publications_unodc_commentary-e

principle, however, should not be interpreted so broadly as to censure or penalize ajudge for engaging in a non-conformist lifestyle or for privately pursuing interests oractivities that might be offensive to segments of the community. Judgments on suchmatters are closely connected to the society and times in question and few can beapplied universally.An alternative test106. It has been suggested that the proper inquiry is not whether an act is moralor immoral according to some religious or ethical beliefs, or whether it is acceptableor unacceptable by community standards (which could lead to arbitrary andcapricious imposition of narrow morality), but how the act reflects upon the centralcomponents of the judge’s ability to do the job for which he or she has beenempowered (fairness, independence and respect for the public) and on the publicperception of his or her fitness to do the job. Accordingly, it has been suggested thatin making a judgment on such a matter, six factors should be considered:(a) The public or private nature of the act and specifically whether it iscontrary to a law that is actually enforced;(b) The extent to which the conduct is protected as an individual right;(c) The degree of discretion and prudence exercised by the judge;(d) Whether the conduct was specifically harmful to those most closelyinvolved or reasonably offensive to others;(e) The degree of respect or lack of respect for the public or individualmembers of the public that the conduct demonstrates;(f) The degree to which the conduct is indicative of bias, prejudice, orimproper influence.(Cincinnati Bar Association v Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E. 2d 477 (1972); 411 US967 (1973), cited in Amerasinghe, Judicial Conduct, 53). But in Pennsylvania, also in theUnited States, the Supreme Court declined to discipline a judge who had engaged in an extramarital sexual relationship which included overnight trips and a one-week vacation abroad (Inre Dalessandro, 483 Pa. 431, 397 A. 2d 743 (1979), cited in Amerasinghe, Judicial Conduct,53). Some of the foregoing examples would not be viewed in some societies as impinging onthe judge’s public duties as a judge but relevant only to the private zone of consensual noncriminaladult behaviour.81