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Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 28 / Tuesday, February 11, 1997 / Notices6279cumulative occupational radiationexposures.3. The proposed amendment will notresult in a significant constructionimpact.Since the proposed changes do notinvolve any construction, therefore,there will be no construction impacts.4. The proposed amendment will notresult in a significant increase in thepotential for, or radiological or chemicalconsequences from, previously analyzedaccidents.The proposed changes which involveevacuating UF6 from the compressionloop to the cascade (low pressure sink)in the Standby Operational Mode willnot result in a significant increase in thepotential for UF6 releases. In fact,venting the compression loop to thecascade may enhance safety byminimizing the potential for overpressurizationof the UF6 withdrawalloop with subsequent confinementrupture. To avoid enrichment losses,UF6 is vented back to the A-suction ofa compressor in the cascade that hasUF6 of similar enrichment. All A-suction pressures in lines that wouldreceive the vented UF6 aresubatmospheric. Therefore, anyconfinement failure would likely resultin inleakage as opposed to outleakage.In addition, cascade units that wouldreceive vented UF6 would likely becomprised of relatively smaller sizedequipment containing relatively smallerquantities of UF6 since they would belocated near the top and at the bottomof the cascade. Therefore, the proposedchange will not result in a significantincrease in the potential for UF6releases.Going from a closed compression loopvent path to an open compression loopvent path will not result in a significantincrease for, or radiologicalconsequences from, previouslyevaluated criticality accidents. Thelikelihood of an accidental criticality inthe cascade due to wet-air (moderator)inleakage would not be increasedsignificantly for the following reasons:a. This amendment involves a valvethat is internal to several valves evenwhen the pigtail is not attached to thewithdrawal manifold. These valveswould be in the closed position.Therefore, several misvalving errorswould be required to permit significantwet-air inleakage into the cascadethrough the compression loop ventvalve.b. To maintain the integrity of theUF6 pressure boundary, USEC iscommitted to applying appropriatequality assurance requirements toprocess gas piping and equipment(including valves) with diameters of 2inches or larger.c. Formation of UO2F2 in the cascadedue to significant inleakage of wet-airwould result in compressor vibrationand would reduce barrier permeabilitythus affecting cascade compressorperformance which would be observedin the control rooms via motor loadindications. Changes in compressor A-suction pressures would also bedetected.d. Introduction of wet-air into thecascade would be detected on the linerecorders that continuously indicatenitrogen and oxygen concentrations.Based on the primary reasonsprovided above, the proposed TSRchange will also not significantly raisethe probability or consequences of acriticality accident.5. The proposed amendment will notresult in the possibility of a new ordifferent kind of accident.For similar reasons provided in theassessment of criterion 4, evacuatingUF6 from the compression loop to thecascade in the Standby OperationalMode will not result in a new potentialaccident involving UF6 releases orcriticality. In fact, venting thecompression loop to the cascade mayenhance safety by minimizing thepotential for over-pressurization of theUF6 withdrawal loop with subsequentconfinement rupture.6. The proposed amendment will notresult in a significant reduction in anymargin of safety.As discussed above, from a UF6release accident standpoint, venting tothe cascade may enhance safety, andfrom a criticality accident standpoint,the safety impact is insignificant. Thisprocedure, which is routine operation atPORTS, will not result in the violationof any limiting condition of operation.Therefore, the opening of the ventpathway in the Standby OperationalMode will not significantly reduce anymargin of safety.7. The proposed amendment will notresult in an overall decrease in theeffectiveness of the plant’s safety,safeguards, or security programs.As discussed above, from a UF6confinement standpoint venting to thecascade may enhance the plant’s safetyprogram and from a criticality safetyprogram standpoint, the safety impact isinsignificant.The staff has not identified anysafeguards or security relatedimplications from the proposedamendment. Therefore, the opening ofthe vent pathway in the StandbyOperational Mode will not result in anoverall decrease in the effectiveness ofthe plant’s safety, safeguards, or securityprograms.Effective date: This amendmentbecomes effective at 12:00 noon on theday following the day issued.Certificate of Compliance No. GDP–2:Amendment will revise the TechnicalSafety Requirements.Local Public Document Roomlocation: Portsmouth Public Library,1220 Gallia Street, Portsmouth, Ohio45662.Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th dayof February 1997.For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.Carl J. Paperiello,Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safetyand Safeguards.[FR Doc. 97–3322 Filed 2–10–97; 8:45 am]BILLING CODE 7590–01–P[Docket 70–7001]Notice of Amendment to Certificate ofCompliance GDP–1 for the U.S.Enrichment Corporation, PaducahGaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, KYThe Director, Office of NuclearMaterial Safety and Safeguards, hasmade a determination that the followingamendment request is not significant inaccordance with 10 CFR 76.45. Inmaking that determination the staffconcluded that (1) there is no change inthe types or significant increase in theamounts of any effluents that may bereleased offsite; (2) there is nosignificant increase in individual orcumulative occupational radiationexposure; (3) there is no significantconstruction impact; (4) there is nosignificant increase in the potential for,or radiological or chemicalconsequences from, previously analyzedaccidents; (5) the proposed changes donot result in the possibility of a new ordifferent kind of accident; (6) there is nosignificant reduction in any margin ofsafety; and (7) the proposed changeswill not result in an overall decrease inthe effectiveness of the plant’s safety,safeguards or security programs. Thebasis for this determination for theamendment request is shown below.The NRC staff has reviewed thecertificate amendment application andconcluded that it provides reasonableassurance of adequate safety, safeguards,and security, and compliance with NRCrequirements. Therefore, the Director,Office of Nuclear Material Safety andSafeguards, is prepared to issue anamendment to the Certificate ofCompliance for the Paducah GaseousDiffusion Plant. The staff has prepareda Compliance Evaluation Report whichprovides details of the staff’s evaluation.