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94 so u R c e s o f we a p o n sy s T e m s In n o v a T Io n In T h e depaR TmenT o f defense
military preparedness. They also had a major impact on the Air Force, especially
given the service’s expanding role in the development, production, and deployment
of intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Much of the
propulsion and materials technology built into the missile force complemented
the hardware requirements of the new space program. Consequently, the Air
Research and Development Command’s in-house facilities broadened their
programming functions to include space-based R&D for military applications.
Organizational changes followed. In April 1959, Bernard Schriever, now a major
general, assumed command of ARDC. Guided by the success of the ballistic
missile program managed by the Western Development Division, Schriever
separated weapons production and procurement from the Air Materiel
Command and merged both functions into ARDC, resulting in the formation of
the Air Force Systems Command in 1961. The remaining functions of AMC—
supply and maintenance—were consolidated into the new Air Force Logistics
Command.
The driving force behind the formation of the Air Force Systems Command
was the ongoing struggle between ARDC and AMC to work out a mutually
agreeable division of labor at the often-disputed point in the procurement process
where weapons development ceased and production commenced. The adoption
of ideas about concurrency—the process of overlapping R&D and production
stages to accelerate the development of weapon systems—had only exacerbated
this conflict. New institutional mechanisms, such as the Weapon System Project
Office, provided a temporary solution to this problem by managing all phases
of R&D and procurement through on-site collaboration of ARDC and AMC
personnel. Still, even in cases where this solution was effective—at the Western
Development Division, for example—a tenuous relationship continued to exist
between the commands. Typically, the Air Staff had to intervene to resolve
disputes on a case-by-case basis. 79
Other organizational problems persisted, which prompted Air Force Chief
of Staff Gen. Thomas White to request, shortly after the launch of Sputnik,
that the Scientific Advisory Board form a special committee to review ARDC
policies, functions, and procedures. Submitted in the summer of 1958, the
Stever Committee Report (named after the committee’s chairman, MIT physicist
H. Guyford Stever) recommended sweeping changes to ARDC’s highly
centralized management structure. Day-to-day oversight and micromanagement
of programs, the committee concluded, should not be the function of the
headquarters staff. Rather, headquarters should focus on program coordination
and long-term policymaking. The committee advised General White to
decentralize ARDC’s command structure and grant full control of program
functions and resource allocation to the weapon system project offices operating
in the field. To facilitate this transition and improve operating efficiencies
at the program level, the committee urged the Air Staff to reorganize ARDC
79 Johnson, The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation, 52–54; Gorn, Vulcan’s Forge,
63–66.