Collapse

Barrett: The Collapse of Iraq and Syria
6. Conclusion
The Conclusion is open ended. We know how the events of the last decade
began and, having reviewed the last 500 years and more of the history
of the region, we can guess with a high degree of certainty that there is no
solution to the instability and factionalized forces that have created the current
chaotic situation. At some point, the chaos of the moment will subside
into a simmering brew of local and regional ethnic, sectarian, and social
rivalries with various parts falling under the sway of autocratic rulers who,
through patronage and fear, will establish an equilibrium that brings some
order to the chaos. However, we do not know exactly what that will look like
on a map nor do we know who or what those autocratic forces will be. We
do absolutely know it will not be a Western style democracy and it will be
imposed top-down on all or part of the region depending on who prevails
in what area. At this point, we should also understand that Lebanon, Syria,
and Iraq are lines on a map, not real states, and that in the end, the lines
on the map will either be redrawn by those autocratic forces or the de facto
reality will be an uneasy Lebanese-like truce across the region that pays
homage to, but in reality ignores, the lines drawn on the map as a result of
Sykes-Picot and the French and British mandates following World War I.
U.S. blundering in 2003 and 2013 complicated all of these issues and made
them American problems. Where are we now? What is possible? And where
are we likely to go in the future?
The survival of the Assad regime was not the only problem associated
with U.S. reluctance to become more involved in the Syrian problem and
warned that it was spreading to Iraq. When ISIS emerged as a separate radical
group in 2011, U.S. allies in the region urged more support for the other
Syrian options in order to quickly overthrow Assad and to blunt the influence
of ISIS. None of the options were ‘democratic’ and several were Islamist.
The inability of Washington to see where events were headed and refusal to
intervene more decisively allowed ISIS to grow. The U.S. equivocated offering
non-lethal support. The less radical elements in the Syrian opposition
found themselves at the mercy of the Assad regime on the one hand and the
radical jihadists on the other. 188
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