Cutting or Tightening the Gordian Knot

than seeking to overcome, state weakness. The political interests of key
political actors seem to be vested in the status quo that keeps open basic
questions of statehood and borders, that can then be taken back out of
the box whenever needed to win the next election. Ethno-nationalist mobilization
is just so much easier and more convenient than devising
complex economic and social programmes, whose results can be measured,
for which you can be called to account.
But responsibility for changing the dynamics of Balkan politics lies not
only with Balkan leaders. The international community’s role in the
Balkans is essentially to create an environment where “closure” begins
to make sense for politicians and people in the region. Not much will be
achieved by simply exhorting Balkan politicians to be more statesmanlike,
far-sighted and responsible (like us?). Policies that offer incentives
strong enough to change deeply-entrenched interests and patterns
of behaviour are vital. And this is what the promises of EU and NATO
integration offer, but this is not in itself enough. Integration may indeed
offer new incentives and foster new behaviour patterns – but only when
fundamental political blockages have been removed. Embarking on the
integration process presupposes that there is at least the readiness to recognise
these are blockages, and that they need to be tackled.
The Kosovo status process was meant to achieve “closure” on what has
often been called the “last remaining open question” on the post-
Yugoslav agenda. But it has not – yet – achieved that. This is not just
because Serbia, with Russia’s backing, has blocked it; but also because
deep divisions have emerged among EU and NATO member states over
the question of Kosovo independence. We thought we had consensus on
the Ahtisaari plan, but it turned out not. How can Serbian leaders be expected
to take the risk of developing a serious political strategy for
achieving “closure” on Kosovo, to dare mobilise that neglected but significant
proportion of Serbian public opinion that is ready to “move on”,
when they face not only high-octane nationalism at home, but also incoherent
and ambivalent messages from the EU and NATO member states?
Yet what is the realistic alternative to the Ahtisaari plan? Does it
help Serbia to keep the Kosovo question on the boil and indefinitely at
the top of its political agenda? Does it help the stabilisation of the region
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