September-October - Air Defense Artillery

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64 battery was requested to bring fire upon the area in rear of A and B at 0400 hours, and the mission was effectivelv accomplished. J Both batteries brought cross fire to bear on their respective target areas. The guns of each battery were connected by hot loop to the fire control officer, and to the cannon company of the regiment. The rate of fire used by both batteries was as follows: each mount fired three-second bursts from all four barrels separated by ten-second intervals for a period of one minute, the cycle being repeated by each successive mount in turn. A large volume of fire can be continually maintained by this method, and by alternating mounts, the danger of burning out barrels is eliminated. No counterbattery fire was received during this operation. Approximately 43,000 rounds of caliber .50 ammunition were fired during this ground support mission in the 2-2-1 ratio (armor piercing, incendiary, tracer). The assault waves of the Infantry met very little opposition from the far shore. After the area fired upon had been cleared of the enemy, much evidence of the effectivenes of the firing could be seen. Although the tracer bullets probably contributed least to the actual destruction, statements of prisoners of war indicate that they made the greatest contribution due to the resultant "buttoning up" attitude it caused among the enemy. In the words of several prisoners of war taken by the 104th Infantrv Division, "Everv tracer bullet from the automatic weapor:s seemed as thou'gh it was coming right AZIMUTh {P4A1Gf f)/t/;/f AZIMUTH DRua.\ tll5CR,PT,ON 0" /(ANGE DR.UM ~C"'LE~ / l1.ANGE. DRVM- "'''!~drum ~,,"duol ..d 1/1Y(Jr~s 111' rl1n~e. /'rt,," J,,/l!q/5rt1duo lion(150cytJ'.J j 10 """0 yo' 1716rA',I'/te /~f frrJo'V6f-"" IJ /ccytls. /'ro", "0"t1Y6 ""61' A' Ib r/t, ~ooojltI """I'I< • f~ J'rlro'ut7lit1ns are ~r 2rY6oT. LeT}' Jitl, cl' drum t'«e y,..oo'.-feol!f-Dm /5cC5/o's 1'0~y«r. 11'1;111'Jltle CO,,1'61;'J fll .. 9,-..0'1.1,,1'/0"" /rcm ""Ct1V6" 1'b ~DDC ytis THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL AZ''''UTH tl .. VM Az"nutll drlllr1 ~,.odu6Ied Trtl", 0 I'd .Jo3m//s. '/,,"s1' ,yr.-a".f/"" 2",i/ ... RI9Af htl/Tcrdru," liree ,..,.d II,P .ntl 1..1"1' h,,11' reao'of dDwn. FIG. 4. Septe1ll her-Oct at me, and I just stayed right in my k~ew your Infantry was closing in." As a result of this and a number of previous grou actions performed by the 555th AAA AW Bn, the battalio commander, Lt. Colonel Farnum, submits the followin 1 comments: "The battalion SOP on ground employment, which w drawn up from the experience gained in seventeen previau ground missions, has proven highly beneficial. "On most of our previous ground support missions, th Bofors gun was employed in addition to the quadrupl 1 mount. \\There the objective is a known pin-point on whie explosive charges are needed, the Bofors can be used to great advantage. "In our experience, however, the majority of the groun~ \ support missions do not encompass specific inhabited tar~ gets. Our assignments have been area targets, and the effort on our part has been to keep the enemy 'buttoned up during the push-off. Accordingly, we have felt as though: our biggest contribution to the friendly effort has been to harass the enemy. \Ve have therefore always designed om. fire plan to 'worry the Hell out of many Jerries, rather than stick to a few buildings and injure or kill only a few.' "Nevertheless, if we find that, in addition to the primary harassing goal, we can knock out a few of the enemy in a specific occupied point (as we did by killing approximately thirty in a factory at Lucherberg) we do bring the Bofors~ 4.5',' • . :2." Drv ... 1
play. \Ve have always used the twelve-second burn-out m shell, having brought it over with us from England, find it most satisfactory. ,.we are convinced that inasmuch as most of our assignntSare for harassing mi.ssions, the firing should take place darkness. The demoralizing effect of the tracers at night far greater than in daylight. Usually our missions suprt a night attack' (the l04th Division being noted as a jght-fighting division) and our 'buttoning up' efforts are ~rdinated with our division artillery. Nevertheless, even iththis help, digging in is a must, and has saved us many usualties. "In spite of every research that we have made, precision rringby the l\11-16has been found to be next to impossible. ren if careful previous adjustment is made with new bar- ~Is, excellent stops are employed, and ingenious barrel ~ling devices are used, accurate impact cannot be achieved nce the barrels have become hot. Tests have been .made y this battalion on firing ranges, and the results show that e advancing friendly troops must always be led by a inimum of 300-500 yards. To 'sweep' the ground in. 'lOnt of the infantry as close as 1()(}.250 yards will most 'rtainly bring grief, for the present firing tables are aproximationsonly, and cannot give a guarantee for accuracy f multiple-mount precision work. "The SOP that has been set up for the battalion and the nissionsthat we have performed have always been accomlished with the previous knowledge (through the medium fcareful analysis of aerial photographs and of G-2 knowlge of enemy artillery capabilities) that the enemy artilry would be relatively light. If heavy enemy artillery oppositionwas expected, different tactics would be used; in fact,I would discourage the use of AAA in a ground role underthese conditions unless a real exigency existed, and '1Jeneed of our weapons was critical. I 'wish to emphasize at our experience in ground roles has, on the whole, been underconditions of moderate enemy artillery fire. 'The particular ground mission described above was an eal dual-purpose role, for immediately upon release from e ground assignment, the two groups of four half-tracks ere moved under cover of darkness to the near-by bridges, 'hich they defended against an intense attack by German wlanesduring the following hours of the bridge crossings. "\Ve always make it a policy to rotate our 'assault plalOOns'on these forward front-line roles. In this manner, rery 'assault platoon' has had an equal share in this type faggressive work. Not only, therefore, are all the platoons pable, through actual experience, but none feel that they re being continually 'stuck' with having to face unusual azards. As a result the 'assault platoon' morale is high." The 459th AAA AH! Bn (M) Actions: Considerable time and effort has been spent by this oranization in trying to find a suitable and effective method fYwhich the fire power of the Bofors gun could be utilized . support of Infantry troops. Previous ground support mis- ~onsperformed by this battalion have been direct fire, with the guns having to be emplaced on the crest of ridges in rder for the trackers to lay on the assigned targets. It is the ttalion commander's opinion that these missions were ighly unsatisfactory because damage to the enemy apared only minor, whereas casualties in the battalion ran as AAA NOTES No. 22., ETO 65 high as sixteen per cent of the personnel engaged in the mission. On 18 November 1944, the battalion commander observed the British 40mm Bofors in a ground mission as part of the artillery fire plan supporting the British and American attack on the German strong point of Geilenkirchen. The British were observed to lay their guns in azimuth and elevation by means of graduated azimuth and range drums installed on the gun, and their fire was directed bva forward OP. As a result of these observations, the com- ~anding officer of the 459th AAA AW Battalion procured some of this equipment from British sources and had it installed on the guns of two of his batteries. (See the accompanying article in these Notes entitled Azimuth and Elevation Indicators for 40mm Gun for a detailed description of this equipment. The 459th AAA A\\1 Battalion used the same principle as explained in the article referred to except their equipment has the azimuth drum graduated in degrees instead of mils, with the least reading equal to ~ degree.) The missions assigned to the 459th AAA A\V Battalion by the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisions were: 1. Harassing fire on sugar factory in Julich for the 29th Infantrv Division; 2. I-farassing fire on thread factory in Julich for the 29th Infantry Division; 3. Neutralizing fire on marshalling yards in Julich for the 30th Infantry Division; and 4. Harassing fire on Staats Forest near Julich for the 30th Infantry Division. (See Figure 2 for target areas and gun dispositions.) The gun sites were selected behind a ridge running between Kirchburg and Altdorf. Two OP's were selected to direct fire, one in Kirchburg on the left flank for Battery A, and one in the woods near the river on the right Rank for Batterv B. Th~ guns were surveyed in by a survey patty from the 30th Division <strong>Artillery</strong>, and aiming stakes were set for the base gun in each platoon. All missions were to be fired on call, with fire being shifted from one target to another; consequently it was necessary to lay wire lines to the 175th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, and to the 30th Infantry Division <strong>Artillery</strong>. At 0725 hours, 23 February 1945, 2d Platoon, Battery B, was directed to fire on the thread factory (Target No.2). One adjusting round was fired from the base piece with predetermined data, and fell on the target. This platoon then fired one round from each of the other three guns. Of the first four rounds fired, two hit the factory smokestack. The platoon then fired twenty-five rounds per gun on this target. A heavy concentration of bursts was noted on the factory. T.he 1st Platoon of Battery A then adjusted on the marshalling yards (Target No.3) and placed 100 rounds in this area. Battery B fired 200 rounds on the sugar factory. The 175th Infantry Regiment then notified the OP's that the infantry was nearing the target and fire was discontinued. On the request of the 30th Infantry Division, 700 additional rounds were fired on the marshalling yards. Nine hundred rounds were placed on points from which our OP's observed German Nebelwerfer rockets being fired, and the rocket fire ceased. U
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_ .. ~ook~: (!Cbristmas 3Js (!Comin
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"Target. I" Sensitive fire-control
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coming in fr~m the north. Between t
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Ground Defense Plan Antwerp X By Ca
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10 of men and weapons needed to ade
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12 _E COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL diffe
Page 14 and 15: Antiaircraft Operations in the . ~
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Page 18 and 19: 18 Sil'nal Corps British troops man
Page 20 and 21: 20 atop mountains out on the narrow
Page 22 and 23: THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL A Panth
Page 24 and 25: A Tiger Royal, stopped at Sterpigny
Page 26 and 27: 26 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOLIRNAL Sep
Page 28 and 29: SKETCH No. J ]\,116 half-track. tha
Page 32 and 33: the Field Artillery positions they
Page 34 and 35: 34 out the lucrative target. The gu
Page 36 and 37: JU Once Kembu Plateau was reduced,
Page 38 and 39: 38 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Inte
Page 40 and 41: -tv Retirement was at high speed, w
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Page 44 and 45: 1 Ht:.l..UA~ 1 AI{ 11LLI::.KY .I0LI
Page 46 and 47: 46 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL sept
Page 48 and 49: ,U Ii-If-COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Se
Page 50 and 51: The l05th AAA Battaliotl The 105th
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Page 56 and 57: AAA Planning for the Inoasion1 of S
Page 58 and 59: 3d Inf Division D-Day 5 AAA Group -
Page 60 and 61: AAA Notes No. 22, ET EDITOR'S NOTE:
Page 62 and 63: 62 with PD fuze set at superquick.
Page 66 and 67: 66 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Sep
Page 68 and 69: 68 yards of range, based on firing
Page 72 and 73: CO~ST ~RTILLERY Citations and Comme
Page 74 and 75: 74 FOR: As Chief, European Section,
Page 76 and 77: BOARD NOTES All)' i1ldividllal, whe
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Page 80 and 81: 80 (Name) (Date) Regular Army Commi
Page 82 and 83: 82 Planning Industrial Mobilization
Page 84 and 85: Coast ~rtillery News letter Harbor'
Page 86 and 87: 86 j~.. \ ~)~ Harbor Defenses AI':
Page 88 and 89: From the Front Office SELECTED SPEE
Page 90 and 91: 90 Services Offered by the Coast Ar
Page 92 and 93: 92 ' \X'ork for Veterans 500 POSTWA
Page 94 and 95: 94 THE COAST ARTILLEHY JOURNAL Sept
Page 98: 48~OOO~OOO TONS to EISENHOWER By LI
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September-October - Air Defense Artillery

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