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ReseaRch a n d developmenT In T h e aIR fo R c e 107
function—the Arnold Engineering Development Center—in Tennessee in 1950.
In the 1960s, after R&D had been recombined with production in the new Air
Force Systems Command, Arnold’s technical support functions remained intact
but expanded beyond testing and evaluation of air-breathing engines to include
work on a new generation of rocket motors and solid propellants required by the
rapidly expanding ballistic missile and space programs.
Prompted by evidence of major advances in Soviet air power in the 1950s
and the introduction in the United States of smaller and lighter nuclear warheads
suitable for missile payloads, the Air Force initiated an expeditious program to
accelerate development of intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles. Making
use of the weapon system concept, which sought to merge R&D and production
into a single, overlapping process, Bernard Schriever managed to bypass the
jurisdictional conflicts that had strained relations between the Air Materiel
Command and the Air Research and Development Command. Although the
weapon system concept was not without its limitations—most notably its
chronic reliability problems and cost overruns—Schriever nevertheless adopted
its institutional equivalent—the Western Development Division—as the
model for effective weapons development and procurement. In the late 1950s,
he spearheaded the effort to recombine the Air Research and Development
Command and the production and procurement functions of the Air Materiel
Command into a new organization—the Air Force Systems Command. Given
the high but largely unrealized expectations that preceded ARDC’s founding
in 1950 and its demise ten years later, it is not unreasonable to conclude that,
despite claims to the contrary, the introduction of new weapon systems into
the Air Force’s operating commands during the Cold War depended on the
interaction of research, development, and production.