September-October - Air Defense Artillery

FROr.l THE FIGHTING FRONTS
Id up by intensive small-arms and AT fire. (See Sketch
_.) Several enemy prisoners were interrogated and it was
arned that several enemy field pieces and machine guns
lI"erelocated in the woods to the south of Bachem, GermanY,the
Task Force's next objective. \Vith two sections
of t\A leading, the Task Force made a dash for Bachem.
On the highway running southeast into Bachem the two
~ectionsof AA opened fire on the woods to the right expending
approximately 1,500 rounds of .50 caliber ammuni-
tion and twentv rounds of 37mm. All fire was controlled
by the pl~toon- commander, in the lead vehicle, an 1\116
equipped with SCR-528. All firing was delivered while
on the move in convoy. No enemv fire was encountered
by the Task Force.' .I "
. Later intelligence proved that the AA fire had killed six
of the enemy and approximately the same number were
wounded. Also twenty-five prisoners were taken from the
area fired upon by the AA half-tracks.
Triple- Threat Troops
By Captain A. E. Martin, Coast Artillery Corps
l Adaptable, versatile and useful, partly describe the self-
~propelled automatic weapons and their steadfast gun crews
of the U. S. Third Infantry Division's supporting antiair-
( craft battalion, the 441 st AAA A\V Bn. In addition to the
primary mission of antiaircraft protection, two new jobs
Ireceived much of this battalion's attention during the
last quarter of 1944. These activities consist ,of superlight
artillery for harassing and interdictory missions and
close up direct fire support for the front-line Infantry.
[
Thereby AA troops have developed a three-phase threat to
the enemy.
Such a variety of tasks for any single unit has not been
heard of frequently and was probably omitted intentionally
from the manuals on training and tactics, because it sounds
4 screwy. Yet it works!
I REASONSFORBROADENINGTHETACTICALFIELD
I
For several months the Luftwaffe had almost failed to put
in an appearance anywhere within range of the automatic
weapons in the Third Division Sector and the antiaircraft
i gun crews wearied of continuous alert and watchfulness
with no chance to shoot save an occasional few rounds for
the test firing of their weapons. The Third Infantry Division
Artillery with attached Field Artillery Battalions was getting
AA protection and many bridges and other vital points
within the Division Area were defended, but mostly against
a Luftwaffe threat that was not even the least bit interesting.
Now you don't need to be strong in arithmetic to figure
out that a weapon such as an 1\11-16 half-track mounting
quadruple .50 Cal. ivl.Gs. has tremendous' fire power as
well as good mobility. That is also true of the M-15, the
half-track that looks like an overgrown coal truck, but car-
\ ries a 37mm automatic cannon and twin M.Gs. Cal. .50 in
its thinly armored turret. \Vhy should 64 such, weapons
be idle? \Vhy should 500 well trained gunners watch
faithfully and hopefully for weeks on end with nothing to
fire upon? True enough, the antiaircraft battalion was
doing what it was supposed to do, yet these vehicles consumed
thousands of gallons of gasoline and these men ate
thousands of rations each month with no Kraut losses to
balance the ledger.
DEFICIENCIESOF AA HALF-TRACKEQUIPMENTFOR
GROUNDFIRE MISSIONS
Experience of more than a year of campaigning through
Sicily, Italy and Southern France had taught the drivers
the limitations of the AA half-tracks. Mud and swampy
ground have proved more of a handicap for them than for
some of the other Army vehicles. This was due to the
weight of the AA half-tracks, nine to eleven tons, without
gun crews.
Shell fragments had often penetrated the lA-inch armor
plate and the high silhouette, about 8~ feet, certainly presented
difficulties for camouflaging, therefore the AA halftrack
was recognized as extremely vulnerable.
There had been no sighting device issued as part of the
half-track equipment that could be used for measuring of
angles of azimuth or elevation.
,-ADOPTINGTHESET-UP TOl\/IAKE THE CHANGE
At Remiremont, in the foothills of the Vosges Mountains,
in Eastern France, on October 1, 1944, Major General
"Snapper Jack" ODaniel put into effect with his 3d
Division RCT's, the plan that had been developed by his
AAA battalion. (The 441 st has been identified with the
boys of the "Blue and "Vhite" patch since Salerno.) The
system provided for one AA battery to support each RCT
and the fourth battery to protect the medium F.A. Bn. and
the Division Artillery Airstrip (Cub Field). In each Regimental
Combat Team the AA battery c.P. with 10 halftracks
remained in the ack-ack role with the 105mm F.A.
Bn., and one gun section supported each Infantry Battalion
for such ground missions as might be presented by the
enemy. An M Officer in charge of each gun section (one
M-15 and OI~eM-16), supporting each Infantry battalion,
was given the responsibility for the commitment of the AA
weapons on the ground missions.
Infantry Officers immediately recognized the fire power
of the M~16 with its four .50 Cal. M.Gs. because on several
occasions they had been subjected to similar fire from enemy
weapons called "Flak-\Vaglms." Because of the vulnerability
of both M-16's and M-15's, constant caution and
caref~l judgment in their use and movement had to be
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