Nov - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1062 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009
also envisage the examination of the
matter by the District Inspector of Schools
on merits, and it is for this reason that all
documents are required to be sent to the
District Inspector of Schools, as per
Regulation 37. However for Class-IV
employees, such documents would not be
required to be sent to the District
Inspector of Schools and the entire
procedure has to be followed by the
disciplinary authority, i.e., the Head of the
Institution in the instant case. Sri Ojha,
therefore, submits that this provision itself
specifically excludes the exercise of
power by the District Inspector of Schools
to grant prior approval, as he cannot enter
into the merits of the charges nor the
papers in respect thereof are required to
be sent to the District Inspector of
Schools. He submits that, fortified with
the decisions in the case of Ali Ahmad
Ansari (supra) and Principal, Shitladin
Inter College (supra), his submissions
should be accepted and the ratio in the
aforesaid two decisions should be
approved as laying down the correct law.
43. Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned
Chief Standing Counsel for the State with
the aid of his written submissions and the
decisions cited at the Bar, raised the same
submissions, and urged that the District
Inspector of Schools is under no legal
obligation to grant prior approval in
respect of the proposal of punishment
against a Class - IV employee. He submits
that the word 'employees' occurring in the
opening part of Regulation 31 would
stand restricted to such employees about
whom reference has been made in the
latter Regulations and a Class-IV
employee would stand excluded by virtue
of the specific provision contained in
Regulation 100. He contends that the ratio
of the decision in the case of Daya
Shankar Tewari's (supra) does not lay
down the correct position of law
inasmuch as the Court could not have
read into a provision by employing any
tool of interpretation, so as to include
something, which has been specifically
excluded. He contends that the wisdom of
the legislature cannot be doubted as the
legislature will be presumed to be
conscious of the existence of Regulation
31, while framing Regulation 100, and
when there is a conscious departure by
excluding the applicability of Regulation
31, then in that event, it would be
inappropriate for this Court to read into a
provision, which has not been made
applicable. He submits that in the event
the interpretation as contended by the
other side is accepted, the same would
result in incongruity and would not be in
accordance with the Scheme of the Act
and Regulations referred to hereinabove.
44. Having heard learned counsel
for the parties, it would be appropriate for
us to declare the law on the basis of first
principles underlying the interpretation on
the basis whereof the dispute has to be
resolved. This is necessary in view of the
conflict of the two Division Bench
decisions, as pointed out in the referring
order.
45. Before proceeding to do so, we
may, at the very outset, record that
another Division Bench decision relating
to the same subject, which arose out of a
reference in a second appeal and which
was not cited at the Bar, has come to our
notice and which, in our opinion,
substantially answers the issues referred
before us. The same is reported in 2006
(65) ALR Page 767 Pujari Yadav Vs. Ram
Briksh Yadav decided on 09.10.2006. The
said decision has distinguished the ratio of