Collapse

Barrett: The Collapse of Iraq and Syria
appeared aimed at drawing Washington and its NATO allies into a wider
fight against ISIS, and its supporters in the region.” 193
Now, the U.S. and its allies were committed to undermining ISIS as well
as the more regionally controversial attacks on other radical groups in the
region including Jabha al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate. In the region, some
Arabs view the obsession with Jabha al-Nusra as counterproductive since
the Front has fielded arguably the most effective fight against the Alawite
regime. It also signaled a growing reluctance by the West to precipitate a
sudden collapse of the Syrian regime’s authority in Western Syria because
most likely ISIS, Jabha al-Nusra, or another jihadist group would step into
the vacuum. 194 In short, the West and its allies wanted the Assads gone, but
not the remaining government structure including the Alawite-dominated
Syrian army and the security services. The coalition war against ISIS was
proving a boon to Iran in trying to take the pressure off its client in Baghdad
and to Syria in focusing on the evils of ISIS and Jabha al-Nusra. Turkey is
the only state in the region indirectly supporting ISIS and directly assisting
Ahrar Al-Sham, another Islamist group also support by Qatar, because
both provide leverage against the emergence of independent Kurdish areas
in Syria and the former threatens the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq. 195
After months of air attacks and claims of progress on the part of the
coalition, Iraqi Prime Minister Hayder al-Abadi, bolstered by the recapture
of Tikrit, proclaimed that his government had won the ‘psychological battle’
with ISIS. Despite the fact this involved massive intervention of Shi’a militias,
the personal presence of Quds Force commander Qasem Sulaymani, and
U.S. air strikes, it appeared that the government had turned a corner in its
struggle against ISIS. 196 It was a mirage. Between 15 and 20 May 2015, ISIS
delivered two stunning surprises. First, it captured the provincial capital of
Anbar province driving more numerous but poorly motivated Iraqi troops
from the town. Then, five days later, they captured Palmyra when Syrian
forces were redeployed to the west. These victories, combined with Sunni
resentment and fear of the Shi’a regime in Baghdad and the Alawite regime
in Damascus, have brought fresh Sunni recruits into ISIS’s ranks. 197 The reaction
of anti-ISIS Sunni militiamen who were promised support that never
arrived was predictable: “Abadi is a liar just like Maliki. He won’t arm the
Sunnis but will weaken them instead.” 198 The Sunnis also deeply resented
those Shi’a militias that flooded into Sunni areas at Abadi’s orders. 199
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