A stable macroeconomic framework, strong publicinstitutions, high investment in human capital andcontinuity in development policies explain Chile’sstrong economic and social performance over <strong>the</strong>past years. 35 The Central Bank has conductedmonetary policy with prudence and persistent tradeliberalization has helped achieve an efficientresource allocation. According <strong>to</strong> ratingorganizations and think tanks, Chile ranks high withrespect <strong>to</strong> law and order, quality <strong>of</strong> its civil service,management <strong>of</strong> public institutions, and transparency(low levels <strong>of</strong> corruption). Public expenditures ineducation, health, housing, social security and o<strong>the</strong>rsocial services have increased over recent years,reaching 71 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>to</strong>tal government spending in1999. Reforms introduced in <strong>the</strong> 1980s <strong>to</strong> promoteefficient delivery <strong>of</strong> social services have beenimproved and are moni<strong>to</strong>red for effectiveness.Concerning <strong>the</strong> access <strong>to</strong> credit and loans, a WorldBank study (Sirtaine, 2006) stated that only largefirms have access <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire range <strong>of</strong> financialinstruments available in Chile and abroad (capitalmarket or <strong>of</strong>f-shore banks). Small size firms, on <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r hand, face financing constraints and SMEshave no access <strong>to</strong> capital market financing. While in<strong>the</strong> mid 80s and early 90s some smaller firms didmanage <strong>to</strong> issue equity, this channel has dried outdue <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir depressed performance. In addition, <strong>the</strong>under-development <strong>of</strong> private equity in Chile onlyallows a fraction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se firms <strong>to</strong> access privateequity. As for access <strong>to</strong> bank loans, banks arerapidly expanding <strong>the</strong>ir leasing and fac<strong>to</strong>ring lines<strong>of</strong> business, nearly exclusively devoted <strong>to</strong> mediumand small firms. However, both industries are still in<strong>the</strong>ir infancy in terms <strong>of</strong> volumes lent.There are various obstacles <strong>to</strong> downsizing access <strong>to</strong>capital markets and increasing <strong>the</strong> penetration <strong>of</strong>banks in smaller segments. The key obstacles forenabling more small and micro enterprises <strong>to</strong>access bank financing are: (i) <strong>the</strong> legal difficulties inusing and executing movable pledges, (ii) <strong>the</strong> lowquality and trustworthiness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> financialstatements <strong>of</strong> smaller firms, (iii) <strong>the</strong> imposition <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> stamp tax on <strong>the</strong> renewal <strong>of</strong> small value loans,and (iv) <strong>the</strong> cap on interest rates on small loans(tasa maxima convencional) (Sirtaine, 2006). On<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, some institutions (i.e. UnitedNations Research Institute for <strong>Social</strong> Development-UNRISD) claim that economic policies in Chilehave been “fiscally permissive” in some sec<strong>to</strong>rs,such as <strong>the</strong> mining industry 36 (Riesco, 2005).The following chart shows competitiveness indica<strong>to</strong>rssupplied by <strong>the</strong> World Economic Forum (WEF). Alldata is from 2005 and <strong>the</strong> chart is sorted by indica<strong>to</strong>rranking. As for <strong>the</strong> general level <strong>of</strong> competitiveness,Chile is in a very good condition. The three mainobstacles for <strong>the</strong> country’s competitivenessdevelopment are: <strong>the</strong> restrictive labor regulations, <strong>the</strong>government bureaucracy and <strong>the</strong> inadequatelyeducated workforce. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, o<strong>the</strong>r WEFsub-index rankings show a good situation in Chile for<strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> its competitiveness.35 Although since 1817, Chile's war <strong>of</strong> independence from Spain brought in<strong>to</strong> place a system <strong>of</strong> representative democracy, <strong>the</strong> country'spolitical his<strong>to</strong>ry has not always been smooth. In 1970, a Marxist government under Salvador Allende came <strong>to</strong> power in response <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong>perceived failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> established liberal party. Allende's attempts <strong>to</strong> radically change <strong>the</strong> structure and direction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> countrybrought about a second political crisis, and in 1973 a right-wing government under General Augus<strong>to</strong> Pinochet Ugarte seized power withassistance from <strong>the</strong> United States Central Intelligence Agency. Allende was killed in <strong>the</strong> coup, and Pinochet's government maintainedpower for <strong>the</strong> next decade and a half, frequently resorting <strong>to</strong> terror in order <strong>to</strong> stifle discontent. In 1990, having failed in his bid <strong>to</strong> gainpopular ratification for his rule, Pinochet handed over <strong>the</strong> presidency <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> rightfully- elected Patricio Aylwin Azocar. Chile's politicalclimate has since remained stable, although <strong>the</strong>re is still considerable tension between <strong>the</strong> military and <strong>the</strong> government concerning <strong>the</strong>human rights violations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pinochet era (wikipedia 2006). The last presidential and congressional elections were held in December2005 and January 2006. Michelle Bachelet won that presidential election and <strong>to</strong>ok <strong>of</strong>fice on March 11, 2006.36 As a result overproduction has been encouraged (almost 40 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world copper production is from Chile) and world copperprices remained low, damaging employment in <strong>the</strong> mining sec<strong>to</strong>r locally and internationally and harming government revenues. Somemining companies in Chile claim <strong>to</strong> act responsibly48 <strong>Recommended</strong> <strong>actions</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>foster</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>adoption</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corporate</strong> <strong>Social</strong> Responsibility (CSR) practices in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
OrganizationWEFIndexNumber <strong>of</strong> Countriesin <strong>the</strong> IndexChile’s RankingIntensity <strong>of</strong> localcompetition 117 7WEF Technological readiness 117 26WEF Global Competitiveness 11727 (1 out <strong>of</strong> 21 inLatin America)WEFTime required <strong>to</strong> start abusiness 117 31WEF Local equity market access 117 33WEFEfficiency <strong>of</strong> legalframework 117 35WEFNumber <strong>of</strong> proceduresrequired <strong>to</strong> start a business 117 37WEF Capacity for innovation 117 40WEFUniversity/industry researchcollaboration 117 45WEFCompany spending onresearch and development 117 47Also, <strong>the</strong> institutional framework in Chile appears <strong>to</strong> be stable and trustworthy.OrganizationWEFIndexNumber <strong>of</strong> Countriesin <strong>the</strong> IndexChile’s RankingFavoritism in decisions <strong>of</strong>government <strong>of</strong>ficials 117 20WEF Public trust <strong>of</strong> politicians 117 23WEF Reliability <strong>of</strong> police services 117 27WEF Judicial independence 117 47Transparency International Corruption Perception 159 21Chile49
- Page 1 and 2:
Recommended actionsto foster the ad
- Page 3 and 4:
Recommended actionsto foster the ad
- Page 5 and 6: table of contentsI Acknowledgements
- Page 7: Chapter 6: Mexico1 Executive Summar
- Page 10 and 11: acronymsCDMCSRECFLAFSCGDPGHGGRIHRWI
- Page 12 and 13: strong internal relationship, in ot
- Page 14 and 15: programs that affect the private se
- Page 16 and 17: Section Four - Recommended Actions
- Page 18 and 19: (Technology Index, Public Instituti
- Page 20 and 21: BibliographyESADE, SDA Bocconi, Nor
- Page 22 and 23: The following chart shows competiti
- Page 24 and 25: CSR area significanceThe following
- Page 26 and 27: structured philanthropic policies,
- Page 28 and 29: the private sector and to develop g
- Page 30 and 31: c. Facilitating, recommended action
- Page 32 and 33: BibliographyAnselmi, P. (2005) ‘L
- Page 34 and 35: APPENDIX 1 - ARGENTINA’S STAKEHOL
- Page 36 and 37: 28 Recommended actions to foster th
- Page 38 and 39: 2 Economic and SocialFrameworkBrazi
- Page 40 and 41: 3 Current State of CSRThe concept o
- Page 42 and 43: micro and small companies based on
- Page 44 and 45: Brazil ratified the Kyoto Protocol
- Page 46 and 47: - Improve monitoring systems andenv
- Page 48 and 49: e. Endorsing, recommended actions f
- Page 50 and 51: Websites consultedwww.accountabilit
- Page 52 and 53: APPENDIX 1 - BRAZIL’S STAKEHOLDER
- Page 54 and 55: APPENDIX 1 - BRAZIL’S STAKEHOLDER
- Page 58 and 59: An investigation of Chile’s equit
- Page 60 and 61: CSR area significanceThe following
- Page 62 and 63: powerful, but are mainly involved i
- Page 64 and 65: Fomento al Desarrollo Científico y
- Page 66 and 67: a. Improving Promotion and Advocacy
- Page 68 and 69: Websites consultedwww.accionrse.clw
- Page 70 and 71: APPENDIX 1 - CHILEAN STAKEHOLDER MA
- Page 73 and 74: Chapter 4: Colombia1 Executive Summ
- Page 75 and 76: In addition, corruption is a widely
- Page 77 and 78: CSR area significancesupply chain m
- Page 79 and 80: However, market pressures, primaril
- Page 81 and 82: - Sponsor a human rights campaign t
- Page 83 and 84: . Improving Promotion and Advocacy,
- Page 85 and 86: Websites consultedwww.accountabilit
- Page 87 and 88: APPENDIX 1 - COLOMBIAN STAKEHOLDER
- Page 89 and 90: APPENDIX 1 - COLOMBIAN STAKEHOLDER
- Page 91 and 92: Chapter 5: El Salvador1 Executive S
- Page 93 and 94: El Salvador’s competitiveness. Co
- Page 95 and 96: ecome key organizations in the batt
- Page 97 and 98: According to Vives, Corral and Isus
- Page 99 and 100: subsequent survey, by the World Ban
- Page 101 and 102: following strategies, as defined in
- Page 103 and 104: 4.4 Civil SocietyIn this study, civ
- Page 105 and 106: Tsukamoto, M, Twose, N., (2003) ‘
- Page 107 and 108:
APPENDIX 1 - EL SALVADOR’S STAKEH
- Page 109 and 110:
Chapter 6: Mexico1 Executive Summar
- Page 111 and 112:
OrganizationWEFWEFWEFIndexNumber of
- Page 113 and 114:
there is a general confusion about
- Page 115 and 116:
CSR area significancemaxCSR actual
- Page 117 and 118:
and because of institutional voids
- Page 119 and 120:
- Improve monitoring systems andenv
- Page 121 and 122:
- Participate in the publication of
- Page 123 and 124:
López-Acevedo, G., (2006) ‘Mexic
- Page 125 and 126:
AppendixThe following stakeholder m
- Page 127:
APPENDIX 1 - MEXICAN STAKEHOLDER MA
- Page 130 and 131:
Peruvian civil society has a strong
- Page 132 and 133:
environment, and they have waste tr
- Page 134 and 135:
Not even the lack of relations and
- Page 136 and 137:
- Create awareness of accountabilit
- Page 138 and 139:
These two groups will likely implem
- Page 140 and 141:
Websites consultedwww.accountabilit
- Page 142 and 143:
APPENDIX 1 - PERUVIAN STAKEHOLDER M
- Page 145 and 146:
Chapter 8: Venezuela1 Executive Sum
- Page 147 and 148:
OrganizationWEFIndexNumber of Count
- Page 149 and 150:
3 Current State of CSRCSR actual po
- Page 151 and 152:
cooperatives and farmers 114 Unfort
- Page 153 and 154:
a. Mandating, recommended actions f
- Page 155 and 156:
BibliographyArmas, V. (1999) ‘Esp
- Page 157:
AppendixThe following stakeholder m