September-October - Air Defense Artillery

play. \Ve have always used the twelve-second burn-out
m shell, having brought it over with us from England,
find it most satisfactory.
,.we are convinced that inasmuch as most of our assignntSare
for harassing mi.ssions, the firing should take place
darkness. The demoralizing effect of the tracers at night
far greater than in daylight. Usually our missions suprt
a night attack' (the l04th Division being noted as a
jght-fighting division) and our 'buttoning up' efforts are
~rdinated with our division artillery. Nevertheless, even
iththis help, digging in is a must, and has saved us many
usualties.
"In spite of every research that we have made, precision
rringby the l\11-16has been found to be next to impossible.
ren if careful previous adjustment is made with new bar-
~Is, excellent stops are employed, and ingenious barrel
~ling devices are used, accurate impact cannot be achieved
nce the barrels have become hot. Tests have been .made
y this battalion on firing ranges, and the results show that
e advancing friendly troops must always be led by a
inimum of 300-500 yards. To 'sweep' the ground in.
'lOnt of the infantry as close as 1()(}.250 yards will most
'rtainly bring grief, for the present firing tables are aproximationsonly,
and cannot give a guarantee for accuracy
f
multiple-mount precision work.
"The SOP that has been set up for the battalion and the
nissionsthat we have performed have always been accomlished
with the previous knowledge (through the medium
fcareful analysis of aerial photographs and of G-2 knowlge
of enemy artillery capabilities) that the enemy artilry
would be relatively light. If heavy enemy artillery oppositionwas
expected, different tactics would be used; in
fact,I would discourage the use of AAA in a ground role
underthese conditions unless a real exigency existed, and
'1Jeneed of our weapons was critical. I 'wish to emphasize
at our experience in ground roles has, on the whole, been
underconditions of moderate enemy artillery fire.
'The particular ground mission described above was an
eal dual-purpose role, for immediately upon release from
e ground assignment, the two groups of four half-tracks
ere moved under cover of darkness to the near-by bridges,
'hich they defended against an intense attack by German
wlanesduring the following hours of the bridge crossings.
"\Ve always make it a policy to rotate our 'assault plalOOns'on
these forward front-line roles. In this manner,
rery 'assault platoon' has had an equal share in this type
faggressive work. Not only, therefore, are all the platoons
pable, through actual experience, but none feel that they
re being continually 'stuck' with having to face unusual
azards. As a result the 'assault platoon' morale is high."
The 459th AAA AH! Bn (M) Actions:
Considerable time and effort has been spent by this oranization
in trying to find a suitable and effective method
fYwhich the fire power of the Bofors gun could be utilized
. support of Infantry troops. Previous ground support mis-
~onsperformed by this battalion have been direct fire, with
the guns having to be emplaced on the crest of ridges in
rder for the trackers to lay on the assigned targets. It is the
ttalion commander's opinion that these missions were
ighly unsatisfactory because damage to the enemy apared
only minor, whereas casualties in the battalion ran as
AAA NOTES No. 22., ETO 65
high as sixteen per cent of the personnel engaged in the
mission. On 18 November 1944, the battalion commander
observed the British 40mm Bofors in a ground mission as
part of the artillery fire plan supporting the British and
American attack on the German strong point of Geilenkirchen.
The British were observed to lay their guns in
azimuth and elevation by means of graduated azimuth and
range drums installed on the gun, and their fire was directed
bva forward OP. As a result of these observations, the com-
~anding officer of the 459th AAA AW Battalion procured
some of this equipment from British sources and had it
installed on the guns of two of his batteries. (See the accompanying
article in these Notes entitled Azimuth and
Elevation Indicators for 40mm Gun for a detailed description
of this equipment. The 459th AAA A\\1 Battalion
used the same principle as explained in the article referred
to except their equipment has the azimuth drum graduated
in degrees instead of mils, with the least reading equal to
~ degree.)
The missions assigned to the 459th AAA A\V Battalion
by the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisions were:
1. Harassing fire on sugar factory in Julich for the 29th
Infantrv Division;
2. I-farassing fire on thread factory in Julich for the 29th
Infantry Division;
3. Neutralizing fire on marshalling yards in Julich for
the 30th Infantry Division; and
4. Harassing fire on Staats Forest near Julich for the
30th Infantry Division. (See Figure 2 for target areas and
gun dispositions.)
The gun sites were selected behind a ridge running between
Kirchburg and Altdorf. Two OP's were selected to
direct fire, one in Kirchburg on the left flank for Battery A,
and one in the woods near the river on the right Rank for
Batterv B.
Th~ guns were surveyed in by a survey patty from the
30th Division Artillery, and aiming stakes were set for the
base gun in each platoon. All missions were to be fired on
call, with fire being shifted from one target to another;
consequently it was necessary to lay wire lines to the 175th
Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, and to the 30th
Infantry Division Artillery.
At 0725 hours, 23 February 1945, 2d Platoon, Battery B,
was directed to fire on the thread factory (Target No.2).
One adjusting round was fired from the base piece with predetermined
data, and fell on the target. This platoon then
fired one round from each of the other three guns. Of the
first four rounds fired, two hit the factory smokestack. The
platoon then fired twenty-five rounds per gun on this target.
A heavy concentration of bursts was noted on the factory.
T.he 1st Platoon of Battery A then adjusted on the marshalling
yards (Target No.3) and placed 100 rounds in this
area.
Battery B fired 200 rounds on the sugar factory. The
175th Infantry Regiment then notified the OP's that the
infantry was nearing the target and fire was discontinued.
On the request of the 30th Infantry Division, 700 additional
rounds were fired on the marshalling yards.
Nine hundred rounds were placed on points from which
our OP's observed German Nebelwerfer rockets being fired,
and the rocket fire ceased. U