September-October - Air Defense Artillery

AAA NOTES
r.;onersand Corporal Peruchena's track, No. 232, took
'f[\, prisoners. The rest of the Germans were killed, a
- i of about seventy, and none were believed to have
Yt:3ped. No casualties were sustained by the AAt\ Pernel.
- e. During the action, half-track No. 242 (1\11-15) fired
y pproximately 1,600 rouI?ds of .50 cal. ammunition and
\' balf-track No. 232 (l\l-16) fired approximately 1,800
- ~ounds. The battalion commander of the 65th Armored
rield Artillery .Battali0.n credited t?e two AAA units w~th
oaringsaved hIS battahon from bemg overrun.
S -. Subject: AAA Ground Support of the Roer River Cross-
.
mgs.
I Source: AAA Section, Headquarters, Twelfth Army
, Group.
a. The crossings of the Roer River by the First and Ninth
0. S. Armies were effectively supported by AAA units,
someof which rendered a dual support in both the ground
role and the normal antiaircraft role. Two interesting
,ground support missions were performed: the 555th AAA
• A\V Bn (M) in support of the 104th Infantry Division of
\'11Corps, First U. S. Army, and the 459th AAA A\V Bn
(7\1) in support of the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisions
and XIX Corps, Ninth U. S. Army. The 555th Bn executed
its mission under the cover of darkness, using eight
lY-16 half-tracks; the 459th Bn executed its mission during
f daylight hours using eight 40mm Bofors guns.
( b. The action of each battalion is given separately, accompanied
by a sketch and comments by the two battalion
commanders on their respective actions.
The 555th AAA AW Bn (M) Action:
,
The mission given to the 555th Bn by the 104th Infantry
Division was
(1) to provide AAA .protection for bridge sites 1, 2, 3,
and 4 (see figure 1), division trains, and artillery; and
( (2) to render ground support to the 413th and 415th
lInfantry Regiments prior to daylight on "D" day.
Based on the above instructions, the battalion decided to
place the four M-16's of Battery A in positions to give
ground support to the 415th Infantry, with four alternate
positions selected for AAA defense of Bridge sites 1 and 2.
Likewise Battery D was given the mission of protecting
bridge .site 3 (4 was not to be used), with the four M.16's
of this battery available to the 413th Infantry for supporting
fire prior to H-hour.
The 555th Battalion had previously drawn up an SOP
for ground employment of AAA which was disseminated
to all elements of the .104th Division. This SOP calls for
thorough
mission.
preparations before commitment to any ground
In accordance with the SOP, the commanding officers
of the 415th and 413th Infantry were contacted by the
commanders of Battery A and Battery 0 respectively in
order to determine the target areas and possible sites for
the AAA weapons. At the same time the fire plans, which
included time of firing, rate of fire, communications, and
liaison were worked out. The battalion commander and the
battery commanders involved made a sand table study of
the area in which the mission was to be performed. One
battery commander made a personal survey from an artiI-
No. 22, ETa
40 MM GUN BLACKOUT DIAL
BLACKOUT DIAL BEFORE MODIFICATION
A
FIG. 3
40 MM GUN BLACKOUT 01AL
BLACKOUT DIAL AFTER MODIFICATION
~
63
lery observation plane of the target areas assigned to his
battery; the other battery commander made a similar survey
of his target area from a high church steeple.
In selecting the sites for the half-tracks, the alternate
AAA positions mentioned above were selected for Battery
A and completely prepared for occupation, together with
the positions from which the ground firing was to be conducted
(See Figure 1).
As both supported combat teams desired fire to be
brought on different target areas, the AAA batteries worked
independently of each other directly through the Infantry
Battalions making the main effort. Each battery commander
controlled the fire of his own weapons from the CP of the
infantry battalion which he was supporting.
Battery A fired on a schedule from H to H plus 30 minutes,
giving 10 minutes of fire to each target area "0," "E,"
and "F," shown in Figure 1. Immediately upon completion
of this firing, the tracks took up their. AAA positions at
bridges, sites 1 and 2. Battery D fired from H minus 15 to
H plus 15 minutes, keeping short bursts of intermittent fire
on areas "A" and "B" and continual fire on area "C." This