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ReseaRch a n d developmenT In T h e aIR fo R c e 83
Air Force acquired aircraft, missiles, and other military hardware also guided
this technical effort. “We can no longer afford to order an airframe and then
try to stuff it with government furnished equipment developed separately under
separate contracts,” observed the chief of WADC’s Weapons Systems Division.
“From now on,” he continued, “the faster aircraft go, the more exactly we must
tailor our power, aerodynamics, guidance, and firepower to fit each other in a
single airframe package.” 44 Lending urgency to these technological considerations
was the Air Staff ’s concern about recent advances in Soviet air power and the
perceived threat that they posed to American security. Both factors—one
technological, the other strategic—prompted ARDC managers and their
subordinates at the Wright Air Development Center to rely on industry and
the scientific community for major breakthroughs. Such reliance, however, was
not to be sought at the complete expense of the in-house R&D programs that
already maintained a vital link between the laboratory and the factory floor. 45
Representative examples to be discussed briefly below include the center’s role
in the development of the Convair B–58 Hustler, the first supersonic bomber,
and the R&D activities underway in the center’s aircraft and power plant
laboratories.
Development of the delta wing B–58 began in the early 1950s, when the
Air Force selected the Convair Division of the General Dynamics Corporation
to serve as the program’s prime contractor. In this capacity—a defining feature
of the weapon systems concept—Convair managed all phases of the B–58’s
development, from the airframe produced in-house to the weapon subsystems
(for bombing and navigation, autopilot and controls, offensive and defensive
armament, communications, reconnaissance, cooling, and ground support)
designed and built by other firms under contract. 46 Convair also handled the
complete integration of all subsystems into a fully functional, combat-ready
aircraft. ARDC monitored, evaluated, and supervised the overall development
program, and, in collaboration with the Air Materiel Command, recommended
and selected the contractor—in this case Convair—most qualified to complete
the project. The Wright Air Development Center provided technical support. 47
44 “Weapon System Plan Spurs Development,” Aviation Week 59 (17 August 1953): 83.
45 ARDC put several procedural changes in place to accelerate weapon systems development. In 1955,
for example, competitive bidding based on paper design studies was eliminated in favor of direct selection
of contractors equipped with the expertise to meet specific service requirements. ARDC also made
proprietary knowledge of weapons requirements available to a larger pool of contractors to boost industry
participation in the procurement process, especially through the expansion of in-house corporate R&D. C.
Witze, “Speed R&D, USAF Orders Industry,” Aviation Week 63 (22 August 1955): 12–13; “USAF Urges
Aircraft Industry to Use Own Funds for Research,” Aviation Week 63 (5 September 1955): 14–15; “ARDC
Trades Secrets for Progress,” Aviation Week Buyer’s Guide 63 (Mid-December 1955): 11; “Progress Proves
ARDC’s Mission Vital,” Aviation Week 65 (6 August 1956): 76–77; C. Witze, “Industry Role in New
Weapons Increased,” Aviation Week 65 (6 August 1956): 86–88; “How ARDC ‘Buys’ Scientific Ideas,”
Aviation Week 66 (3 June 1957): 358.
46 Convair did not manage development and production of the propulsion system. The high
development cost prompted the Air Staff to assign those functions directly to ARDC.
47 Other ARDC facilities also provided technical support. Air and ground tests on the B–58’s weapon
systems were conducted at Holloman Air Force Base in 1956. See I. Stone, “Holloman Evaluates Missile
Systems,” Aviation Week 65 (6 August 1956): 133.