On the other hand, there is evidence that, apart from other benefits to members such <strong>as</strong> therotation of sav<strong>in</strong>gs for small-scale and emergency borrow<strong>in</strong>gs, SHG bank l<strong>in</strong>kage reduces thetransaction cost of both banks and borrowers for loans from the formal sector.There is no disput<strong>in</strong>g the benefits of SHG-bank l<strong>in</strong>kage <strong>in</strong> enabl<strong>in</strong>g access to loan funds ofgroup members who were not be<strong>in</strong>g served by the bank<strong>in</strong>g system 46 . However, the limitsimposed the group’s sav<strong>in</strong>gs on SHG borrow<strong>in</strong>gs means that, for comparatively new SHGsonly some of the SHG members can expect to receive a modest loan <strong>in</strong> the range of Rs. 3000to 5000. Thus the majority of group members are either net savers or pure savers 47 . Despitethe critical importance of sav<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> the SHG model, it is the sav<strong>in</strong>gs service that is le<strong>as</strong>tdeveloped. There are <strong>in</strong>variably no sav<strong>in</strong>gs products other than the compulsory weekly/biweekly/monthlycontribution and open access to sav<strong>in</strong>gs is not available. Profits of SHGoperations are only shared <strong>in</strong> some organisations 48 . Exit rules are unclear but usually result <strong>in</strong>loss of claims over share of separat<strong>in</strong>g members <strong>in</strong> accumulated profits of the SHG.<strong>F<strong>in</strong>ancial</strong> and organisational susta<strong>in</strong>ability: Given their good repayment performance, theviability or susta<strong>in</strong>ability of SHGs <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial terms is currently not an issue. SHG <strong>in</strong>comethrough <strong>in</strong>terest charges and f<strong>in</strong>es, particularly for absence and late attendance of meet<strong>in</strong>gs,though small is matched by an extremely low-cost of operations limited to ma<strong>in</strong>tenance ofbooks of accounts and payment of an honorarium to the local accountant. Typically,borrow<strong>in</strong>gs are a 12% per annum under the bank l<strong>in</strong>kage scheme and on lend<strong>in</strong>g to membersat 2% per month flat rate. 49 Indeed, well-function<strong>in</strong>g SHGs are able to use part of their profitsfor buy<strong>in</strong>g services of accountants, teachers, paravets, etc. from their own funds for othersocial and economic services. PRADAN (but not HCSSC), encourage SHGs to bear all costsof operations right from the outset. Separate contributions are also raised for other one-offactivities.The organisational susta<strong>in</strong>ability of SHGs is more open to question. Little research h<strong>as</strong> beendone on the <strong>in</strong>ternal dynamics of SHGs, the access of relatively poor members to loans andthe relative stake of, and costs borne and benefits realised by, different categories ofmembers, e.g., the net borrowers, net savers and pure savers identified earlier. Experiencesuggests that even after a period of 3 to 5 years (the time usually taken for SHGs to achievethe experience and maturity required to function <strong>as</strong> an <strong>in</strong>dependent f<strong>in</strong>ancial entity), SHGsare not equipped to engage directly with banks and other agencies 50 .46 This needs to be qualified s<strong>in</strong>ce the much-maligned IRD programme of the 1980s and 1990s, despite its manyshortcom<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g improper target<strong>in</strong>g, did <strong>in</strong> fact reach substantial sections of the poor. Several membersof most SHGs are former IRD beneficiaries. That a fair proportion of SHG members may be non-poor is anothermatter.47 Though given their sav<strong>in</strong>g performance, the access of members of SHGs of the study NGOs is higher, thisphenomenon can be said to be true of them <strong>as</strong> well.48 Though PRADAN and HCSSC SHGs distribute 100% and 50% respectively of profits out of loan fund andsav<strong>in</strong>gs fund operations to members on the b<strong>as</strong>is of their sav<strong>in</strong>gs lodged with the SHG.49 SHGs usually charge a higher rate (3-5% flat per month) on the ma<strong>in</strong>ly consumption and emergency loansprovided by them from their own funds.50 A senior manager of PRADAN reports a vulnerable stage of “group fatigue”, two years or so after theformation of an SHG, when the <strong>in</strong>itial enthusi<strong>as</strong>m of group function<strong>in</strong>g wears off and a period of renewedmotivation is necessary. The build<strong>in</strong>g of the group cooperation and solidarity <strong>in</strong> non-f<strong>in</strong>ancial activities, <strong>in</strong>apposition to the rout<strong>in</strong>e bank<strong>in</strong>g activity, can be seen <strong>as</strong> a must to re<strong>in</strong>force the group cohesion. Thus whilesav<strong>in</strong>gs and credit may be used <strong>as</strong> an entry po<strong>in</strong>t activity, it may not be sufficient to ensure susta<strong>in</strong>able longtermfunction<strong>in</strong>g of the SHG.46
Even where SHGs are not constituted <strong>in</strong>to higher-level f<strong>in</strong>ancial organisations, promot<strong>in</strong>gNGOs have felt the need to form cluster level <strong>as</strong>sociations, for cross learn<strong>in</strong>g and for NGOmonitor<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g later stages of SHG development. HCSSC, PRADAN and MYRADA haveencouraged SHGs to form <strong>in</strong>to cluster bodies of 10-20 groups belong<strong>in</strong>g to contiguousvillages. In the c<strong>as</strong>e of other agencies which have <strong>help</strong>ed to form member or communityb<strong>as</strong>ed organisations for f<strong>in</strong>ancial services at the development block level, <strong>in</strong>termediate nonf<strong>in</strong>ancialorganizations at village or cluster level have been promoted with similar objectives.A related learn<strong>in</strong>g is that scattered SHG development is likely to be counterproductive andshort-lived s<strong>in</strong>ce each SHG needs to receive sustenance from wider <strong>as</strong>sociates even when notbrought together <strong>in</strong>to a higher order f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>termediary. This is especially so when theclose contact and support of the promot<strong>in</strong>g NGO is to be withdrawn.Quality of groups: The susta<strong>in</strong>ability of SHGs is clearly related to the “quality” of groupspromoted. A common characteristic of lead<strong>in</strong>g SHG promoters is the <strong>in</strong>tensive tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g andcapacity build<strong>in</strong>g undertaken at group level at various stages, which <strong>in</strong> turn contributes tohigher costs of promotion. By now NGOs and banks have generally devised <strong>as</strong>sessmentcriteria for appraisal and periodic evaluations of group performance and susta<strong>in</strong>ability 51 .Assessment <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>in</strong>clude frequency and attendance of meet<strong>in</strong>gs, volume of sav<strong>in</strong>gs,rotation of own sav<strong>in</strong>gs, development of f<strong>in</strong>ancial and skills, quality of leadership, etc. It iscommon to f<strong>in</strong>d, though only at field office level, data on rat<strong>in</strong>gs of groups <strong>in</strong>to good,average and poor or similar categories. Broadly speak<strong>in</strong>g, even best practice NGOs generallyhave only about 50% of groups placed <strong>in</strong> the highest category, with 30-40% of SHGs need<strong>in</strong>gadditional support and 10-20% fail<strong>in</strong>g to take off. This accounts for the vary<strong>in</strong>g duration ofexternal <strong>in</strong>puts necessary <strong>in</strong> SHG promotion and development and makes the c<strong>as</strong>e forcont<strong>in</strong>ued long-term NGO presence <strong>in</strong> the area. The quality of SHGs promoted h<strong>as</strong> become <strong>as</strong>erious issue <strong>in</strong> the c<strong>as</strong>e of SHGs promoted under the DWCRA, and other state <strong>in</strong>itiatives,especially <strong>in</strong> Andhra Pradesh where limited and improper facilitation h<strong>as</strong> led to a largeproportion of SHGs becom<strong>in</strong>g defunct. The revival of these SHGs is part of the activities ofthe CASHE project, APMAS and the ASP.Long-term prospects: The longer-term prospect for SHGs l<strong>in</strong>ked to banks is unclear. Thelead<strong>in</strong>g NGOs covered <strong>in</strong> the study have ph<strong>as</strong>ed out from some are<strong>as</strong> after hav<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>ked theSHGs formed to banks. 52 There is, however, une<strong>as</strong>e about their ability to cont<strong>in</strong>ue to accessto funds from the bank<strong>in</strong>g system and to move along a growth path out of poverty. WithNGO withdrawal the monitor<strong>in</strong>g of the SHGs also ce<strong>as</strong>es and there is little <strong>in</strong>formation ontheir activities. However, s<strong>in</strong>ce the NGO generally cont<strong>in</strong>ues to work <strong>in</strong> the area it is <strong>in</strong> aposition to undertake troubleshoot<strong>in</strong>g on their behalf.The logical path for members of SHGs l<strong>in</strong>ked to banks should be to graduate to (larger)<strong>in</strong>dividual loans under the bank’s normal lend<strong>in</strong>g programme. This does not appear to beemerg<strong>in</strong>g, both on account of the absence of a vision at NGO and bank level <strong>as</strong> well <strong>as</strong>51 NABARD h<strong>as</strong> developed rat<strong>in</strong>g criteria for appraisal of groups for bank l<strong>in</strong>kage, <strong>as</strong> have various banks. Aparticularly elaborate questionnaire on a 700 po<strong>in</strong>t score to <strong>as</strong>sess the quality and creditworth<strong>in</strong>ess of a grouph<strong>as</strong> been developed by BASIX. MYRADA uses very detailed criteria for evaluation of group performance,guidel<strong>in</strong>es for f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g self-<strong>help</strong> groups and guidel<strong>in</strong>es for an evaluation to decide if NGO <strong>in</strong>volvement can beph<strong>as</strong>ed out.52 This is not a widespread phenomenon. NGOs promot<strong>in</strong>g SHGs and village sangh<strong>as</strong> under long-term donorpartnerships for runn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tegrated programmes have often resisted ph<strong>as</strong><strong>in</strong>g out of their area of operations evenafter 10 to 15 years.47
- Page 4 and 5:
List of AcronymsAIAMEDAIMSAPMASASAA
- Page 6 and 7: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1. Introduction1.1
- Page 8 and 9: self-management by members and scal
- Page 10 and 11: 6.4 On the other hand field reports
- Page 12 and 13: sustainable self-help groups. An in
- Page 14 and 15: 2. DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-HELP GROUPS
- Page 16 and 17: average loan per SHG was Rs. 18,227
- Page 18 and 19: • training and sensitising bank o
- Page 20 and 21: organizational structure and the na
- Page 22 and 23: Table 2.1 (contd.)S.No.ParticularsN
- Page 24 and 25: the SHG from banks starts from pari
- Page 26 and 27: • In either situation SHGs can co
- Page 28 and 29: 3.2.3 SHG Federations Linked to MF
- Page 32 and 33: 3.4 ConclusionThis section served t
- Page 34 and 35: MYRADA,Karnatakaa.o.OUTREACH,Karnat
- Page 36 and 37: Name ofNGO/StateDHANFoundation,Tami
- Page 38 and 39: However, for a comparative analysis
- Page 40 and 41: linkages with credit and savings 34
- Page 42 and 43: out of 5,153 SHGs covered under the
- Page 44 and 45: eceived revolving fund grants, cost
- Page 46 and 47: the high level of educated unemploy
- Page 48 and 49: CARE-CASHE Project(A.P.)(implemente
- Page 50 and 51: Holy CrossSocial ServiceCentre(HCSS
- Page 52 and 53: Agency/Programme5. Rashtriya Mahila
- Page 54 and 55: microfinance intermediary 41 . Unde
- Page 58 and 59: infrastructural and other constrain
- Page 60 and 61: would not be possible while working
- Page 62 and 63: through the SHG as a basis to sourc
- Page 64 and 65: the programme is particularly probl
- Page 66 and 67: It is possible to query the methodo
- Page 68 and 69: world. Other partners from India ar
- Page 70 and 71: RECOMMENDATIONSIt is not clear what
- Page 72 and 73: REFERENCESAIAMED (2000), Good Pract
- Page 75: Mahajan, Vijay and G. Nagasri (1999
- Page 79 and 80: Appendix 2: Types of SHGsTypes of S
- Page 81 and 82: Appendix 3 (contd.)OrganisationSIDB
- Page 83 and 84: 4. Trade based Group model: The est
- Page 85 and 86: Appendix 5S.No.1. JOTHI 92,077.00
- Page 87: Appendix 6: Stages of Evolution of