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Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 28 / Tuesday, February 11, 1997 / Notices6175individual company’s independence inits export activities. The analysis isnarrowly focused and the result, ifindependence is found, is accordinglynarrow—we analyze that singlecompany’s U.S. sales of the subjectmerchandise separately and calculate acompany-specific antidumping rate.Thus, for purposes of calculatingmargins, we analyze whether specificexporters are free of government controlover their export activities, using thecriteria set forth in Silicon Carbide at22585. Those exporters who establishtheir independence from governmentcontrol are entitled to a separate margincalculation. Thus, a finding that acompany is entitled to a separate rateindicates that the company hassufficient control over its exportactivities such that the manipulation ofsuch activities by a government seekingto channel exports through companieswith relatively low dumping rates is nota concern. See Disposable PocketLighters from the PRC, 60 FR 22359,22363 (May 5, 1995) (DisposableLighters); Tapered Roller Bearings andParts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished,from the PRC, 61 FR 65527, 65527–65528 (December 13, 1996) (TRBs IV–VI); TRBs VII, Comment 1.Having rejected the CDIW positionthat state ownership per se eliminatesthe possibility of a company gaining aseparate rate, we do not acceptPetitioner’s argument that the statutorydefinition of affiliated persons at section771(33) of the Act should determine ourseparate-rates analysis. The applicationof this standard is overly broad for thepurpose of determining whether toassign separate rates to the PRC-ownedcompanies under review.First, the type of state ‘‘ownership’’involved (ownership by ‘‘all of thepeople’’) is not the type of ‘‘ownership’’addressed by section 771(33).Ownership by all of the people signifiesonly that ‘‘no individual can take thecompany . . . it belongs to thecommunity.’’ Silicon Carbide at 22586.It does not mean that a single entity‘‘controls’’ all such firms. Id.Second, even if such firms did meetthe section 771(33) ‘‘affiliated party’’standard, this definition does notdetermine the issue of whether weshould calculate separate rates for thestate-owned firms in this review.Instead, in order to make thatdetermination, we must consider thespecific issue of de jure and de factogovernment control over exportactivities. This is analogous to ourpractice in market-economy cases ofcalculating individual dumping rates foraffiliated parties unless we determinethat there is a significant potential formanipulation of pricing or productiondecisions. With respect to NME firms,we examine the potential formanipulation by the government usingthe de jure and de facto test set forth inSilicon Carbide. Thus, if the SiliconCarbide test shows that no governmententity controls the export activities ofthe firms in question so as to present asignificant potential for manipulation ofsuch activities, it is not appropriate toassign a single rate.In investigating the extent ofgovernment control over these firms’’export activities, we obtainedinformation regarding this specificissue, and the PRC companies thatresponded to our questionnairesubmitted information indicating a lackof both de jure and de facto governmentcontrol over their export activities.Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, ourdetermination in this regard did nothinge on the fact that the term ‘‘TRBs’’does not appear on the ‘‘TemporaryProvisions for Administration of ExportCommodities.’’ Further, we are notpersuaded to change our separate-ratesdeterminations based on the fact thatthe term ‘‘bearings’’ appears on the list,particularly since the term ‘‘bearings’’appears on a section of the list thatsimply indicates that an exporter mustobtain an ‘‘ordinary’’ license in order toexport bearings. Instead, as detailed inthe Preliminary Results (at 40611), therecord evidence in this case, includingour verification findings, clearlyindicates a lack of both de jure and defacto government control over theexport activities of the firms to whichwe have assigned separate rates.We also do not accept Petitioner’sargument that we have misapplied thepresumption of state control in thiscase. Given the information thatrespondents provided in this review,our statement in the Preliminary Resultsthat ‘‘there is no evidence ofgovernment control over exports’’ isequivalent to an affirmative statementthat ‘‘the government does not controlthe export activities of thesecompanies.’’ We were able to make thisdetermination because the companiesprovided information affirmativelyindicating a lack of government control.Finally, contrary to Petitioner’s claimthat the necessary informationconcerning the de facto portion of theanalysis is inaccessible to bothPetitioner and to the Department, suchinformation was, in fact, subject toverification and was discussed in therelevant verification reports. Based onour analysis of the Silicon Carbidefactors, the verified information on therecord supports our determination thatthese respondents are, both in law andin fact, free of government control overtheir export activities. Thus, it would beinappropriate to treat these firms as asingle enterprise and assign them asingle margin. Accordingly, we havecontinued to calculate separate marginsfor these companies. See TRBs IV–VI at65528.Comment 2Petitioner claims that the Departmentimproperly granted Shandong andWanxiang separate rates based onvoluntary responses to the separate-ratesquestionnaire, although thesecompanies did not request review anddid not respond to any other part of theDepartment’s questionnaire. Petitionerstates that the result of this finding,which will allow these companies tohave their POR entries assessed at theirPOR deposit rates, is an abuse of thesingle-rate methodology. Petitionerstates that it is inappropriate that these‘‘non-respondents’’ are able to obtainmore favorable treatment than othernon-respondents. Petitioner claims thatthis approach is unfair because it didnot know of the existence of thesecompanies and could not have askedthat the review cover them. Petitionersuggests that the Department defergranting separate rates for Shandongand Wanxiang until it conducts a reviewin which they are named in a reviewrequest, in which case they must fullyparticipate in the review. Petitionermakes the same suggestion for GreatWall, a company that requested aseparate rate but whose separate-ratesresponse the Department did notanalyze in the preliminary results.Petitioner adds that, even if these threefirms are permitted to establishseparate-rate entitlement in this review,the rate applicable for this periodshould be the rate applicable had theynot submitted their voluntary separaterates responses, which is the PRC rate.Guizhou Machinery et al. respondthat Petitioner provides no support forits objection to the Department’s statedintention to liquidate Shandong andWanxiang’s POR entries at the depositrate in effect at the time of entry.Guizhou Machinery et al. and L&S statethat, since the Department did notreview these companies’’ entries duringthis segment of the proceeding, the Actrequires the liquidation of their PORentries at the deposit rate in effect at thetime of entry. Guizhou Machinery et al.state no party requested review ofShandong and Wanxiang nor did theDepartment name them in the notice ofinitiation. Citing 19 CFR 353.22(e),Guizhou Machinery et al. contend that,pursuant to the Department’sregulations, non-reviewed companies