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Nov - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

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1066 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />

things, then anything not mentioned is<br />

excluded. The aforesaid well-known<br />

maxim was described as a principle <strong>of</strong><br />

logic and commonsense and not merely a<br />

technical rule <strong>of</strong> construction. Reference<br />

may be had to the decision in the case <strong>of</strong><br />

B. Shankara Rao Badami Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />

Mysore, [1969 (1) SCC 9] and followed<br />

in Union <strong>of</strong> India Vs. Tulsiram P<strong>at</strong>el<br />

[(1985) 3 SCC 398] [paragraph 70].<br />

53. In our opinion, the aforesaid<br />

principle squarely applies in the present<br />

context and for the reasons given<br />

hereinabove and hereinafter, we would<br />

interpret Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 read with<br />

Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100 to mean th<strong>at</strong> the sanction<br />

<strong>of</strong> prior approval in respect <strong>of</strong> the<br />

termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> a Class-IV employee<br />

would stand excluded. The reasoning<br />

given by the learned Single Judge in Daya<br />

Shanakar Tiwari (supra) to th<strong>at</strong> extent<br />

does not lay down the law correctly and,<br />

therefore, its approval by the Division<br />

Bench in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal Rashtriya<br />

Inter College, (supra) also cannot be said<br />

to be laying correct law.<br />

54. There is yet another reason to<br />

come to this conclusion, which has also<br />

been taken note <strong>of</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> Pujari<br />

Yadav (supra). The provision <strong>of</strong> appeal<br />

against an order <strong>of</strong> termin<strong>at</strong>ion passed by<br />

the Head <strong>of</strong> the Institution lies to the<br />

Committee <strong>of</strong> Management. The order <strong>of</strong><br />

the Committee <strong>of</strong> Management can be put<br />

in jeopardy in a further appeal before the<br />

District Inspector Schools. The hierarchy<br />

so provided, therefore, clearly amplifies<br />

the intention <strong>of</strong> the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure th<strong>at</strong> a<br />

Class-IV employee would have the<br />

benefit <strong>of</strong> appeals to the higher authorities<br />

<strong>at</strong> two stages. If a prior approval or<br />

sanction was intended before the<br />

punishment to be awarded, then the<br />

District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools would be<br />

supposed to go into the merits <strong>of</strong> such a<br />

punishment. Th<strong>at</strong> is the purpose for a<br />

prior approval or sanction, which requires<br />

the sanctioning authority to examine an<br />

order <strong>of</strong> punishment in depth before<br />

proceeding to grant sanction. It is for this<br />

reason th<strong>at</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37 quoted<br />

hereinabove, makes it imper<strong>at</strong>ive for the<br />

punishing authority to send all documents<br />

including reports to the Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />

Schools for approval.<br />

55. There is yet another reason to<br />

come to the same conclusion. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />

37 specifically excludes for sending <strong>of</strong><br />

any such report to the Inspector in the<br />

case <strong>of</strong> Class-IV employees and all<br />

proceedings in rel<strong>at</strong>ion to Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37<br />

have to be undertaken by the appointing<br />

authority. The aforesaid st<strong>at</strong>utory<br />

provision, therefore, does not allow the<br />

sending <strong>of</strong> any such documents to the<br />

Inspector in the case <strong>of</strong> Class-IV<br />

employees. It injuncts the sending <strong>of</strong> any<br />

such papers to the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />

Schools for examin<strong>at</strong>ion. In our opinion,<br />

the intention <strong>of</strong> the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure is clear<br />

enough th<strong>at</strong> the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />

Schools is not required to examine the<br />

m<strong>at</strong>erial on the basis where<strong>of</strong> any<br />

punishment has been awarded to a Class-<br />

IV employee. To our mind, there is no<br />

purpose to seek prior approval or sanction<br />

when the Inspector cannot examine the<br />

documents, which are necessary for<br />

granting such sanction. To interpret it<br />

otherwise, would be to do viol<strong>at</strong>ion to the<br />

procedure, which specifically st<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong><br />

all proceedings in this regard have to be<br />

performed by the appointing authority,<br />

namely the Head <strong>of</strong> the Institution. If we<br />

interpret the provisions making it<br />

compulsory to obtain a sanction, then the<br />

aforesaid procedure as engrained in

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