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JSOU Report 16-1<br />
Aflaq resigned in disgust as president (just ahead of the arrival of Alawite<br />
security agents), and went to Baghdad where he held court on the deviations<br />
of the Syrian Ba’th. In 1971, although gratuitous, further confirmation that<br />
the Ba’th was no longer a political party but rather a political tool for maintaining<br />
Assad’s control came in the form of treason trials for Aflaq and four<br />
others, now resident in Ba’thist-controlled Baghdad. All were condemned to<br />
death as a warning that Aflaq and his associates were persona non grata in<br />
Syria and that he would not tolerate any interference from Iraq. 109<br />
Ruling Syria became an exercise in controlled participation. At a foundational<br />
level, Assad depended on his family and fellow Alawites; others filled<br />
important positions, but they were not the bedrock of the regime. Nevertheless,<br />
the façade of political participation provided a safety valve. In 1972, the<br />
Syrian government announced the creation of the Ba’th dominated National<br />
Progressive Front and local councils in each of the governorates. The councils<br />
in particular were more apolitical and focused on practical issues affecting<br />
the regions. This approach provided an outlet for political participation and,<br />
perhaps more importantly, a tripwire for rising political discontent. The real<br />
competition for power in Syria lay within the factions of the ruling elite. 110<br />
The 1973 October War with its promising beginning for the Arabs<br />
devolved into a series of ceasefires and, ultimately, agreements that removed<br />
Egypt as a confrontation state. Syria and Assad were isolated and vilified<br />
The real competition for<br />
power in Syria lay within<br />
the factions of the ruling<br />
elite.<br />
60<br />
despite having signed a ceasefire and disengagement<br />
agreement over the Golan Heights.<br />
The isolation extended beyond the immediate<br />
participants in the 1973 war and the confrontation<br />
with Israel. By 1975, hostility between<br />
Assad and the Ba’th Party in Baghdad boiled<br />
over into a vitriolic propaganda campaign pitting Damascus against Baghdad.<br />
Michael Aflaq, from the safety of Baghdad, assailed Assad for betraying<br />
the Arabs to Zionists and in return, Damascus accused Baghdad of abandoning<br />
Arab lands (Khuzestan) to Iran. 111<br />
To complicate bilateral relations, Soviet-sponsored dam building in<br />
Syria on the Euphrates had severely limited water for agriculture in Iraq.<br />
“From 1975 onward the two countries began abusing each other over the<br />
airwaves—fascist rightwing criminal—was the standard invective—arresting<br />
each others’ sympathizers, moving troops threateningly to the border, and<br />
setting off explosives in each others’ capitals.” 112 As the Syrian-Iraqi war of