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JSOU Report 16-1
26
neither the Turks nor the Germans, but the British officials governing
Egypt; for despite India’s protests, British Cairo went ahead with
the intrigues in Mecca. 20
Arguably, it was less British entreaties than the Hashemite declaration of
an Arab Revolt against Turkish rule that broke the stalemate in Arabia. Concerned
that his position would be compromised vis-à-vis the Hashemites, Ibn
Saud agreed to support the British. He attended a coordinating conference
in Kuwait; then he returned home and did nothing. 21
The issue between the Hashemites and the Sauds went beyond what the
outcome of the war would be on the Arabian Peninsula. Both parties saw
the Levant and Mesopotamia as the real prize to be gained in the conflict.
The Hashemites, the protectors of the Holy Places and the descendants of
the Prophet, saw a new Arab Caliphate in which they would take their rightful
places as rulers. Sharif Hussein saw the potential to realize his dream of
ruling the entire Ottoman Arab world. 22 With regard to the Greater Levant,
the contrasts provide an interesting point of departure. None of the notables
or other groups from Basra and Beirut was particularly enamored with being
ruled by anybody from Arabia. From that point of view, they believed that
the issue had been settled when the Umayyads moved the capital from the
Hejaz to Damascus. For the sectarian minorities, the Westernized elements,
and most of the merchant class, the Hashemites were far more acceptable
than the Ibn Saud’s Wahhabi Ikhwan.
On the other hand, some among the Sauds saw the Arabian Desert and
the tribes as a natural extension of what they had already accomplished in
the Nejd. If they could consolidate their control in Arabia, then the logical
next steps would be an expansion into the Western Mesopotamian and
Syrian desert providing substantial leverage on the urban centers to the
north. The prospect unnerved many of the British experts in the Arab Bureau
who feared the potential of the Wahhabi Ikhwan to destabilize Hejaz. 23 Ever
shrewd and methodical, Ibn Saud focused on the task at hand—conquest of
Arabia and consolidation of his regime there.
The crisis of 1916 sparked other agreements that were to have far-reaching
consequences. If the agreements with the Hashemites and the Sauds had
indicated a growing desperation on the part of the British to secure allies in
the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 was an attempt to
preserve unity among the Allies. The agreement delineated; assuming the