Cutting or Tightening the Gordian Knot

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ing up to the demands of granting “internal self-determination”, by exerting discriminatory and repressive policies against peoples on their territory. State practice does confirm the development in the legal sphere. Shortly after the adoption of the Friendly Relations Declaration the people in the then East Pakistan in 1971 revolted against Pakistani rule. 20 While the people in East Pakistan were predominantly Bengalis, they had to live under the rule of (predominantly Urdu-speaking) West-Pakistanis. The revolt led into full-fledged civil war which ended, after Indian intervention, with the successful secession of East Pakistan in 1972 which declared itself independent under the name Bangladesh. The new state was quickly recognized by the majority of other states. 21 This does not mean that states would have done so in explicit and deliberate reference to the previously adopted Friendly Relations Declaration where the legal framework for justified secession had developed. The coincidence in time can be, however, seen as an indicator for a shift in paradigm. It expressed itself on the one hand in adopting a resolution which now sets rules and guidelines for exceptionally justified secession, and on the other hand in the political practice in recognizing a secession which had followed the criteria established a year before. Further cases since then have concerned the secession of Eritrea 22 and of East-Timor, 23 in both cases based on previous repression by a state power of different ethnicity. 20 On the secession of Bangladesh see Library of Congress, Bangladesh: http:// lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bd0139) through http:// lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bd0141). 21 See R. A. Falk, op. cit., p. 56. 22 After a decades-long guerilla war and the fall of the Marxist Mengistu government in Ethiopia, a procedure for the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia was agreed in 1991, and a referendum held in April 1993 which resulted in a overwhelming majority for Eritrea’s independence. On May 28, 1993, the United Nations formally admitted Eritrea to its membership. On Eritrea’s war of independence see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eritrean_War_of_Independence; 23 On East Timor see P.V. Nanda, ibid., pp. 324. 85
We may thus conclude that the simplistic equation “self-determination means secession” is utterly wrong. Neither legal norms nor state practice would support such statement. It is, on the other hand, also true that international law does no longer exclude secession, either. It is justifiable under rather limited but well-defined circumstances, as a last resort or “emergency exit” from unrepresentative and repressive regimes. 24 In a nutshell we may say the guideline reads “no repression – no secession”, with its reverse meaning – “secession is the consequence of repression”. The situation in Kosovo 25 Kosovo had been for centuries been part of the Ottoman Empire and occupied by Serbia after the Balkan wars 1912/1913 under claims of an “historical right” 26 to this territory which had been seen as “the cradle of Serbian identity” – despite the fact that even at that time it was predominantly inhabited by Albanians rather than Serbs. 27 During the “first Yugoslavia”, Kosovo had no special status but was regarded a district in Southern Serbia. To counterbalance the Albanian majority, frequent attempts were undertaken to redress the ethnic bal- 24 “[T]here could be circumstances which might lead to the acceptance of unilateral secession. One such exception … is in the colonial context. The second exception is undemocratic, authoritarian regimes, which are not representative, thus not providing the opportunity for the “people” to participate effectively in the political and economic life of the State, especially when there is a pattern of flagrant violations of human rights”: P.V. Nanda, ibid., pp. 325. 25 On the historical background see Miranda Vickers; Between Serb and Albanian, A History of Kosovo; Columbia University Press; New York, 1998. 26 Branislav Krstić, Kosovo izmedu istorijskog i etničkog prava (Kosovo between historical and ethnic right(s); Kuča vid, Belgrade, 1994; the book deals primarily with population development. That author’s father had written a book about the Serbian colonization of Kosovo (Djordje Krstić, Kolonizacija u Južnoj Srbiji (Colonization in southern Serbia), Sarajevo, 1928; referred to in the introduction, p. 9. 27 The first reliable population census of 1903 counts 111 350 orthodox, 69 250 muslim and 6 600 catholic Serbs and 230 000 Albanians, mostly (215 050) Muslim; quote from The Development of the Situation in the Kosovo; background working paper, CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, fall 1993. 86
Page 1 and 2:
Ernst M. Felberbauer Predrag Jureko
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Impressum: Study Group Information
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Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
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This book includes contributions fr
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Groups and co-operates with the Swi
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the region. Austria wants to make s
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Background Speech Judy Batt Regiona
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taken as “given”, i.e. psycholo
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to encourage Serbia to believe it w
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The Status Process and Its Implicat
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undermine elements within the Serbi
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the Western Balkans are a common an
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The Independence of Kosovo and the
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with Slovenia, experienced an evolu
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Although separated from their Kosov
Page 36 and 37: terial posts. Throughout the years
Page 38 and 39: the participation of the Macedonian
Page 40 and 41: Effectively, the legal changes base
Page 42 and 43: veys on the perception of the Kosov
Page 44 and 45: Regarding citizen’s feelings towa
Page 46 and 47: the final status of Kosovo was a mu
Page 48 and 49: Table 5. Should Macedonia recognize
Page 50 and 51: ings of the CRPM’s phone poll don
Page 52 and 53: called Gostivar flag riots in 1997
Page 54 and 55: nian groups that objected to a well
Page 56 and 57: ovo independence and further on the
Page 58: State Statistical Office of the Rep
Page 61 and 62: State of Southern Serbia The area k
Page 63 and 64: not always readily seen, this may b
Page 65 and 66: ity among the Albanian population.
Page 67 and 68: wever, apparently multi-ethnic comm
Page 69 and 70: firms) are seen in abundance, but r
Page 71 and 72: forceful than initially expected, f
Page 73 and 74: unlikely that the Albanian communit
Page 75 and 76: Conclusion As a region for which co
Page 78 and 79: The Secession of Kosovo - A Precede
Page 80 and 81: The findings would then allow for a
Page 82 and 83: This changed with the adoption of t
Page 84 and 85: While most of the provisions could
Page 88 and 89: ance, inter alia by settling Serbs
Page 90 and 91: Kosovo thus served as a catalyst fo
Page 92 and 93: As a rule, Albanians have been evic
Page 94 and 95: “facilitating of a political proc
Page 96 and 97: As a result, none of these argument
Page 98 and 99: deputies. Other Albanian Parties ex
Page 100 and 101: volved to the Entities. Key issues
Page 102 and 103: lack the key criteria for justifiab
Page 104: PART III: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATI
Page 107 and 108: Notwithstanding this clear-sketched
Page 109 and 110: opean Affairs. Four support staff,
Page 111 and 112: the institutions, a regular assessm
Page 113 and 114: tighter. Furthermore, the deploymen
Page 115 and 116: able to kill two birds with one sto
Page 118 and 119: Kosovo’s Independence: The Conseq
Page 120 and 121: pating under its own sovereign term
Page 122 and 123: companying offer of free visa issue
Page 124: which would mean the exclusion and
Page 127 and 128: Bondsteel (“Kosovo’s real capit
Page 129 and 130: The NATO Toolbox Critique of NATO d
Page 131 and 132: Allied Divisions Persistent disunit
Page 133 and 134: Meanwhile, Kosovo has been nearly i
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The Russian “Return” to the Wes
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štunica, and Tomislav Nikolić are
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strong enough to fight NATO troops
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Some Aspects of Russian Economic Ex
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people. 17 A sizeable share of it c
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From UNMIK to EULEX: An Outline of
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security for all. They have in fact
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sense this happened in Kosovo in Ma
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European Presence in Kosovo as an A
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Rifts Among Local Partners and Comp
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deal with. This proved to be very d
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International Support to Enhance Co
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in 1975 are human contacts, informa
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ion. It also aims at post-crisis ca
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ety in its functions, in particular
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WUS has also assisted in founding a
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Conclusions Although many roads hav
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Untying the Gordian Knot in the Bal
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his diminutive physical stature, he
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simple recollection; it is a shared
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For our purposes here, the Battle o
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younger generation through its rela
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My God, what awaited us! To see a l
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Examples of conflict-as-symptoms ar
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grassroots levels. They have contac
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In the research literature where PD
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Grassroots Leadership Grassroots tr
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If a trauma victim makes it to leve
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Conclusion The essential point of d
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more to further enhance prospects f
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quires constant attention and engag
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ionists riled by another Belfast pr
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le%20of%20Kosovo%20--%20Britannica%
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Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse a
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PART V: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 205
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d. optimizing the influence of the
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support for the return of Serbs as
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association process. On the other h
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RHODES Matthew, College of Internat
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