Nov - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.State of U.P. and others 1061
the action in question was taken on the
basis of the complaint and order of the
Inspector himself.
Issue notice.
Stay in the meanwhile.
Sd/ B.N. Kirpal J.
Sd/ Ruma Pal, J."
38. It has been stated that the said
appeal was even though dismissed on
02.11.2001, yet the question of law raised
therein was left open to be decided. The
said order of the Apex Court is quoted
below :
"Leaving the question of law open,
the Special Leave petition is dismissed."
39. Relying on the decision of Shri
Shitladin Inter College (supra) case and
the latter Division Bench judgment in the
case of Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra), Sri
Ojha contends that the words of
Regulation 31 read with Regulation 37,
are unambiguous and clear enough, which
do not require any purposive
interpretation as suggested by the other
side and further, the history of various
amendments brought about in Section 16-
G and the Regulations framed would
clearly demonstrate that had the
legislature intended to bring about any
such provision seeking prior approval,
then the same would have been expressly
included, and the legislature or the
Regulation making authority having not
done so, there is no occasion for this
Court to read into the provisions, the
requirement of a prior approval in respect
of a punishment to be awarded to a Class-
IV employee. He further submits that if
that is done, then it would be encroaching
upon the function of the legislature or the
rule making authority, which our Courts
have held to be outside their jurisdiction
and even otherwise, there is no necessity
of doing so, as there is an ample
protection in the Act making room for
reconsideration of the matter at the stage
of appeal before the Committee of
Management and by way of a
representation even thereafter to the
District Inspector of Schools himself.
40. Mr. Ojha further submits that
Regulation 37 clarifies the position, where
the sending of reports for the purpose of
approval has been clearly excluded, and
Regulation 31 stands specifically
excluded in the matter of Class-IV
employees by way of Regulation 100. He
submits that Regulation 31, therefore,
cannot be read beyond for which it has
been intended, and he further submits that
if such a provision was necessary, then
the legislature could have done it, as was
done in the case of Class-III employees
by introducing Regulation 44 and 44-A of
the Regulations under Chapter III
aforesaid, which have been already
quoted and reproduced hereinbefore while
referring to Ali Ahmad Ansari's case.
41. He submits that if the
interpretation of having a prior approval is
accepted, then it would be an anomalous
situation where the Committee of
Management would hear an appeal in
respect of a decision taken after approval
by a higher authority, namely the District
Inspector of Schools. This incongruity
would further stand multiplied, if the
District Inspector of Schools is called
upon to hear a representation in respect of
the same matter, for which he has granted
prior approval.
42. He further submits that the
words 'prior approval' in respect of the
punishments referred to in Regulation 31