Collapse

Barrett: The Collapse of Iraq and Syria
north. The aftermath also contributed to a process that eventually alienated
many of Saddam Hussein’s Western supporters. 149
By 1988, the sacrifices of the war convinced many around the Ayatollah
Khomeini that Iran had to accept a ceasefire. With U.S. intelligence support,
a resupplied and refitted Iraqi military dealt the Iranians a string of defeats
in 1988. The Iranians suffered massive losses in men and material, including
virtually all the Iraqi territory that they held in the border regions. Iranian
cities were under sustained missile and air attack, including the use of chemical
weapons, and Saddam Hussein threatened more massive weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) attacks if the Iranians did not accept a ceasefire. Then
an American warship shot down an Iranian airliner. The regime in Tehran
was shocked by the lack of global support in the incident and believed that
it was an intentional provocation to be followed by an all-out attack by U.S.
forces. In July 1988, Iran announced its willingness to accept a ceasefire. In
August, Iraq came under heavy pressure to end hostilities, and both sides
accepted a ceasefire.
For both sides, losses were horrific. Iran was simply exhausted having suffered
over 200,000 dead with much of its infrastructure destroyed. For Iraq,
the impact was in many ways more severe but less visible. With over 100,000
dead, including many Shi’a conscripts used as cannon fodder, any hope that
Saddam Hussein had of creating a unified secular state had vanished. In the
north, the Kurds, although cowed, were perhaps forever alienated from any
state governed by Baghdad—Sunni or Shi’a. While Iraq survived with the
less physical damage than Iran, behind the security and military façade, any
hope for a nation-state to coalesce had disappeared. The hardships of the war
had driven additional wedges into the fabric of political, economic, and social
structure. The massive expenditures on the war effort and the dramatic collapse
of oil prices during the
war meant that the patronage
system no longer extended
outward as far as it once had.
Patronage went to supporters
With over 100,000 dead … any hope
that Saddam Hussein had of creating a
unified secular state had vanished.
of the regime to maintain their loyalty; thus, the Sunnis and other minorities
who supported the regime received the lion’s share of more limited government
subsidies and support. Politically, the breadth of the ruling elite
narrowed significantly. Family members or fellow Tikriti clansmen now
controlled every key element of the security and military structure with the
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