Cutting or Tightening the Gordian Knot

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laying the ground for their subsequent implementation and oversight by the ICR. Change of Course – UNMIK’s role in Kosovo after 15 June 2008 Original plans which were driven by the Contact Group 18 were based on the Ahtisaari Plan and drawn upon the assumption that there would be a), a UN SC Resolution backing the plan and b) a subsequent gradual phase-out of UNMIK and transfer of specific competencies to the new international presences. Russia however started sliding away from supporting the Ahtisaari plan in early 2007 resulting in the lack of a new UN SC Resolution in June 2007 endorsing the CSP. The Troika negotiations were the last joint attempt by the Contact Group, including the Russian party, to reach an agreement. Subsequent political steps taken in late 2007 and early 2008 were driven without the consent of Russia, hence resulting in solely Quintet-driven actions. The Joint Actions for the establishment of the EUSR and the EULEX Mission were adopted by the Council of the European Union on 4 February 2008, i.e. prior to the orchestrated declaration of independence, so to ensure the support of all 27 EU members states. Given the lack of a new UN SC Resolution and the opposition of the Russian and Serbian delegation to back the Ahtisaari plan at UN level, it was clear that UNMIK would continue playing a role in Kosovo also after the entry into force of the Constitution on 15 June. Transition Period 1 – 17 February to 15 June 2008 The CSP establishes a 120 days transition period at the end of which, the EULEX Mission would deploy and replace UNMIK in the areas of rule of law. However, in the absence of a UN SC Resolution, the UN showed no signs to leave the battleground to the EU Missions while the timelines to deploy almost 2 000 international EULEX staff became increasingly 18 The Contact Group includes the Quintet member states and the Russian Federation. 111
tighter. Furthermore, the deployment of the EULEX personnel depended on the planned transfer of premises and equipment from UNMIK to the EULEX Mission, which for obvious reasons was not forthcoming. During spring 2008, EU-representatives held numerous high-level meetings with the Department of Peacekeeping of the UN (DPKO) to find ways forward and unlock the impasse, attempts that were opposed by regular demarches of the Russian delegation to the UN. A variety of scenarios for the deployment of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo were contemplated, including placing the rule of law mission under the 1244 umbrella and dividing up the territory between UNMIK and EULEX according to ethnic lines. The latter option was considered not least because of the strong opposition of the Serbian Government, and hence the Kosovo Serb community, against the deployment of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. With time passing and the forthcoming entry into force of the Constitution on 15 June, the UN Secretary General came increasingly under pressure to move forward taking into account the changed circumstances on the ground and the loss of internal legitimacy of his SRSG. The local authorities also made clear in several instances that they would not tolerate the SRSG’s authority deriving from the UN SC Resolution 1244 after 15 June, which they considered overruled by the new Constitution. The situation on the ground was de facto stalled and full of uncertainties, with UNMIK still in place but unwilling to hand over neither responsibilities nor any of its equipment, and hence, EULEX being unable to deploy. Only the legislative work – driven by the ICO – continued and kept the Assembly of Kosovo occupied while recognitions were slowly trickling in. The UN-EULEX Umbrella Arrangement On 12 June 2008, Ban Ki-Moon finally made the long-awaited step, sending a letter 19 to the Serbian President and to the President of Kosovo 19 Letter of BAN Ki-Moon to Mr. Boris Tadić of 12 June 2008 and Letter of Ban Ki- Moon to Mr. Fatmir Sejdiu of 12 June 2008. 112
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Ernst M. Felberbauer Predrag Jureko
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Impressum: Study Group Information
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Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
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This book includes contributions fr
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Groups and co-operates with the Swi
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the region. Austria wants to make s
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Background Speech Judy Batt Regiona
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taken as “given”, i.e. psycholo
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to encourage Serbia to believe it w
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The Status Process and Its Implicat
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undermine elements within the Serbi
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the Western Balkans are a common an
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The Independence of Kosovo and the
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with Slovenia, experienced an evolu
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Although separated from their Kosov
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terial posts. Throughout the years
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the participation of the Macedonian
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Effectively, the legal changes base
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veys on the perception of the Kosov
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Regarding citizen’s feelings towa
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the final status of Kosovo was a mu
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Table 5. Should Macedonia recognize
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ings of the CRPM’s phone poll don
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called Gostivar flag riots in 1997
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nian groups that objected to a well
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ovo independence and further on the
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State Statistical Office of the Rep
Page 61 and 62: State of Southern Serbia The area k
Page 63 and 64: not always readily seen, this may b
Page 65 and 66: ity among the Albanian population.
Page 67 and 68: wever, apparently multi-ethnic comm
Page 69 and 70: firms) are seen in abundance, but r
Page 71 and 72: forceful than initially expected, f
Page 73 and 74: unlikely that the Albanian communit
Page 75 and 76: Conclusion As a region for which co
Page 78 and 79: The Secession of Kosovo - A Precede
Page 80 and 81: The findings would then allow for a
Page 82 and 83: This changed with the adoption of t
Page 84 and 85: While most of the provisions could
Page 86 and 87: ing up to the demands of granting
Page 88 and 89: ance, inter alia by settling Serbs
Page 90 and 91: Kosovo thus served as a catalyst fo
Page 92 and 93: As a rule, Albanians have been evic
Page 94 and 95: “facilitating of a political proc
Page 96 and 97: As a result, none of these argument
Page 98 and 99: deputies. Other Albanian Parties ex
Page 100 and 101: volved to the Entities. Key issues
Page 102 and 103: lack the key criteria for justifiab
Page 104: PART III: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATI
Page 107 and 108: Notwithstanding this clear-sketched
Page 109 and 110: opean Affairs. Four support staff,
Page 111: the institutions, a regular assessm
Page 115 and 116: able to kill two birds with one sto
Page 118 and 119: Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
Page 120 and 121: pating under its own sovereign term
Page 122 and 123: companying offer of free visa issue
Page 124: which would mean the exclusion and
Page 127 and 128: Bondsteel (“Kosovo’s real capit
Page 129 and 130: The NATO Toolbox Critique of NATO d
Page 131 and 132: Allied Divisions Persistent disunit
Page 133 and 134: Meanwhile, Kosovo has been nearly i
Page 136 and 137: The Russian “Return” to the Wes
Page 138 and 139: štunica, and Tomislav Nikolić are
Page 140 and 141: strong enough to fight NATO troops
Page 142 and 143: Some Aspects of Russian Economic Ex
Page 144: people. 17 A sizeable share of it c
Page 148 and 149: From UNMIK to EULEX: An Outline of
Page 150 and 151: security for all. They have in fact
Page 152 and 153: sense this happened in Kosovo in Ma
Page 154 and 155: European Presence in Kosovo as an A
Page 156 and 157: Rifts Among Local Partners and Comp
Page 158 and 159: deal with. This proved to be very d
Page 160 and 161: International Support to Enhance Co
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in 1975 are human contacts, informa
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ion. It also aims at post-crisis ca
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ety in its functions, in particular
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WUS has also assisted in founding a
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Conclusions Although many roads hav
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Untying the Gordian Knot in the Bal
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his diminutive physical stature, he
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simple recollection; it is a shared
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For our purposes here, the Battle o
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younger generation through its rela
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My God, what awaited us! To see a l
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Examples of conflict-as-symptoms ar
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grassroots levels. They have contac
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In the research literature where PD
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Grassroots Leadership Grassroots tr
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If a trauma victim makes it to leve
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Conclusion The essential point of d
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more to further enhance prospects f
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quires constant attention and engag
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ionists riled by another Belfast pr
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le%20of%20Kosovo%20--%20Britannica%
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Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse a
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PART V: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 205
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d. optimizing the influence of the
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support for the return of Serbs as
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association process. On the other h
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RHODES Matthew, College of Internat
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