2008 Amendments to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ...

Subsection (a) first identifies those aspects of the initial child-support order that are
governed by the term’s original decision and the function of the issuing tribunal. First and
foremost, ultimate responsibility for enforcement and final resolution of the obligor’s compliance
with all aspects of the support order belongs to the issuing tribunal. Thus, calculation of whether
the obligor has fully complied with the payment of current support, arrears, and interest on
arrears is also the duty of the issuing tribunal.
In UIFSA (1992) the decision was made by NCCUSL that the duration of child support
should be fixed by the initial controlling child-support order. See Section 611(c). This policy
decision was somewhat controversial at the time, especially given the general rule that “local law
controls.” But, case law regarding issues created by movement from one state with one duration
to a state with another policy was hopelessly muddled, so a solution was sought. Then, as now,
the policies of states on this subject varied greatly: today, a few states continue to set the once
most-common age of 21 as the cut-off date; some continue the obligation past 21, dependent on
enrollment in higher education (often with limited time specified); at the other end of the
spectrum, some states end the obligation of child support at age 18; in others at 19; and, most
popularly, at one or the other of either age 18 or 19, plus graduation from high school, whichever
is later.
Under subsection (a), if the initial issuing tribunal sets the age for termination of child
support at 18, a responding state must recognize and enforce that child-support order. If the
responding state sets its child support to age 21, the responding tribunal may not apply that time
duration to require additional support to that age. The converse is also true. If the controlling
order of another state ends the support obligation at 21, the responding tribunal in a state with 18
as the maximum duration for child support must enforce the controlling order until age 21. The
dissent on this policy decision in UIFSA has abated over time. Interestingly, the Convention
establishes age 21 as the hallmark. At the same time, under Convention art. 2(2), a country may
reserve the right to limit the application of the Convention with regard to child support to persons
who have not reached the age of 18. Obviously, the United States will not make such a
reservation.
Similarly, subsection (a) directs that the law of the issuing state or foreign country
governs whether a payment made for the benefit of a child, such as a Social Security benefit for a
child of a disabled obligor, should be credited against the obligor’s child support obligation. In
sum, on these subjects the consistent rule is that a controlling order from State A is enforced in
State B (and State C as well).
Note that as soon as a general proposition is identified, an exception may well be
presented. Subsection (b) contains a choice-of-law provision that often diverges from other local
law. In situations in which the statutes of limitation differ from state to state, the statute with the
longer term is to be applied. In interstate cases, arrearages often will have accumulated over a
considerable period of time before enforcement is perfected. The rationale for this exception to
the general rule of “local law applies” is that the obligor should not gain an undue benefit from
his or her choice of residence if the forum state, as the obligor’s state of residence, has a shorter
statute of limitations for arrearages than does the controlling order state. On the other side of the
coin, i.e., if the forum has a longer statute of limitations, the obligor will be treated in an
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