the past decade, an increasing proportion of extremeweather events has been occurring in developednations (Europe, Japan <strong>and</strong> the US) (see chart onpage 6).The first impact scenario, or CCF-I, portrays a worldwith an increased correlation <strong>and</strong> geographicalsimultaneity of extreme events, generating anoverwhelming strain for some stakeholders. CCF-Ienvisions a growing frequency <strong>and</strong> intensity ofweather extremes accompanied by disease outbreaks<strong>and</strong> infestations that harm humans, wildlife, forests,crops <strong>and</strong> coastal marine systems. The events <strong>and</strong> theiraftermaths would strain coping capacities in developing<strong>and</strong> developed nations <strong>and</strong> threaten resources <strong>and</strong>industries, such as timber, tourism, travel <strong>and</strong> theenergy sector. The ripples from the damage to theenergy sector would be felt throughout the economy.In CCF-I, an accelerated water cycle <strong>and</strong> retreat ofmost glaciers undermine water supplies in someregions <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong> integrity in others. Melting of permafrost(permanently frozen l<strong>and</strong>) in the Arctic becomes morepronounced, threatening native peoples <strong>and</strong> northernecosystems. And gradually rising seas, compoundedby more destructive storms cascading over deterioratingbarrier reefs, threaten all low-lying regions.Taken in aggregate, these <strong>and</strong> other effects of awarming <strong>and</strong> more variable climate could threateneconomies worldwide. In CCF-I, some parts of thedeveloped world may be capable of responding tothe disruptions, but the events would be particularlypunishing for developing countries. For the world over,historical weather patterns would diminish in value asguides to forecasting the future.The second impact scenario, CCF-II, envisions aworld in which the warming <strong>and</strong> enhanced variabilityproduce surprisingly destructive consequences. Itexplores a future rife with the potential for sudden,wide-scale <strong>health</strong>, environmental <strong>and</strong> <strong>economic</strong>impacts as climate <strong>change</strong> pushes ecosystems pasttipping points. As such, it is a future inherently morechaotic <strong>and</strong> unpredictable than CCF-I.Some of the impacts envisioned by the second scenarioare very severe <strong>and</strong> would involve catastrophic,widespread damages, with a world economy besetby increased costs <strong>and</strong> chronic, unmanageable risks.<strong>Climate</strong>-related disruptions would no longer becontained or confined.Threshold-crossing events in both terrestrial <strong>and</strong> marinesystems would severely compromise resources <strong>and</strong><strong>ecological</strong> functions, with multiple consequences forthe species that depend upon them. For example:• Repeated heat waves on the order of the 2003 <strong>and</strong>2005 summers could severely harm populations, killlivestock, wilt crops, melt glaciers <strong>and</strong> spreadwildfires.• The probability of such extreme heat has alreadyincreased between two <strong>and</strong> four times over the pastcentury <strong>and</strong>, based on an IPCC climate scenario,more than half the years by the 2040s will havesummers warmer than that of 2003.• Chronic water shortages would become moreprevalent, especially in semi-arid regions, such asthe US West.• With current usage levels, more environmentallydisplaced persons <strong>and</strong> a changing water cycle, thenumber of people suffering water stress <strong>and</strong> scarcitytoday will triple in two decades.VULNERABILITIES INTHE ENERGY SECTORImage: Photodisc• Heat waves generate blackouts.• Sequential storms disrupt offshore oil rigs, pipelines,refineries <strong>and</strong> distribution systems.• Diminished river flows reduce hydroelectric capacity<strong>and</strong> impede barge transport.• Melting tundra undermines pipelines <strong>and</strong> powertransmission lines.• Warmed inl<strong>and</strong> waters shut down power plantcooling systems.• Lightning claims rise with warming.Each stage in the life cycle of oil, includingexploration, extraction, transport, refining <strong>and</strong>combustion, carries hazards for human <strong>health</strong> <strong>and</strong> theenvironment. More intense storms, thawing permafrost<strong>and</strong> dried riverbeds, make every stage moreprecarious.7 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARYOther non-linear impact scenarios include:• Widespread diebacks of temperate <strong>and</strong> northernforests from drought <strong>and</strong> pests.• Coral reefs, already multiply stressed, collapse fromthe effects of warming <strong>and</strong> diseases.• Large spikes occur in property damages from a riseof major rivers. (A 10% increase in flood peakwould produce 100 times the damage of previousfloods, as waters breach dams <strong>and</strong> levees.)• Severe storms <strong>and</strong> extreme events occurringsequentially <strong>and</strong> concurrently across the globeoverwhelm the adaptive capacities of evendeveloped nations; large areas <strong>and</strong> sectors becomeuninsurable; major investments collapse; <strong>and</strong>markets crash.CCF-II would involve blows to theworld economy sufficiently severeto cripple the resilience that enablesaffluent countries to respond tocatastrophes. In effect, parts ofdeveloped countries would experiencedeveloping nation conditions for prolongedperiods as a result of naturalcatastrophes <strong>and</strong> increasing vulnerabilitydue to the abbreviated return timesof extreme events.Still, CCF-II is not a worst-case scenario.A worst-case scenario would include large-scale, nonlineardisruptions in the climate system itself —slippage of ice sheets from Antarctica or Greenl<strong>and</strong>,raising sea levels inches to feet; accelerated thawingof permafrost, with release of large quantities ofmethane; <strong>and</strong> shifts in ocean thermohaline circulation(the stabilizing ocean “conveyor belt”).Finally, there are scenarios of climate stabilization.Restabilizing the climate will depend on the globalscaleimplementation of measures to reducegreenhouse gas emissions. Aggressively embarking onthe path of non-fossil fuel energy systems will takeplanning <strong>and</strong> substantive financial incentives — notmerely a h<strong>and</strong>ful of temporizing, corrective measures.This assessment examines signs <strong>and</strong> symptomssuggesting growing climate instability <strong>and</strong> exploressome of the exp<strong>and</strong>ing opportunities presented by thishistoric challenge.APPLYING THE SCENARIOSIn choosing how to apply the two impact scenarios,we have focused on case studies of specific <strong>health</strong><strong>and</strong> <strong>ecological</strong> consequences that extend beyond themore widely studied issue of property damagesstemming from warming <strong>and</strong> natural catastrophes. Ineach case study, we identify current trends underway<strong>and</strong> envision the future consequences for economies,social stability <strong>and</strong> public <strong>health</strong>.Infectious diseases have resurged in humans <strong>and</strong> inmany other species in the past three decades. Manyfactors, including l<strong>and</strong>-use <strong>change</strong>s <strong>and</strong> growingpoverty, have contributed to the increase. Ourexamination of malaria, West Nile virus <strong>and</strong> Lymedisease explores the role of warming <strong>and</strong> weatherextremes in exp<strong>and</strong>ing the range <strong>and</strong> intensity of thesediseases <strong>and</strong> both linear <strong>and</strong> non-linear projections forhumans <strong>and</strong> wildlife.The rising rate of asthma (two to threefold increase inthe past two decades; fourfold in the US) receivesspecial attention, as air quality is affected by manyaspects of a changing climate (wildfires, transporteddust <strong>and</strong> heat waves), <strong>and</strong> by the inexorable rise ofatmospheric CO 2in <strong>and</strong> of itself, which boostsragweed pollen <strong>and</strong> some soil molds.We also examine the public <strong>health</strong> consequences ofnatural catastrophes themselves, including heat waves<strong>and</strong> floods. An integrated approach exploring linkagesis particularly useful in these instances, since thestovepipe perspective tends to play down the very real<strong>health</strong> consequences <strong>and</strong> the manifold social <strong>and</strong><strong>economic</strong> ripples stemming from catastrophic events.Another broad approach of the CCF scenarios is tostudy climate <strong>change</strong> impacts on <strong>ecological</strong> systems,both managed <strong>and</strong> natural. We examine projectionsfor agricultural productivity that, to date, largely omitthe potentially devastating effects of more weatherextremes <strong>and</strong> the spread of pests <strong>and</strong> pathogens.Crop losses from pests, pathogens <strong>and</strong> weeds couldrise from the current 42% to 50% within the comingdecade.
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- Page 4 and 5: Table of ContentsIntroductionPart I
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a better understanding of subpopula
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60 | EXTREME WEATHER EVENTSFLOODSFO
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MOSQUITO- AND SOIL-BORNE DISEASESEC
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Table 2.2 Direct and Indirect Healt
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HEALTH AND ECOLOGICALIMPLICATIONSOu
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68 | NATURAL AND MANAGED SYSTEMSCAS
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Figure 2.27 Soybean Sudden Death Sy
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HARMFUL ALGALBLOOMSFigure 2.32 Red
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CASE STUDIES 84 | NATURAL AND MANAG
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CASE STUDIES 90 | NATURAL AND MANAG
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“Climate change is one of the wor
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94 | FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS• Incr
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Extreme weather events are a partic
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98 | FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONSTable 3.
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100 | FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONSdemand
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102 | FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONSClimate
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These include:Solar Photovoltaic Pa
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Finally, new technologies need to b
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110 | FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONSBRETTON
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112 | APPENDICESAppendix A. Summary
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Table B.1 Summer Percentage Frequen
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Climate sensitivity for small-scale
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diffuse and do not manifest in sing
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APPENDIX D.LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ATT
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Carmenza RobledoGruppe OekologieEMP
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126 | BIBLIOGRAPHYBibliographyAAAAI
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128 | BIBLIOGRAPHYChordas, L. Epide
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Ford, S.E. & Tripp, M.R. Diseases a
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132 | BIBLIOGRAPHYKalkstein, L. S.,
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134 | BIBLIOGRAPHYMills, E. The ins
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136 | BIBLIOGRAPHYRose, J. B., Epst
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138 | BIBLIOGRAPHYVandyk, J. K., Ba
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Infectious and Respiratory Diseases