Nov - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1068 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009
Supreme Court in the case of State of
Kerala and Another Vs. P.V. Neelakandan
Nair and others [(2005) 5 SCC 561] in
paragraphs 8 to 16 held that while
interpreting a Rule, attention should be
paid not only to what has been said, but
also to what has not been said. The Rule
has to be interpreted not like a Euclid's
theorem, but with some imagination of
the purposes, which lie behind the Rule.
A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in B. Prabhavathi Vs. Govt. of
Andhra Pradesh, [2002 (3) ESC 108] in
paragraph 44 ruled that Rules framed
under the Act should be harmoniously
interpreted as they form part of the Act.
60. Having considered the principles
enunciated and referred to hereinabove
and applying them to the present
controversy, it is clear to us that nothing
has been omitted by the legislature, which
may require filling up by the Court as
suggested by Sri R.C. Singh. As
explained hereinabove in Pujari Yadav
(supra), the rule making authority itself
proceeded to fill in the gaps by making
express recitals in Regulations 31, 37, 100
and the other provisions relating thereto.
The amendments in Regulation 31 lead to
a heavy full stop to the role of the
Inspector and is not a silent comma
expressing doubt. The same brings about
a clarity which has an almost window
pave effect and removes the cloud of
doubt that has been raised to be resolved
by us.
61. There is yet another principle,
which deserves to be taken notice of. If
the sanction is required prior to giving
effect to a punishment in respect of a
Class-IV employee, then the District
Inspector of Schools would hear an appeal
against his own approval. This, to our
mind, would bring about an anomaly,
which may extend to an absurdity. The
same authority cannot be presumed to
have been conferred with a power to hear
an appeal against its own approval. This
would be rendering nugatory the
hierarchy provided for in Regulation 31
itself, where an appeal is provided to the
Committee of Management against the
order of disciplinary authority and a
further appeal to the Inspector of Schools.
The purpose, therefore, is clear enough
and it does not suffer from any ambiguity
which may require us to render an
interpretation, which otherwise would
bring about an incongruous result. As
observed above, the Rules of
Interpretation as enunciated by the Apex
Court do not permit us to give an
interpretation, which would obviously
result in a clear anomaly as pointed out
hereinabove. This we adopt, as the law
permits us to apply 'the intention seeking'
Rule of Interpretation to illustrate the
anomaly that may result in the event we
accept the proposition that a prior
sanction is required.
62. A feeble submission raised by
Sri R.C. Singh was that the District
Inspector of Schools has to merely grant
prior approval and not to make an indepth
examination, as at that stage, he
would be proceeding as if to perform a
routine work. Such an action would not,
therefore, prevent him from hearing an
appeal when the matter may arise out of
an appeal before the Committee of
Management.
63. We are not inclined to accept the
aforesaid submission for the simple
reason that the District Inspector of
Schools, in our opinion, does not perform
a mere ministerial act while granting