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JSOU16-1_Barrett_IraqSyria_final

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JSOU Report 16-1<br />

Aflaq resigned in disgust as president (just ahead of the arrival of Alawite<br />

security agents), and went to Baghdad where he held court on the deviations<br />

of the Syrian Ba’th. In 1971, although gratuitous, further confirmation that<br />

the Ba’th was no longer a political party but rather a political tool for maintaining<br />

Assad’s control came in the form of treason trials for Aflaq and four<br />

others, now resident in Ba’thist-controlled Baghdad. All were condemned to<br />

death as a warning that Aflaq and his associates were persona non grata in<br />

Syria and that he would not tolerate any interference from Iraq. 109<br />

Ruling Syria became an exercise in controlled participation. At a foundational<br />

level, Assad depended on his family and fellow Alawites; others filled<br />

important positions, but they were not the bedrock of the regime. Nevertheless,<br />

the façade of political participation provided a safety valve. In 1972, the<br />

Syrian government announced the creation of the Ba’th dominated National<br />

Progressive Front and local councils in each of the governorates. The councils<br />

in particular were more apolitical and focused on practical issues affecting<br />

the regions. This approach provided an outlet for political participation and,<br />

perhaps more importantly, a tripwire for rising political discontent. The real<br />

competition for power in Syria lay within the factions of the ruling elite. 110<br />

The 1973 October War with its promising beginning for the Arabs<br />

devolved into a series of ceasefires and, ultimately, agreements that removed<br />

Egypt as a confrontation state. Syria and Assad were isolated and vilified<br />

The real competition for<br />

power in Syria lay within<br />

the factions of the ruling<br />

elite.<br />

60<br />

despite having signed a ceasefire and disengagement<br />

agreement over the Golan Heights.<br />

The isolation extended beyond the immediate<br />

participants in the 1973 war and the confrontation<br />

with Israel. By 1975, hostility between<br />

Assad and the Ba’th Party in Baghdad boiled<br />

over into a vitriolic propaganda campaign pitting Damascus against Baghdad.<br />

Michael Aflaq, from the safety of Baghdad, assailed Assad for betraying<br />

the Arabs to Zionists and in return, Damascus accused Baghdad of abandoning<br />

Arab lands (Khuzestan) to Iran. 111<br />

To complicate bilateral relations, Soviet-sponsored dam building in<br />

Syria on the Euphrates had severely limited water for agriculture in Iraq.<br />

“From 1975 onward the two countries began abusing each other over the<br />

airwaves—fascist rightwing criminal—was the standard invective—arresting<br />

each others’ sympathizers, moving troops threateningly to the border, and<br />

setting off explosives in each others’ capitals.” 112 As the Syrian-Iraqi war of

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