September-October - Air Defense Artillery

3d Inf Division D-Day
5 AAA Group
-H1 AM A\V Bn (SP)
72 AAA Gun Bn
534 AAA AV/ Bn
104 AAA BB Btr)'
45th Iuf Division D-Day
105 AAA Group 216 AAA Gun Bn
106 AAA A\V Bn (SP) 107 AAA A\V Bn
103 AAA BB Btry
2. Due to limited shipping, two Corps A\V Batteries
and the A\V Bn with the 45th Division were not loaded
on the assault convoy.
3. In order to provide Armee "B" with command echelons
and to supplement their AA, the following US units
were attached and arrived in the target area over secured
beaches on 0 + 1:
34 AAA Brigade 62 AAA Gun Bn
80 AAA Group 893 AAA AW Bn
4. All AA follow-ups to the assault area other than that
listed in Paragraphs 2 and 4 above were mounted from
Italy, Africa, Corsica and Sardinia.
lV Assault Phase
1. The AA with each division went ashore in the following
order of priority: (H-I-Iour was 0800 15 August
1944)
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOllRNAL
a. SP Bn-one battery with each RCT a~d one with
Oiv Reserve. All SP's initially went into position
on the beaches.
b. BB Btry-one platoon (15 balloons) with each
RCT. The inflated balloons with hand winches
were walked ashore from LCT's by three men
each.
c. Group Hqs-Coordination of all AA in the Di~ision
Sector.
d. Gun Bn-Each battery proceeded to pre-selected
positions based on study of maps, aerial photographs
and models, thus giving a coordinated gun
defense coverage of the entire Corps assault area.
e. A\V Bns-General beach defense in order to relieve
the SP's to move forward with Division artillery.
and Infantry elements.
-I 2. The Gun Bn and two A\V Bns operating directly
.lnder VI Corps were divided over the entire Corps sector
n order to thicken the initial defense and also add to the
:lepth.
3. By the night of 0 Day the following AA was in po-
';ition and operational:
I 12 SP Batteries 14 A\V Batteries
14 Gun Batteries 90 Barrage Balloons
4. On D + 1 French Armee "B" began unloading the
,:ollowing AA over newly secured beaches west of the as-
I;ault area:
I 34 AAA Brigade
80 AAA Group
36th Iuf Division D-Day
68 AAA Group
443 AAA A\V Bn (SP)
68 AAA Gun Bn
895 AAA A\V Bn
102 AAA BB Btr)'
62AAA Gun Bn
893 AM A\V Bn
21 AAA A\V Bn (French Div Organic)
37 AAA A\~J Bn (French Oiv Organic)
V Build-liP of AA to D + 10
Septem her-October
1. After the assault lift the build-up was as follows:
213 AM Group D + 8
31 AAA Brigade D + 10 l
112 AAA Gun Bn D + 10 ~
36 AAA AW Bn (French) 0 + 10 I
11 AAA Gun Bn (French) 0 + 10
BvO + 10 the following AA had landed:
/
u.s. Frel/ch TOlal
Brigade Hqs 3 0 3
Group Hqs 5 0 5
Gun Bns 6 1 7
A\V Bns ) 3 8
Sp Bns 3 0 3
BB Btries 3 0 3
VI Clwllge ill Responsibilities
Due to the rapid advance inland it was necessary to relieve
the CG VI Corps from AA defense of the beaches,
minor ports and airfields on D + 5. The 68 and 105 AM
Groups with the required units were relieved from attached
to VI Corps on 0 + 5, placed directly under Army for
operational control and assigned the mission of AA defense
of all vulnerable points in rear of the rear boundary of VI
Corps and Armee "B." On D + 10 the 31 st 1\AA Brigade
arrived and was assigned the AA defense responsibility of
all beaches and ports and bridges in rear areas and of all
airfields vice the 68 and 105 AAA Groups relieved.
VII Radar
1. Planning Stage:
a. Because of the excellent state of training and combat
efficiency of Radar personnel in Gun Bns considered
for the assault, efforts of the planning section
were directed largely towards equipping all units
with the fifth SCR-584 and a full complement of
RC-184's, attachment and supply of Signal Radar
l\tlaintenance Teams, and providing Battalions with
at least a thirty-day supply of all maintenance
items. Radar operational plans were left to the discretion
of AAA Brigades because of their past experience,
but all plans were carefully coordinated .
2. Remarks:
a. SCR-584's and -545's landed during the assault
phase again proved their value as easily handled,
dependable equipment. They were moved into
position; and, have since D + I, operated continuously
without unforeseen maintenance difficulties.
No critical items of supply have developed due to
the completeness of the Battalion Maintenance
Kit, ME-104, carried in the assault by all Gun
Bns. The fifth SCR-584, authorized for Hq Btrys
of AAA Gun Bns, proved of great value as an early
warning set when units became widely separated.
Signal Radar Maintenance Teams were attached
I\