Cutting or Tightening the Gordian Knot

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štunica, and Tomislav Nikolić are “ours”. Nikolić, for example, recently said: “I admit that I like the Russians. This nation is very close to me”. 4 Kommersant, probably Russia’s best daily newspaper, shortly before the elections featured the headline “Russia may receive the majority in the Serbian parliament”, 5 meaning that parties with a “pro-Russian” orientation could prevail over forces, considered as “anti-Russian”. And this really occurred on election day, 11 May 2008: The Radicals got 29.1%, Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia, or DSS, 11.3 and the Socialists 7.9%. This gave them the control of 128 out of the 250 MPs. Nevertheless, many Russian politicians and media outlets had to try very hard to hide their disappointment, because Tadić’s coalition “For a European Serbia” won a relative majority with 38.7% and 102 seats. Asylum for Miloševićs Family Members in Russia and the “Anchorman Scandal” Milošević’s widow, Mirjana Marković, and their son Marko Milošević entered a Moscow police station in March 2005 and made a formal request for political asylum. The Russian Federal Migration Service admitted at the beginning of February 2008 that both have been granted asylum despite the fact that they were (and are) on Interpol’s wanted list. Serbia’s Justice Ministry said in a statement later this month that it has formally asked Russia to extradite Marković and her son. Belgrade previously issued international arrest warrants for the two, who are wanted for fraud in connection with an alleged cigarette-smuggling ring that operated during the 1990s. On 28 February 2008, Russian news agency Interfax quoted a spokesman for the Russian Migration Service as saying 4 Renate Flottau, „Dann wird es Krieg in Europa geben!“ (Interview). Spiegel Online, 23 May 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,553871,00.html(accessed 24 May 2008). 5 Mikhail Zygar, Serbia Tied with St. George’s Ribbon. Russia may receive the majority in the Serbian parliament. Kommersant, 12 May 2008, http://www.kommersant.com/p890573/Russian-Serbian_relations (accessed 20 May 2008). 137
that “we will not extradite them. They were granted refugee status in Russia”. 6 Konstantin Syomin, anchor of the “Vesti Plus” nightly news program of the “Rossiya” TV channel, commented at the occasions of clashes in Belgrade after the declaration of independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008, referring to the killing of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjić in 2003: “The people of Belgrade surely remember today other demonstrations when they went berserk to overthrow good old Slobodan Milošević. How the nation, stupefied by liberal promises, lamented the dead Western puppet Zoran Djindjić – a man who destroyed the legendary Serbian army and intelligence services, who sold the heroes of Serbian resistance to [the International Tribunal in] The Hague in exchange for abstract economic aid and who got for all that a well-deserved bullet”. 7 The Serbian Foreign Ministry demanded an apology, calling Syomin’s comments “offensive”, “absolutely unacceptable” and “justifying the murder of a democratically elected prime minister”. 8 – “Rossiya” is a de facto government-controlled channel, and its news content is strictly censured by the Kremlin. There is no doubt that Syomin only frankly stated what a formidable part of the Russian political elite thinks. However, the affair did not lead to any noticeable deterioration of Russian- Serbian relations: Obviously, both sides proceeded from the assumption that only “the West” would benefit from a persistent dispute between them, so they decided to brush this scandal under the carpet as soon as possible. Kosovo’s Independence and Serbian-Russian Relations Radical Party leader Nikolić demanded in December 2007 the setup of a Russian military base in Serbia. He continued that his country is not 6 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 12, No. 41, Part II, 29 February 2008. 7 Pavel Felgenhauer, Kremlin Continues to Blast the West Over Kosova. Eurasia Daily Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation), 27 February 2008. 8 Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije: Srbija protestovala zbog izjava na ruskoj televiziji, Beograd, 23. februara 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Srpski/ Press frame16.htm (accessed 24 May 2008) 138
Page 1 and 2:
Ernst M. Felberbauer Predrag Jureko
Page 3 and 4:
Impressum: Study Group Information
Page 5 and 6:
Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
Page 7 and 8:
This book includes contributions fr
Page 9 and 10:
Groups and co-operates with the Swi
Page 11 and 12:
the region. Austria wants to make s
Page 14 and 15:
Background Speech Judy Batt Regiona
Page 16 and 17:
taken as “given”, i.e. psycholo
Page 18:
to encourage Serbia to believe it w
Page 22 and 23:
The Status Process and Its Implicat
Page 24 and 25:
undermine elements within the Serbi
Page 26:
the Western Balkans are a common an
Page 30 and 31:
The Independence of Kosovo and the
Page 32 and 33:
with Slovenia, experienced an evolu
Page 34 and 35:
Although separated from their Kosov
Page 36 and 37:
terial posts. Throughout the years
Page 38 and 39:
the participation of the Macedonian
Page 40 and 41:
Effectively, the legal changes base
Page 42 and 43:
veys on the perception of the Kosov
Page 44 and 45:
Regarding citizen’s feelings towa
Page 46 and 47:
the final status of Kosovo was a mu
Page 48 and 49:
Table 5. Should Macedonia recognize
Page 50 and 51:
ings of the CRPM’s phone poll don
Page 52 and 53:
called Gostivar flag riots in 1997
Page 54 and 55:
nian groups that objected to a well
Page 56 and 57:
ovo independence and further on the
Page 58:
State Statistical Office of the Rep
Page 61 and 62:
State of Southern Serbia The area k
Page 63 and 64:
not always readily seen, this may b
Page 65 and 66:
ity among the Albanian population.
Page 67 and 68:
wever, apparently multi-ethnic comm
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firms) are seen in abundance, but r
Page 71 and 72:
forceful than initially expected, f
Page 73 and 74:
unlikely that the Albanian communit
Page 75 and 76:
Conclusion As a region for which co
Page 78 and 79:
The Secession of Kosovo - A Precede
Page 80 and 81:
The findings would then allow for a
Page 82 and 83:
This changed with the adoption of t
Page 84 and 85:
While most of the provisions could
Page 86 and 87:
ing up to the demands of granting
Page 88 and 89: ance, inter alia by settling Serbs
Page 90 and 91: Kosovo thus served as a catalyst fo
Page 92 and 93: As a rule, Albanians have been evic
Page 94 and 95: “facilitating of a political proc
Page 96 and 97: As a result, none of these argument
Page 98 and 99: deputies. Other Albanian Parties ex
Page 100 and 101: volved to the Entities. Key issues
Page 102 and 103: lack the key criteria for justifiab
Page 104: PART III: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATI
Page 107 and 108: Notwithstanding this clear-sketched
Page 109 and 110: opean Affairs. Four support staff,
Page 111 and 112: the institutions, a regular assessm
Page 113 and 114: tighter. Furthermore, the deploymen
Page 115 and 116: able to kill two birds with one sto
Page 118 and 119: Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
Page 120 and 121: pating under its own sovereign term
Page 122 and 123: companying offer of free visa issue
Page 124: which would mean the exclusion and
Page 127 and 128: Bondsteel (“Kosovo’s real capit
Page 129 and 130: The NATO Toolbox Critique of NATO d
Page 131 and 132: Allied Divisions Persistent disunit
Page 133 and 134: Meanwhile, Kosovo has been nearly i
Page 136 and 137: The Russian “Return” to the Wes
Page 140 and 141: strong enough to fight NATO troops
Page 142 and 143: Some Aspects of Russian Economic Ex
Page 144: people. 17 A sizeable share of it c
Page 148 and 149: From UNMIK to EULEX: An Outline of
Page 150 and 151: security for all. They have in fact
Page 152 and 153: sense this happened in Kosovo in Ma
Page 154 and 155: European Presence in Kosovo as an A
Page 156 and 157: Rifts Among Local Partners and Comp
Page 158 and 159: deal with. This proved to be very d
Page 160 and 161: International Support to Enhance Co
Page 162 and 163: in 1975 are human contacts, informa
Page 164 and 165: ion. It also aims at post-crisis ca
Page 166 and 167: ety in its functions, in particular
Page 168 and 169: WUS has also assisted in founding a
Page 170 and 171: Conclusions Although many roads hav
Page 172 and 173: Untying the Gordian Knot in the Bal
Page 174 and 175: his diminutive physical stature, he
Page 176 and 177: simple recollection; it is a shared
Page 178 and 179: For our purposes here, the Battle o
Page 180 and 181: younger generation through its rela
Page 182 and 183: My God, what awaited us! To see a l
Page 184 and 185: Examples of conflict-as-symptoms ar
Page 186 and 187: grassroots levels. They have contac
Page 188 and 189:
In the research literature where PD
Page 190 and 191:
Grassroots Leadership Grassroots tr
Page 192 and 193:
If a trauma victim makes it to leve
Page 194 and 195:
Conclusion The essential point of d
Page 196 and 197:
more to further enhance prospects f
Page 198 and 199:
quires constant attention and engag
Page 200 and 201:
ionists riled by another Belfast pr
Page 202 and 203:
le%20of%20Kosovo%20--%20Britannica%
Page 204 and 205:
Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse a
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PART V: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 205
Page 209 and 210:
d. optimizing the influence of the
Page 211 and 212:
support for the return of Serbs as
Page 213 and 214:
association process. On the other h
Page 215 and 216:
RHODES Matthew, College of Internat
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