Cutting or Tightening the Gordian Knot

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have been running bilateral support programmes with Serbia and BiH to support their PfP approach. Enhancing military co-operation among other priorities means to co-operate in the field of education. In this regard I want to point out that we run a specific ESDP training program for SEE. I also want to emphasize our support for the Peace Support and Operations Training Centre in Sarajevo, where Dr. Vetschera is providing support to the Bosnian colleagues in their effort to further develop this new important training institution. We are strongly engaged in RACVIAC and the SEE Clearing House Initiative. Together with other countries we have run several SALW activities, recently in Sarajevo. I shall not forget the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe run by the Austrian Ministry of Interior and DCAF. It supports improvements in justice and home affairs in the region. So all in all, Austria has managed to establish a certain degree of comprehensive approach between different ministries regarding the Western Balkans. It is a very constructive cooperation. Austria welcomes NATO’s invitation extended to Croatia and Albania to prepare their accession, although Austria itself is not planning to become a member of the Alliance. We would have found it helpful if this invitation also would have been extended to FYROM. Also the MoD sees the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia at the end of April and that such an agreement will be signed with Bosnia and Herzegovina in June as positive developments. The opening of the dialogue on visa liberalisation between the European Commission and countries in the region is an important step in this direction. We hope that the Macedonian name issue will be solved soon to pave the way for the next steps there also. We understand the emotional reactions of Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs following the declaration of independence. However, certain red lines like the use of violence must not be crossed. With the forming of a Serb government and the expected entry into force of the Kosovo Constitution on 15 June 2008 we enter a crucial period in 9
the region. Austria wants to make sure that EULEX can be active on the whole territory of Kosovo. We know of course how difficult the situation in the North is and it may not be sure, that the EU can start operations there immediately. We also know that the legal situation is complicated and not easy for the UN. In any case we all need clarity for the post-June 15 future. UNMIK needs it, the EU and NATO need it and not least the Kosovo government. Furthermore, we need to ensure a smooth handover from UNMIK to EULEX. The deployment of EULEX has already experienced some delay because the EU does not know whether we will be able to draw on UNMIK’s assets. The most dangerous thing would be to have a security gap after 15 June because of a lingering confusion about the respective roles of UNMIK and EULEX. We must not come to a situation where local havoc might break out. As you know our government has recognized Kosovo as an independent state and is supporting the implementation of Ahtisaari’s Kosovo plan. Nevertheless Austria like the other EU countries – regardless of their position towards Kosovo’s status – is aware how important it is to launch co-operation between Priština and Belgrade. The priority is about reducing security risks. As I said last year: we all hope that leaders in the region have the courage to overcome the darkness of the past two decades. We all hope that they have the dedication to look forward, for the benefit of their people. The workshop comes at the right time again. Parts of the Western Balkans are in a defining phase of its stabilisation: a new state has been created, and this has caused considerable tensions. The achieved peace processes need to be strengthened nevertheless. We see this workshop as an opportunity to exchange different opinions on the actual developments in Kosovo and Serbia and their influence on the regional peace process in an open academic forum. During the workshop we want top tackle some questions, which seem to be of special importance for the general topic: 10
Page 1 and 2: Ernst M. Felberbauer Predrag Jureko
Page 3 and 4: Impressum: Study Group Information
Page 5 and 6: Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
Page 7 and 8: This book includes contributions fr
Page 9: Groups and co-operates with the Swi
Page 14 and 15: Background Speech Judy Batt Regiona
Page 16 and 17: taken as “given”, i.e. psycholo
Page 18: to encourage Serbia to believe it w
Page 22 and 23: The Status Process and Its Implicat
Page 24 and 25: undermine elements within the Serbi
Page 26: the Western Balkans are a common an
Page 30 and 31: The Independence of Kosovo and the
Page 32 and 33: with Slovenia, experienced an evolu
Page 34 and 35: Although separated from their Kosov
Page 36 and 37: terial posts. Throughout the years
Page 38 and 39: the participation of the Macedonian
Page 40 and 41: Effectively, the legal changes base
Page 42 and 43: veys on the perception of the Kosov
Page 44 and 45: Regarding citizen’s feelings towa
Page 46 and 47: the final status of Kosovo was a mu
Page 48 and 49: Table 5. Should Macedonia recognize
Page 50 and 51: ings of the CRPM’s phone poll don
Page 52 and 53: called Gostivar flag riots in 1997
Page 54 and 55: nian groups that objected to a well
Page 56 and 57: ovo independence and further on the
Page 58: State Statistical Office of the Rep
Page 61 and 62:
State of Southern Serbia The area k
Page 63 and 64:
not always readily seen, this may b
Page 65 and 66:
ity among the Albanian population.
Page 67 and 68:
wever, apparently multi-ethnic comm
Page 69 and 70:
firms) are seen in abundance, but r
Page 71 and 72:
forceful than initially expected, f
Page 73 and 74:
unlikely that the Albanian communit
Page 75 and 76:
Conclusion As a region for which co
Page 78 and 79:
The Secession of Kosovo - A Precede
Page 80 and 81:
The findings would then allow for a
Page 82 and 83:
This changed with the adoption of t
Page 84 and 85:
While most of the provisions could
Page 86 and 87:
ing up to the demands of granting
Page 88 and 89:
ance, inter alia by settling Serbs
Page 90 and 91:
Kosovo thus served as a catalyst fo
Page 92 and 93:
As a rule, Albanians have been evic
Page 94 and 95:
“facilitating of a political proc
Page 96 and 97:
As a result, none of these argument
Page 98 and 99:
deputies. Other Albanian Parties ex
Page 100 and 101:
volved to the Entities. Key issues
Page 102 and 103:
lack the key criteria for justifiab
Page 104:
PART III: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATI
Page 107 and 108:
Notwithstanding this clear-sketched
Page 109 and 110:
opean Affairs. Four support staff,
Page 111 and 112:
the institutions, a regular assessm
Page 113 and 114:
tighter. Furthermore, the deploymen
Page 115 and 116:
able to kill two birds with one sto
Page 118 and 119:
Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
Page 120 and 121:
pating under its own sovereign term
Page 122 and 123:
companying offer of free visa issue
Page 124:
which would mean the exclusion and
Page 127 and 128:
Bondsteel (“Kosovo’s real capit
Page 129 and 130:
The NATO Toolbox Critique of NATO d
Page 131 and 132:
Allied Divisions Persistent disunit
Page 133 and 134:
Meanwhile, Kosovo has been nearly i
Page 136 and 137:
The Russian “Return” to the Wes
Page 138 and 139:
štunica, and Tomislav Nikolić are
Page 140 and 141:
strong enough to fight NATO troops
Page 142 and 143:
Some Aspects of Russian Economic Ex
Page 144:
people. 17 A sizeable share of it c
Page 148 and 149:
From UNMIK to EULEX: An Outline of
Page 150 and 151:
security for all. They have in fact
Page 152 and 153:
sense this happened in Kosovo in Ma
Page 154 and 155:
European Presence in Kosovo as an A
Page 156 and 157:
Rifts Among Local Partners and Comp
Page 158 and 159:
deal with. This proved to be very d
Page 160 and 161:
International Support to Enhance Co
Page 162 and 163:
in 1975 are human contacts, informa
Page 164 and 165:
ion. It also aims at post-crisis ca
Page 166 and 167:
ety in its functions, in particular
Page 168 and 169:
WUS has also assisted in founding a
Page 170 and 171:
Conclusions Although many roads hav
Page 172 and 173:
Untying the Gordian Knot in the Bal
Page 174 and 175:
his diminutive physical stature, he
Page 176 and 177:
simple recollection; it is a shared
Page 178 and 179:
For our purposes here, the Battle o
Page 180 and 181:
younger generation through its rela
Page 182 and 183:
My God, what awaited us! To see a l
Page 184 and 185:
Examples of conflict-as-symptoms ar
Page 186 and 187:
grassroots levels. They have contac
Page 188 and 189:
In the research literature where PD
Page 190 and 191:
Grassroots Leadership Grassroots tr
Page 192 and 193:
If a trauma victim makes it to leve
Page 194 and 195:
Conclusion The essential point of d
Page 196 and 197:
more to further enhance prospects f
Page 198 and 199:
quires constant attention and engag
Page 200 and 201:
ionists riled by another Belfast pr
Page 202 and 203:
le%20of%20Kosovo%20--%20Britannica%
Page 204 and 205:
Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse a
Page 206:
PART V: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 205
Page 209 and 210:
d. optimizing the influence of the
Page 211 and 212:
support for the return of Serbs as
Page 213 and 214:
association process. On the other h
Page 215 and 216:
RHODES Matthew, College of Internat
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Cutting or Tightening the Gordian Knot

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