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6174 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 28 / Tuesday, February 11, 1997 / Noticesinaccurate because the list does name‘‘bearings’’ (citing ‘‘TemporaryProvisions for Administration of ExportCommodities’’). Petitioner states that thefact that TRBs, as ‘‘bearings,’’ appear onthis list eliminates a significant reasonfor the Department’s decision todetermine separate rates.Petitioner adds that, in thepreliminary results, the Departmentmisapplied its standard criteria byignoring the presumption thatrespondents constitute a single entity.Petitioner argues that, in fact, theDepartment has presumed in favor ofthe absence of de jure and de factocontrol and has accepted unsupportedclaims and non-market-economy (NME)laws as the basis for single rates despitecommon ownership of entities.Petitioner cites as evidence for theswitch in the presumption the fact that,in the preliminary results, theDepartment stated that ‘‘there is noevidence that [the authority of generalmanagers to enter into contracts] issubject to any level of governmentcontrol’’ (citing the Preliminary Resultsat 40612). Petitioner claims that,instead, the Department should have tofind that ‘‘it has firm evidence that thisauthority is not subject to any level ofgovernment control.’’Petitioner also argues that theDepartment should make its separaterateanalysis consistent with rules forevaluating affiliated parties and forcollapsing firms (citing section 771(33)of the Act with respect to thedetermination of affiliated parties). Inthis regard, Petitioner states that theDepartment should consider whetherthe common owners have the ability toexercise restraint or direction over thecompanies, including whether theowners can shift production or exportactivities among firms. Petitioner arguesthat, if the Department undertook suchan analysis, it would find that none ofthe respondents is entitled to a separaterate because the PRC government hasthe ability, whether or not it exercisesit in an apparent manner, to controlexport and pricing activities, select keymanagement, direct the disposition ofrevenues (including export revenues),negotiate contracts, and shift exports tofirms with low dumping margins.Petitioner contends further that theDepartment’s de jure and de factoseparate-rates analysis places animpossible burden of proof on domesticinterested parties because a statecontrolledeconomy can amend its lawsand regulations without in factrelinquishing control. Petitioner claimsthat the state can simply delete anyevidence of de jure control from laws,regulations, corporate charters and otherdocuments. Given this situation,Petitioner argues, both the domesticindustry and the Department areconfronted with the requirement thatthey prove a negative without havingaccess to information that wouldindicate continuing control overproduction and pricing decisions by thestate. Thus, Petitioner states, claimsmade by plant managers, themselvesinterested in obtaining separate rates,become the basis for the Department’sde facto analysis and, without access tonecessary information, domesticinterested parties confront anirrebuttable presumption.Guizhou Machinery et al. respondthat the Department properlydetermined that the PRC respondentsare entitled to separate rates. GuizhouMachinery et al. argue that, whether theDepartment states, ‘‘there is no evidenceof control’’ or it has ‘‘firm evidence’’ ofno control, both statements indicate thatthe Department in fact found noevidence of control. Guizhou Machineryet al. assert that Petitioner objects to thetest itself, not the words the Departmentused to describe its findings.Guizhou Machinery et al. alsocontend that Petitioner’s proposal toapply the affiliated-party definition insection 771(33) of the Act wouldeliminate the possibility of separaterates for PRC-owned firms. GuizhouMachinery et al. acknowledge that, inCompact Ductile Iron WaterworksFittings from the PRC, 58 FR 37908 (July14, 1993) (CDIW), the Departmentdetermined that it would not consider arequest for separate rates for any stateownedcompany on the basis that nostate-owned company could besufficiently independent of state controlto be entitled to separate rates. However,Guizhou Machinery et al. note, theDepartment subsequently departed fromthe CDIW decision and returned to itsformer practice, with somemodifications (citing FinalDetermination of Sales at Less ThanFair Value: Silicon Carbide From thePeople’s Republic of China, 59 FR 22585(May 2, 1994) (Silicon Carbide)).Guizhou Machinery et al. argue that, inthe preliminary results, the Departmentproperly employed its more recentseparate-rates analysis methodologyfrom Silicon Carbide.Guizhou Machinery et al. add thatnothing in the Statement ofAdministrative Action (SAA) suggeststhat Congress or the Administrationintended that the Department wouldapply the affiliated-party provision inNME cases in a manner that wouldresult in eliminating separate rates and,if the SAA had intended that result, theSAA would not be silent on thequestion. Guizhou Machinery et al. addthat, in the House Report to the URAA,there is no mention of regulatory controlby state or provincial governments andno mention of ‘‘affiliation’’ stemmingfrom the fact that two entities are bothregulated by the same governmentalentity. Further, Guizhou Machinery etal. claim, while the SAA explicitlydiscusses the question of affiliation withrespect to a number of price and costissues, it does not mention separaterates issues. Guizhou Machinery et al.add that section 771(33) has its roots inArticle 4.1, note 11 of the Agreement onImplementation of Article VI of theUruguay Round of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT), which contemplated controlonly over producers and exporters, notaffiliation of otherwise competingexporters because of governmentauthority or centrally exercised control.Finally, with respect to Petitioner’sargument that the nature of the de jureand de facto tests imposes animpossible burden of proof onPetitioner, Guizhou Machinery et al.state that it is not reasonable to believethat the PRC would repeal all of itslaws, regulations, and corporate charterssolely to guarantee that the Departmentwill be incapable of discovering anyevidence of de jure control inantidumping proceedings.Department’s PositionWe disagree with Petitioner. We havecalculated separate rates for theresponding PRC companies in thesefinal results because each hasdemonstrated an absence of governmentcontrol over its export activities.In CDIW, we adopted the position thatstate ownership (i.e., ‘‘ownership by allthe people’’) ‘‘provides the centralgovernment the opportunity tomanipulate [the exporter’s] prices,whether or not it has taken advantage ofthat opportunity during the period ofinvestigation.’’ CDIW at 37909. Wedetermined, therefore, that state-ownedenterprises would not be eligible forseparate rates. However, we havemodified our separate-rates policy as setforth in CDIW. We subsequentlydetermined that ownership ‘‘by all thepeople’’ in and of itself cannot beconsidered dispositive in establishingwhether a company can receive aseparate rate. See Silicon Carbide at22586. As such, it is our policy that aPRC-based respondent is entitled to aseparate rate if it demonstrates on a dejure and a de facto basis that there is anabsence of government control over itsexport activities.A separate-rate determination doesnot presume to speak to more than an