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Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 28 / Tuesday, February 11, 1997 / Notices6213become the new cash deposit rate forthat company’’)).In these reviews, numerouscompanies named in the notice ofinitiation did not respond to ourquestionnaires. On July 26, 1994, wesent a letter to the PRC embassy inWashington and to the Ministry ofForeign Trade and EconomicCooperation (MOFTEC) in Beijing,requesting the identification of TRBproducers and manufacturer, as well asinformation on the production of TRBsin the PRC and the sale of TRBs to theUnited States. MOFTEC informed usthat the China Chamber of Commercefor Machinery and Electronics ProductsImport & Export (CCCME) wasresponsible for coordinating the TRBscase. MOFTEC also said it forwardedour letter and questionnaire to theCCCME. On August 31, 1994 we sent acopy of our letter and the questionnairedirectly to the CCCME, asking that thequestionnaire be transmitted to allcompanies in the PRC that producedTRBs for export to the United States andto all companies that exported TRBs tothe United States during the POR.Because we did not receiveinformation concerning many of thecompanies named in the notice ofinitiation, we have presumed that thesecompanies are under governmentcontrol. In accordance with our NMEpolicy, therefore, the governmentcontrolledenterprise, which iscomprised of all exporters of subjectmerchandise that have notdemonstrated they are separate fromPRC control, is part of this review andwe must assign a ‘‘PRC rate’’ to thatenterprise. As we did not receiveresponses from these exporters, we havebased the PRC rate on BIA, pursuant tosection 776(c) of the Act. This rate willform the basis of assessment for thisreview as well as the cash deposit ratefor future entries.We acknowledge a recent CITdecision cited by Transcom and by L&S,UCF America Inc. v. United States, SlipOp. 96–42 (CIT Feb. 27, 1996), in whichthe Court affirmed the Department’sremand results for reinstatement of therelevant cash deposit rate but expresseddisagreement with the PRC-ratemethodology which formed theunderlying rationale for reinstatement.The Court raised various concerns withthe Department’s application of a PRCrate.The Court suggested that theDepartment lacks authority for applyinga PRC rate in lieu of an ‘‘all others’’ rate.However, despite the concernsexpressed by the Court, it is theDepartment’s view that it has theauthority to use the PRC rate in lieu ofan ‘‘all others’’ rate. See Heavy ForgedHand Tools, Finished or Unfinished,With or Without Handles, from thePeople’s Republic of China; PreliminaryResults of Antidumping DutyAdministrative Review, 61 FR 15218,15221 (April 5, 1996).The PRC rate is consistent with thestatute and regulations. Section 751(a)requires the Department to determineindividual dumping margins for eachknown exporter or producer. Asdiscussed above, in NME cases, allproducers and exporters which have notdemonstrated their independence aredeemed to comprise a single exporter.Thus, we assign the PRC rate to theNME entity just as we assign anindividual rate to a single exporter orproducer, or group of related exportersor producers, operating in a marketeconomy. Because the PRC rate is theequivalent of a company-specific rate, itchanges only when we review the NMEentity. As noted above, all exporters orproducers will either qualify for aseparate company-specific rate or willbe part of the NME enterprise andreceive the PRC rate. Consequently,whenever the NME enterprise has beeninvestigated or reviewed, calculation ofan ‘‘all others’’ rate for PRC exporters isunnecessary.Thus, contrary to the argument byTranscom and L&S, the Department’sautomatic-assessment regulation (19CFR 353.22(e)) does not apply to thisreview except in the case of companiesthat demonstrate that they are separatefrom PRC government control and arenot part of this review, as discussedbelow.We also disagree with the assertion byTranscom and L&S that companies notnamed in the initiation notices did nothave an opportunity to defend theirinterests by demonstrating theirindependence from the PRC entity. Anycompany that believes it is entitled to aseparate rate may place evidence on therecord supporting its claim. Thecompany referenced by Transcom andL&S made no such showing, despite ourefforts to transmit the questionnaire toall PRC companies that produce TRBsfor export to the United States.Furthermore, Transcom’s argumentthat the BIA-based PRC-wide ratecannot be applied to exports by GoldHill because Gold Hill is a Hong Kongcompany rather than a PRC companyare also unfounded. Because Gold Hill’sChinese suppliers did not respond tothe Department’s questionnaire, wewere unable to determine, with respectto sales by Gold Hill, whether Gold Hillor the Chinese suppliers were the firstsellers in the chain of distribution toknow that the merchandise they soldwas destined for the United States. SeeYue Pak, Ltd. v. United States, Slip Op.96–65, at 6 (CIT April 18, 1996)(citingsection 773(f)). When resellers choose touse uncooperative suppliers that areunder a dumping order, they must bearthe consequences. See Yue Pak at 16.Otherwise, uncooperative PRCproducers would be free to hide behindand continue exporting through low-rateHong Kong exporters.Comment 35Petitioner opposes revocation of theorder with respect to Shanghai,claiming: (1) That it is unlikely the finalresults in the three reviews at issuewould demonstrate consecutive periodsof de minimis margins for Shanghai; (2)under the other circumstances of thiscase, it is likely that those persons willin future sell subject merchandise at lessthan FMV; and (3) Shanghai’s threeyears of no dumping would be tooremote in time to serve as a basis forrevocation.Petitioner claims that the preliminaryde minimis margin for Shanghai wasbased on results that contain seriousand obvious errors. Petitioner contendsthat as a result of corrections andchanges made due to such errors, whichhave been noted elsewhere, the finalresults will likely yield increaseddumping margins.Petitioner also argues that, although ajoint-venture company with a producerin a market-economy country, Shanghaiis still mostly owned by the PRC-basedpartner and, thus, all of the people ofthe PRC. Therefore, Petitioner asserts, itwould be irrational to ignore Shanghai’srelationship to other producers andexporters for purposes of revocation.Petitioner notes that, in those instancesin which the Department has revokedorders in NME cases, it has always doneso in toto, citing Titanium Sponge FromGeorgia, Revocation of the AntidumpingFinding, 60 FR 57219 (November 14,1995), and Ceiling Fans From thePeople’s Republic of China: FinalResults of Changed CircumstancesReview and Revocation of AntidumpingDuty Order, 60 FR 14420 (March 17,1995). Petitioner argues that theDepartment has never revoked an orderapplicable to an NME country withrespect to an individual companypreviously found to have dumpedmerchandise in the United States.Furthermore, Petitioner claims, theDepartment cannot reasonably predictthat Shanghai is unlikely to make salesat less than FMV in the future. Becauseof recent legislative changes under theUruguay Round Agreements, Petitionerargues, ESP adjustments (discussed inComment 14 above) will be mandated in