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JSOU Report 16-1 cause of Arab unity and noninterference as well. To counter these threats, in 1957 the Ba’th began to push for full unification with Egypt, but it would not be the Ba’th that brought the arrangement to fruition; it was the Syrian army that pushed the agreement to conclusion. 49 Many had doubted that it would happen because Nasser demanded total control—the total subjugation of Syria institutions to Egyptian rule. In January 1958, to almost everyone’s surprise, the Syrians agreed to unification on Nasser’s terms. The scope of the proposal shocked Egyptian and Syrian politicians alike. 50 Skeptics pointed out the inherent conflicts between Egyptian and Syrian political practice. Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli allegedly warned Nasser, “You have acquired a nation of politicians; fifty percent believe themselves to be national leaders, twenty-five percent to be prophets, and at least ten percent to be gods.” 51 The Egyptians believed that the problems of unification would be overcome by Syrian acquiescence to Nasser’s demands for a centralized state following the Egyptian model and the dissolution of all political parties and by Nasser’s stature as the leader of the pan-Arab movement. In Syria, the Ba’th Party agreed, but expected to become Nasser’s political partners and ideologically dominate in the new state. 52 Michel Aflaq justified his agreement to disband the Ba’th Party, arguing, “We will be officially dissolved but we will be present in the new unified party, the National Union. Born of the Union of the two countries, this movement cannot be animated by principles other than those of the Ba’th.” 53 Nasser had no intention of sharing power with the fractious Syrian politicians. Nevertheless, on 1 February 1958, from the balcony of the Abdin Palace, Nasser and Khalid al-Azm, the President of the Syrian Republic, proclaimed the creation of the United Arab Republic, announcing that Nasser would be the president of the new republic. Fearing that a federal system was fundamentally unworkable, Nasser believed the ‘ungovernable’ Syrians could, in fact, be managed through centralized control, eliminating the possibility of collapse. 54 Demands for unification spread across the region, accompanied by widespread popular agitation for economic and political change through the union with Egypt and Syria and the removal of traditional leaders. 55 Nasser had become the “new Saladin.” 56 Nasser presented the merger to the suspicious West as a move by Syrian Ba’thists to forestall a Communist coup. He argued that he had abolished all political parties to reduce instability and leftist influence 38
Barrett: The <strong>Collapse</strong> of Iraq and Syria Figure 4. Jamal Abd-al-Nasser signs the unity pact with Syrian president Shukri al-Quwatli, forming the United Arab Republic, February 1958. Source: Newscom and to heighten the focus on “Arab unity.” 57 It also gave the Egyptian president a leg-up on his rival, Nuri Pasha al-Sa’id, in Baghdad. Thus, Nasser agreed to a union with Syria, a country in which “he had never set foot.” 58 In very short order the Syrians realized that Egyptian solutions applied to Syrian problems simply did not work. Egypt was more or less homogeneous and Syria was not. From the military to businessmen, Syrians quickly came to resent Egyptian control. In September 1961, Syrian army units revolted, took over the capital, and declared an end to the United Arab Republic (UAR). Nazim al-Kudsi, a National Party politician, became president with military backing, but his regime, like those before him, was fraught with instability. During the Egyptian administration, the Ba’th, no longer a recognized party, lost prestige. Among the leadership, the lack of direction caused 39
Page 1 and 2: Dr. Roby Barrett’s The Collapse o
Page 3 and 4: The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The
Page 5 and 6: The views expressed in this publica
Page 7: Contents Foreword..................
Page 10 and 11: central governments and loss of sta
Page 12 and 13: fellow at Oxford University. He hol
Page 14 and 15: JSOU Report 16-1 region will provid
Page 16 and 17: JSOU Report 16-1 and Mesopotamia no
Page 18 and 19: JSOU Report 16-1 It was a predictab
Page 20 and 21: JSOU Report 16-1 Chapter three disc
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Page 48 and 49: JSOU Report 16-1 find cohesion and
Page 52 and 53: JSOU Report 16-1 groups within the
Page 54 and 55: JSOU Report 16-1 own stability and,
Page 56 and 57: JSOU Report 16-1 establishment poli
Page 58 and 59: JSOU Report 16-1 Also to prevent in
Page 60 and 61: JSOU Report 16-1 slaughter the oppo
Page 62 and 63: JSOU Report 16-1 In reality, the Sy
Page 64 and 65: JSOU Report 16-1 and intelligence,
Page 66 and 67: JSOU Report 16-1 up with a realisti
Page 68 and 69: JSOU Report 16-1 see, the collapse
Page 70 and 71: JSOU Report 16-1 to the Ottomans—
Page 72 and 73: JSOU Report 16-1 Aflaq resigned in
Page 74 and 75: JSOU Report 16-1 Whatever the case,
Page 76 and 77: JSOU Report 16-1 opposition. It als
Page 78 and 79: JSOU Report 16-1 including a terror
Page 80 and 81: JSOU Report 16-1 Syrian Succession
Page 82 and 83: JSOU Report 16-1 fueled this belief
Page 84 and 85: JSOU Report 16-1 United States. In
Page 86 and 87: JSOU Report 16-1 ultimate vested in
Page 88 and 89: JSOU Report 16-1 By 2001, the Iraqi
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