September-October - Air Defense Artillery

52 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL sePtember-oct~
fense Command, a theater or communications zone com- (2) \\lith the.arrival of the Army Hq, with an.~nny
mand or other rear area headquarters. The organization of
the AM must permit these changes to take place with a
AAA
AM,
Bngade and probably some additional
the normal forward area situation will be'f
minimum of movement, messages and changes. brought into operation. The Beach and small
b. Unity of Command. It is a recognized principle with port de~enses will be generall): taken ove~ more
the Navy and the Ground Forces, that the officer responsible or less mtact by the Anny Bngade, as \\'Ill the •
for an operation should command all elements that are defenses of airfields and, probably, bridges and
recIuired for its success. At each phase this requires the defiles behind or near Corps rear boundaries.
AAA to be under the command of the senior commander in
the area concerned.
c. Suppl)' and Administration. Until AAA Groups andj
or Bri$!ade Hq are given personnel to perform administra-
~ ~
tive and supply functions these must receive special thought
Final Phase: \Vhen it becomes possible to draw a rear
boundary behind the Army, the Army should be relieved of
b I bel b d h
AA responsi i ities lind that oun ary. l' e minimum
h f f I I h f h h
siting 0 units at t lis p lase, as at eac 0 t e ot er phases,
is desirable. Most of the necessary shifts should have been 1
since supply agencies will rarely deal with Divisions on one
hand and Battalions on the other. It is usually preferable to
require the AAA Group and Bri$!ade Hc} to perform a large
~
Part of these functions. This reduces somewhat the number
of battalions each can handle efficiently.
made gradually and prior to the date of changing the respon-
b I h I I b I
si i ity. T is involves, in genera, rep acing mo i e and .,l
d h b I
experience units in rear areas wit semimo i e and less
d
experience ones.
\Vhile the Task Force has been indicated as an Army,
d. Antiaircraft Intelligence Service (AAA1S). In the
combat zone, coordination of the AAAIS and contact with
A\,VS are extremely difficult problems. They are further
because of m)' experience with that particular size of unit.
similar principles will apply to any size invasion Force.
complicated in an amphibious assault. Only Brigades are DETERl\IINATIONOFAAA REQUIREMENTS
provided (in this Theater) with the AA Operations Detach- The final determination of AAA forces required for an
ments, who have adequate personnel and equipment for operation cannot be made until the'plans for the operation
such coordination. are firm and nearly complete. But it will be essential to
\Vhatever organization is evolved must then, have an estimate of these requirements at the earliest possi-
(I) Provide flexibility in Operation, ble date, both for the sections concerned with supply and •
(2) Observe unitv of Command, for higher authority to plan for making such units available.
(3) Handle Adn.;'inistrative and Supply problems, and The following method will give an approximate answer,
(4) Insure adequate warning of approach of hostile air- taking final fractions as unity.
craft. a. For Gun Bns-Multiply the number of Divisions by
e. Following is a solution:
For the assault phase:
two. (60% mobile.)
b. For A'vV Bns-Multiply
three. (75% mobile.)
the number of Divisions by
(l) An AA Section is formed for the Task Force of c. For SjL Bns-l1lis involves several considerations, all
about nine o£licersand 18 to 20 EM. of which depend on the Air Force or Navy. Normally lift
(2) All antiaircraft is assigned to the Army. will not be available for SjL's in the early stages. Two gun
(3) It is then attached to subordinate units as follows Bns with SCR-584's can be brought in the same vehicle lift
for the assault:
(a) To Divisions. So much AAA as is needed for
as one SjL Bn with -268's. But i
f
Air
fi
e
Id
s are to
h
ave
A\V jSL defense, figure 12 SjL's per field. If ports are to
defense of the Division, plus that for its as- have SjL's the size of the ports will determine the number
sault beaches, or small ports and any air- of Bns, but take not less than one Bn per port if used at all.
fields that will be captured and placed in If Fighter-Searchlight teams are to be formed each will reoperation
prior to arrival of Corps AAA. One
Group Hq per Division is included, and
quire about four Battalions of SjL's
wire).
(and 1,500 miles of
should be with the Division for all planning. d. Barrage Balloons. Multiply the number of RCT
(b) To Corps. So much AAA as, when added to beaches, if known, by 15. If not known, provide one VLA
that with Divisions, will cover all require- BIn Bar Btf)' per Division. Check that Navy will supply
ments until arrival of Army AAA. One Bri- balloons for all Naval ships and craft to include LST's, and
gade Hq and, perhaps, one Group Hq per
Corps is included. The Brigade Hq should
that the \Var Shipping Board will equip all merchant ships
with balloons.
join the Corps when Corps planning begins. e. Brigade Headquarters and AAOD's-One per Corps
Subsequent to assault phase: plus one per Army plus one for Ports and rear areas.
(1) \Vith arrival of Corps Hq, with its AAA Brigade f. Group Headquarters-Two per Corps plus two per
and probably additional AAA, the Corps Brigade Army plus two (or more) for rear areas.
takes over all AM, placing, normally, one A\~l g. Ordnance Maintenance Companies (AA)-One per
or SP Bn in direct support of each Division. One AAA Brigade.
Group Hq will normally command this Divisional h. Signal Radar i\'laintenance Units-One per three Gun
AAA for all the Divisions, the remainder of the Bns plus one per SjL Bn.
Corps AM being divided as dictated by circum- i. Renshaw Teams-One or two per Army if Brigades
stances. cia not have teams.