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JSOU Report 16-1
Western policy was a paradox; Washington demanded the opposition
fight by acceptable Western rules of warfare that put them at the mercy of
all comers in a vicious civil war, and then refused meaningful support. U.S.
policy was aimed at bolstering acceptable resistance groups but not enough
that they could actually topple the Assad regime. The former British Chief
of Staff, David Richards, viewed the half measures as useless, “[policy] has
to be creating an army or nothing.” Given that the more radical groups were
better funded, U.S. policies failed to accomplish any of its goals. 189
The potential threat in the form of a more radicalized Sunni community
went unheeded—that is, until ISIS launched an offensive in Iraq and captured
its second largest city, Mosul. ISIS success has served as a force multiplier
spurring groups opposed to the Iranian-backed regimes in Damascus
and Baghdad to unite with the more radical ISIS. 190 Mosul is a Sunni city
that has long been a rival of Baghdad, now the seat of an American-created
Iranian-backed Shi’a government and its militias and intelligence services.
ISIS did not capture Mosul, a city of 1.5 million, with 10,000 fighters without
considerable help from the residents. As one retreating Iraqi soldier put
it, “On the morning of June 10, the commanding officer told the men to stop
shooting, hand over their rifles to insurgents, take off their uniforms and
flee the city.” Before they could leave, local civilians shouting and throwing
rocks attacked them, “We don’t want you in our city. You are Maliki’s sons.
The sons of mutta! [Shi’a temporary marriage practice] You are Safavids!
You are the army of Iran!” One could argue that it was as much a popular
uprising as an assault by ISIS. 191 Others connected with the government fled
for their lives, leaving mountains of U.S.-supplied equipment behind, but a
significant percentage of the population preferred jihadist rule to that of the
Shi’a government in Baghdad.
Strategically, it was a multidimensional debacle because it also played
into Assad’s hands. It shifted focus away from the issue of unseating him, a
prerequisite for any kind of ceasefire or political settlement in the Levant and
shifted to ISIS. His forces mostly focused on attacking opposition groups that
might receive decisive Western support while more or less ignoring ISIS. 192
In addition, ISIS’ goal of consolidating its rule in Eastern Syria and Western
Iraq ‘dovetailed’ with Assad’s decision to focus on holding western Syria. The
successes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria caused King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and
other allies in the Gulf to turn up the political heat on Washington. “While
not mentioning any terrorist groups by name, King Abdullah’s statement
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