division Bench was
stayed by the Apex Court in the following
terms:
"The Hon'ble Supreme Court by
filing Special Leave petition, numbered as
Appeal (Civil) no.2337 of 2001 and
Hon'ble Apex Court in its interim order
was pleased to pass following orders:
"LA 1 is allowed.
It is contended that the action under
Regulation in question does not require
prior approval of the Inspector in the Case
of Class IV employee and further more