September-October - Air Defense Artillery

Launois on 21 November 1944. i\lachine-gun and
JaIl-arms fire coming from the buildings had stopped our
lIoopsapproaching from the south, but the enemy's right
Bank was not well protected. Lt. Fisler's M-15 moved
into position near a church wall and after locating what
was thought to be an enemy machine-gun position in a
house, opened fire with the 37mm gun .. A mixture of
A.P. and H.E. shell was used and after about fifteen seconds
of firing the enemy machine gun was silent. It was
later learned that the machine-gun fire had come from a
flak-wagon parked close to the house. This enemy vehicle
was knocked out by the 37mm gun, expending about 30
rounds of ammunition.
At about the time Lt. Fisler's 1\/1-15was working over
the flak-wagon behind the house, the M-16 had moved
into the edge of town along with a tank-TD team. All
three weapons opened fire on another unfortunate flakwagon
that was attempting to pull out., This flak-wagon
was destroyed and none of the enemy personnel escaped.
In a fast-moving situation, ground missions were found
for the Ack-Ackers with the F.A. Bns. An example of this
occurred at Dampvalley, France, 13 Sept. 1944. Sniper
fire from a wooded area had injured two artillerymen as
one battery of a 105mm F.A. Bn. was moving into position.
Lt. vVilliam Canty ordered one of the M-16s of C Battery
of the AA Bn. to follow and support him in eliminating
the snipers. Proceeding up the draw a short distance;
one of the enemy was spotted and killed by rifle fire. Soon
a large group of Germans was observed approaching through
the woods and when the half-track's machine guns opened
up on the enemy, they surrendered without a fight, but
eight had been killed and four wounded. This action netted
30 POvV's and three light machine guns in addition to the
enemy killed and wounded. These enemy troops had been
by-passed by our Infantry in their rapid advance, but the
Germans did not know their situation.
Enemy air activity is apt to come at any time. This
proved true on the rainy afternoon of 7 December 1944
when 10 or 12 single-engine fighter-bombers of the Luftwaffe
came over Field Artillery positions around Strasbourg
in flights of two, three or four planes at very low altitude.
Just to prove that the AA gunners had not lost "the
touch" in eighteen months overseas, they accounted for
one FVV 190 and two ME 109's destroyed and three others
which probably crashed in Germany, across the Rhine
River.
LESSONS LEARNED IN COMBAT
All the training that could have been given AA Troops
and officers would not have fully prepared them to meet
situations which arose and were surmounted by good cooperation,
reasonable caution and sound judgment in the
job of close support for the Infantry. After questioning
both officers and enlisted men, the following points are
listed:
1. Close liaison with all elements of friendly troops,
1 such as patrols, AT squads, Tank and TD platoons must
c: be maintained. The local situatio'n and any tactical plans
s\must be known and understood by the AA Officer and his
tI'pun crews. If a ground fire mission is planned for the AA
b,weapons, all other elements in the vicinity must kno\v
about it as to time, firing position and target area, to avoid
being fired upon by friendly troops.
2. Practice fire over our own troops with automatic weapons
in mock operations in both daylight and darkness gives
them knowledge of the sound of the AA weapons and
confidence in the gun crews.
3. Knowledge of positions and movements of friendly
troops, enemy-occupied positions or possible routes of approach
of enemy patrols or counterattacks, gives the AA
officer an opportunity to plan missions for his weapons.
Aggressiveness in developing missions promotes a good
working relationship with the supported Infantry unit, and
prevents assignments of jobs for which AA weapons are
not adapted.
4. Camouflage nets are of no use in forward areas. Natural
cover is preferred because it can be left behind when
a quick move is necessary and is more adaptable to each
location. Use screening brush or limbs when in a wooded
area; boards, rubble or dead brush from a fuel pile will
break outline when the half-tracks are shielded from enemy
observation by buildings. '
5. vVhen moving forward use only "swept" roads or
trails and follow the armor whenever possible as an extra
precaution against mines. Road reconnaissance to new
location either on foot or by jeep is important as movement
is usually done at night. A road clear of traffic enables the
half-tracks to get to their new positions quickly and decreases
the time of exposure to enemy interdictory fire.
Noise of movement can be concealed if the move is accomplished
during either friendly or enemy artillery barrages.
6. Selection and reconnaissance of firing positions is by
far the most important and most dangerous single job that
AA officers are required to do in Infantry support. Fire
usually draws fire, especially from a sensitive enemy and
the firing positions should be sufficiently far from friendly
troops to avoid drawing enemy fire upon the friendly posi,
tions. Usually half-tracks should be backed into firing posi
tion so that when the mission is finished a quick withdrawal
may be made.
7. In mountainous terrain the firing on enemy position!
on lower ground may be accomplished if the front wheel:
of the half-track are run uphill away from the enemy, off
setting the limitation of the M-15 to normal horizontal fire
8. AA self-propelled weapons are not intended to takl
the place of armor, but like armor, cannot operate in for
ward areas without ground protection against infiltratiOl
or surprise by the enemy. Usually in road-block position
or when fulfilling the mission of a front-line strong poinl
both half-tracks of a gun section work together or in sUf
port of heavier weapons and with the protection of dougl
boys out to the flanks.
, .
9. \\Then supporting the Infantry, only.a bedroll fe
.each man on the gun crew can be carried on the half-track:
A bi-weekly rotation system between the weapons u
forward and those protecting the Field Artillery battalio
enables the men to get clean clothing from their barracl
bags which are carried in one-ton trailers. This changin
of gun sections gives all men of the battery the same e:
perience and when the crews bring their weapons back I