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Cutting or Tightening the Gordian Knot

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quires constant attention and engagement. Eventual success in N<strong>or</strong><strong>the</strong>rn<br />

Ireland flowed from a strategy of “never letting <strong>the</strong> talking stop” (emphasis<br />

added) (Stephens, 2008).<br />

This is precisely what <strong>the</strong> Kosovar Albanians and Serbs in n<strong>or</strong><strong>the</strong>rn Kosovo<br />

and Belgrade need to do in <strong>or</strong>der f<strong>or</strong> confidence building to start to<br />

take hold and f<strong>or</strong> both to find <strong>the</strong>ir inevitable place in <strong>the</strong> European Union!<br />

Epilogue<br />

Again, it is essential to point out that <strong>the</strong> conditions of ruptured relations<br />

and virulent nationalism are not unique to Kosovar Albanians and Serbs.<br />

These are generic phenomena, meaning that we can learn from one situation<br />

something about ano<strong>the</strong>r situation, despite apparent differences.<br />

This is, in part, <strong>the</strong> value of Padraig O’Malley’s creative initiative to<br />

bring conflict parties from N<strong>or</strong><strong>the</strong>rn Ireland to South Africa, <strong>or</strong>, m<strong>or</strong>e<br />

recently, from N<strong>or</strong><strong>the</strong>rn Ireland and South Africa to meet with Iraqis –<br />

all could learn from one ano<strong>the</strong>r in ways that would not be possible if<br />

<strong>the</strong>y interacted only with “outsider-impartials”.<br />

This assessment clearly applies to <strong>the</strong> most intractable conflict of our<br />

times, <strong>the</strong> Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is a maj<strong>or</strong> driver of regional<br />

and global terr<strong>or</strong>ism. In his review of Benny M<strong>or</strong>ris’ (2008) new book,<br />

1948: A Hist<strong>or</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> First Arab-Israeli War, Glenn Frankel (2008)<br />

begins with a powerful statement on <strong>the</strong> status of <strong>the</strong> conflict, which,<br />

against <strong>the</strong> background of our discussion of Kosovar Albanian-Serb relations,<br />

sounds remarkably familiar:<br />

In a zero-sum w<strong>or</strong>ld, one side's gain must be exactly balanced by ano<strong>the</strong>r's<br />

loss [+10-10/-10+10]. In such a w<strong>or</strong>ld, violence is inevitable,<br />

compromise is betrayal, neutral observers are enemies, and <strong>the</strong> only heroes<br />

are those willing to take <strong>the</strong> contest to its logical, lethal conclusion.<br />

And <strong>the</strong> only hist<strong>or</strong>ies w<strong>or</strong>th publishing are those that validate your own<br />

self-sustaining myths. [This] rem<strong>or</strong>seless, zero-sum conflict ... has been<br />

going on f<strong>or</strong> three sc<strong>or</strong>e years [with] no end in sight (emphasis added).<br />

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