September-October - Air Defense Artillery

45 AM PLANNING FOR THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FHANCE 59
to Brigade 'Headquarters and functioned under
the Brigade Radar Officer, they were, in general,
landed with the first echelon of the AAOD.
Changes in priority caused some teams to be lifted
with follow-up echelons. The use of IIF became
confusing as the operation pr~gressed due to many
elements of the AAF removing Transponders from
various types of Aj8.
VIII Early \Vanzillg
1. Planning Stage:
a. The Early \i\Tarning System planned for the assault
phase of operation "DHAGOON" was divided
roughly into three parts: the time immediately before
and during the assault, D Day to D + 2 and
D + 2 onward.
b. For the assault period, a fighter director ship, and
one alternate, was organized to act as an SOH.
afloat. AA Liaison Officers were to pass Early
Warning direct to gun and A\V Batteries and $.P.
sites in "CHATTER" broadcast form (i.e. Target
locations \\,/reference to known points, broadcast
in the clear in very much the s~me way that football
play by play broadcasts are made).
c. For the D to D + 2 phase the F.D. ship was to
switch to l\,IAFOG (Mediterranean Fighter Operations
Grid) coordinates and pass Early \Varning
to. AAOR's expected to be in operation by
dusk of D-Dav.
d.- For the last p~riod, the F.D. ships were to be replaced
by SOH's ashore which would carry on the
normal Early Warning functions. SOR's were to
be operational by D + 2.
2. Remarks:
a. The "CHATTER" broadcast system of Early Warning
was found to be very satisfactory and was kept
in use after AAOR's were operational because not
all units could join AAOR nets due to the distances
involved.
b. The SOR's afloat were kept in operation longer
than was expected because of technical difficulties
involved in setting up the SOR ashore. SOH ashore
did not become operational until D + 8.
c. Brigade and Group radio equipment was found to
be inadequate for the large areas involved.
IX Fonner lessons leanzed in this Theater which proved
sound and paid dividends in Operation "DRAGOON"
1. Except when there is an acute shortage of LST's and
LCT's, 90mm guns, SCR-584's and prime movers participating
in the assault should not be loaded in Liberty or cargo
ships due to the time required and extreme difficulty in unloading
..
2. In view of terrain and atmospheric conditions which
might possibly be encountered that will interfere with
normal radio communications, Groups and Gun Battalion
Headquart.ers Batteries should be prepared to establish and
operate improvised GOH's during the initial stage of the
assault.
3. In case of the tactical situation becoming highly fluid,
thus necessitating frequent moves, it is very desirable that
GOR's be mounted in vans (One Brigade has found a very
satisfactory solution by converting a former civilian bus to
a mobile GOR).
4. Each AAA Brigade should have a permanently attached
Ordnance Maintenance Company and a small detachment
should accompany the Brigade on the initial lift.
5. All radio equipment must be accurately calibrated
prior to embarkation.
6. Personnel and materiel should be loaded together in
order to reduce the time required for the unit to become
operational upon unloading.
7. Briefing of AA personnel should include missions of
adjacent and supporting units.
8. Rubber mat terrain models are invaluable during the
planning phase and should be made available for study
down to and including battery commanders.
9. The maximum number of A\Vs should be deck-loaded
and in firing position to supplement the AA fire of crafts
and ships.
10. 90mm guns and 584's should be operational by
night of D Day since attacks can nearly always be expected
at dark of the first day.
11. AA units must be distributed over a number of craft
to insu~e AA defense in case of shipping losses or change
in plans.
12. 90mm Gun Bns should be prepared to assume a FA
role in case of une},.'pected ground opposition and heavy
counterattacks.
13. Inflated balloons with hand winches can be walked
ashore from LCT's by three men, thus saving carrying hydrogen
cylinders to the beach and also reducing the time
normally required to establish a barrage.
14. Radios must be depended upon for complete communication,
both tactical and administrative, during the
early phase of an amphibious operation.
15. Each battalion and battery should appoint one officer
to act as TQivl and placed in complete charge of loading
both personnel and equipment.
X Lessons learned in Operation "DRAGOON"
1. Dewaterproofing of AA units should be done at the
AA position if they are within a reasonable distance of the
beach and not in general de\'vaterproofing assembly areas.
2. Brigade and Group Headquarters should be shipped
intact and not divided into an assault echelon and a followup
echelon. In order to make this possible, these units must
be made completely mobile for waterborne invasions.
XI Summary
In conclusion the Seventh Armv AAA, which hac
learned the hard way in Africa, Sicily: and Italy, is withoUi
doubt the world's finest. l\ilore need not be said, the recorc
speaks for itself.