Nov - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.State of U.P. and others 1065
Inspector was necessary before
terminating services of Class-IV
employee then what was the point in
providing appeal first to the Committee of
Management and then to the Inspector. In
case the Inspector has already granted
approval for terminating the service then
can he change his decision in the appeal.
In our opinion the purpose of including
two clauses by 1975 notification, which
continued with some modification by
1978 notification, clearly show that the
principal is empowered to terminate the
services of the Class-IV employee
without taking any prior approval of the
Inspector and his decision is final; it is
subject to an appeal before the Committee
of Management then to the appeal before
the Inspector."
50. We have given our thoughtful
consideration to the aforesaid reasoning
given in the decision of Pujari Yadav
(supra) and we find that Regulation 31
stands qualified by making an express and
separate provision for the procedure to be
followed in the case of Class-IV
employees and, therefore, the word
'employees' occurring in the opening
sentence of Regulation 31 does not
include within its fold, a Class-IV
employee. It is for this reason that
Regulation 31 to that extent stood
excluded in its applicability to Class-IV
employees. To our mind, the Regulation
making Authority was conscious of the
amendments brought about in Regulation
31 in 1975 and 1978, and it is for the said
reason that the applicability of Regulation
31 to that extent has not been included in
Regulation 100. The reasoning given in
Pujari Yadav's case (supra) has our firm
approval as we find that the amendments
bring about a sea-change of procedure in
relation to Class-IV employees with an
exclusive dominant role assigned to the
Head of the institution for taking
disciplinary action. These amendments,
which were introduced stepwise, in our
opinion, exclude the role of the Inspector
of Schools at the stage of taking action by
the disciplinary authority. The
amendments clearly and unambiguously,
which have been quoted in detail in
Appendix A to the judgment in Pujari
Yadav's case (supra), exhibit the intention
of the rule making authority to clothe the
Head of the institution with exclusive
powers of initial disciplinary control
unfettered by any prior sanction from any
other authority.
51. With profound respect, we find
fallacy in the reasoning of learned Single
Judge, in the case of Daya Shankar
Tewari (supra) as upheld by the Division
Bench in the case of Principal, Rashtriya
Inter College (supra) and quoted
hereinabove. The learned Single Judge in
Daya Shankar Tewari's case proceeded on
a consideration of Section 16-G (3) of the
Act, and held that the said provision
provides for Conditions of Service of all
employees including Class-IV employees
as well. According to the learned Single
Judge, Regulation 31 of Chapter III, so
framed would, therefore, apply to a Class-
IV employee and in order to explain the
impact of Regulation 100, held that even
if, Regulation 31 had not been made
specifically applicable, yet the same was
not categorically excluded.
52. Apart from the reasons given by
the Division Bench in the case of Pujari
Yadav (supra) hereinabove, we may
further add that there is a legal principle
engrained in the maxim "expressum facit
cessare tacitum". The said maxim means
when there is express mention of certain