Cutting or Tightening the Gordian Knot

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ion. It also aims at post-crisis capacity building of international organisations, state and non-state actors in order to assist post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. The communication of the European Commission on “Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective” of March 2008 indicates that 1bn Euro are earmarked for Kosovo during the period 2007-2010 for its political and economic development and the costs of the international presence. It also aims at visa liberalisation and for provision of scholarships to improve direct contacts among people. For this purpose, it gives support to mobility programmes, and the step-by-step integration of Western Balkan countries into programmes and agencies of the European Union. Activities to be funded include inter-cultural dialogue, media and youth programmes, which can be of direct relevance to efforts of confidence building and reconciliation. 5 In addition, a European Union Support to Civil Society Facility has been announced, which should support dialogue in the field of human rights, non-discrimination, social integration, local initiatives and capacity building, with a particular focus on media workers, teachers, young politicians, labour unions, etc. It can give support to networks and partnerships and is complementary to the “Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance” (IPA), which foresees an amount of 4bn Euro for the Western Balkan countries in the period of 2007-2011. The facility has been discussed at a Conference of Civil Society Organisations in April 2008 in Brussels. 6 Accordingly, the instruments of the European Union can play a major role in providing much needed support ranging from institution building to civil society and economic cooperation, which all could benefit a confidence building process. 5 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective, COM (2008) 127 final of 5.3.2008. 6 See Support to civil society – a new financial facility under the Instrument for Pre- Accession Assistance (IPA), Eumonitor of 5 March 2008, http://www.eumonitor. net/print.php?sid=95831. 163
Confidence Building as a Multi-stakeholder Process Post-conflict situations like the one in Kosovo are usually characterized by the presence of numerous actors with different agendas and assistance potential. International organisations and state institutions need to cooperate with non-governmental actors, both international as well as local ones. The challenge is to orientate the multi-stakeholder process towards common objectives and to use the full potential of the many actors on the ground also for measures of confidence-building, which needs to take place between the communities inside Kosovo, but also between Kosovo and Serbia. There are different roles to be played by the governmental institutions, by international agencies or by civil society in a number of sectors like education and vocational training, which is particularly relevant for employment. There need to be efforts of “societybuilding” by overcoming stereotypes and prejudices as well as xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes. Although minority and human rights have been top priorities for quite some time, the realities on the ground are far from satisfactory. For example, the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan of 2004, which has been adopted after the violence of March 2004 has given minority rights and human rights particular attention, but appears never to have been fully implemented, although the role of human rights and minority rights has always been recognized as crucial for the final status of Kosovo. 7 Civil society organizations have to play a crucial role for confidence building as does, for example, the activities of the Humanitarian Law Center. However, governmental support for the role of civil society is largely lacking as can be seen from a study undertaken by the Human Rights Centre of the University of Prishtina. 8 Accordingly, there is a need that governments do more actively involve and support civil soci- 7 See Wolfgang Benedek, The Final Status of Kosovo: the Role of Human Rights and Minority Rights, in: Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 80 (2005) 1, 215-233. 8 See Valon Murati, The Role of Civil Society in Good Governance in Kosova, in: Wolfgang Benedek (ed.), Civil Society and Good Governance in Societies in Transition, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights/NWV, Belgrade 2006, 77-114. 164
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Ernst M. Felberbauer Predrag Jureko
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Impressum: Study Group Information
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Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
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This book includes contributions fr
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Groups and co-operates with the Swi
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the region. Austria wants to make s
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Background Speech Judy Batt Regiona
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taken as “given”, i.e. psycholo
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to encourage Serbia to believe it w
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The Status Process and Its Implicat
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undermine elements within the Serbi
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the Western Balkans are a common an
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The Independence of Kosovo and the
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with Slovenia, experienced an evolu
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Although separated from their Kosov
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terial posts. Throughout the years
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the participation of the Macedonian
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Effectively, the legal changes base
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veys on the perception of the Kosov
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Regarding citizen’s feelings towa
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the final status of Kosovo was a mu
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Table 5. Should Macedonia recognize
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ings of the CRPM’s phone poll don
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called Gostivar flag riots in 1997
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nian groups that objected to a well
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ovo independence and further on the
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State Statistical Office of the Rep
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State of Southern Serbia The area k
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not always readily seen, this may b
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ity among the Albanian population.
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wever, apparently multi-ethnic comm
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firms) are seen in abundance, but r
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forceful than initially expected, f
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unlikely that the Albanian communit
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Conclusion As a region for which co
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The Secession of Kosovo - A Precede
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The findings would then allow for a
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This changed with the adoption of t
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While most of the provisions could
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ing up to the demands of granting
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ance, inter alia by settling Serbs
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Kosovo thus served as a catalyst fo
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As a rule, Albanians have been evic
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“facilitating of a political proc
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As a result, none of these argument
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deputies. Other Albanian Parties ex
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volved to the Entities. Key issues
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lack the key criteria for justifiab
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PART III: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATI
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Notwithstanding this clear-sketched
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opean Affairs. Four support staff,
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the institutions, a regular assessm
Page 113 and 114: tighter. Furthermore, the deploymen
Page 115 and 116: able to kill two birds with one sto
Page 118 and 119: Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
Page 120 and 121: pating under its own sovereign term
Page 122 and 123: companying offer of free visa issue
Page 124: which would mean the exclusion and
Page 127 and 128: Bondsteel (“Kosovo’s real capit
Page 129 and 130: The NATO Toolbox Critique of NATO d
Page 131 and 132: Allied Divisions Persistent disunit
Page 133 and 134: Meanwhile, Kosovo has been nearly i
Page 136 and 137: The Russian “Return” to the Wes
Page 138 and 139: štunica, and Tomislav Nikolić are
Page 140 and 141: strong enough to fight NATO troops
Page 142 and 143: Some Aspects of Russian Economic Ex
Page 144: people. 17 A sizeable share of it c
Page 148 and 149: From UNMIK to EULEX: An Outline of
Page 150 and 151: security for all. They have in fact
Page 152 and 153: sense this happened in Kosovo in Ma
Page 154 and 155: European Presence in Kosovo as an A
Page 156 and 157: Rifts Among Local Partners and Comp
Page 158 and 159: deal with. This proved to be very d
Page 160 and 161: International Support to Enhance Co
Page 162 and 163: in 1975 are human contacts, informa
Page 166 and 167: ety in its functions, in particular
Page 168 and 169: WUS has also assisted in founding a
Page 170 and 171: Conclusions Although many roads hav
Page 172 and 173: Untying the Gordian Knot in the Bal
Page 174 and 175: his diminutive physical stature, he
Page 176 and 177: simple recollection; it is a shared
Page 178 and 179: For our purposes here, the Battle o
Page 180 and 181: younger generation through its rela
Page 182 and 183: My God, what awaited us! To see a l
Page 184 and 185: Examples of conflict-as-symptoms ar
Page 186 and 187: grassroots levels. They have contac
Page 188 and 189: In the research literature where PD
Page 190 and 191: Grassroots Leadership Grassroots tr
Page 192 and 193: If a trauma victim makes it to leve
Page 194 and 195: Conclusion The essential point of d
Page 196 and 197: more to further enhance prospects f
Page 198 and 199: quires constant attention and engag
Page 200 and 201: ionists riled by another Belfast pr
Page 202 and 203: le%20of%20Kosovo%20--%20Britannica%
Page 204 and 205: Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse a
Page 206: PART V: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 205
Page 209 and 210: d. optimizing the influence of the
Page 211 and 212: support for the return of Serbs as
Page 213 and 214: association process. On the other h
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RHODES Matthew, College of Internat
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