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JSOU Report 16-1
by the British and French during the mandate period and ruled for 30 years
as such by dictatorships.
This reality requires a complete rethinking of more than policy. It is a
matter of re-conceptualizing the Western view of the region and the political
reality on the ground if Western policy is to even have a chance of being
partially successful in undermining ISIS. The Sunnis of the former state of
Iraq will never accept Shi’a rule from Baghdad (and for that matter the Kurds
will not accept it either), nor will their sectarian brothers in Syria accept any
state run by the oppressive apostate regime in Damascus. In both cases, ISIS
and Jabha al-Nusra are more legitimate and frankly in their view ‘just’ rule.
In addition, they are merely doing under an Islamic banner what Hafiz al-
Assad and Saddam Hussein did ostensibly through the Ba’th Party—imposing
their will on the fractious, feuding elements of the region with a twist.
Saddam and Assad demanded allegiance to a secular ideal that supported
their dictatorships while Baghdadi demands allegiance to an Islamic concept
deeply rooted in the region, the idea of a Caliphate.
Given the historical context and the reality on the ground, it should be
obvious to all which line of thinking is more lucid with the exception of
those that have a vested interest in resurrecting a now decade-old colonial
corpse—Iraq. None of the communities in Iraq really understand or want to
have a civil society. The Shi’a want to rule the Sunnis as the Sunnis ruled the
Shi’a under Saddam; the Sunnis want to reinstate their control in Baghdad or
at a minimum achieve autonomy; the Kurds want their own state and have
it in all but name. Unless it is under the thumb of an authoritarian regime,
sectarianism across the board had been the political order in Mesopotamia.
For SOF, having perspective on problems and challenges is always a critical
commodity. In the Middle East, it is a requirement. Missteps are easy
to make and almost impossible to escape. This study has examined roughly
500 years plus years of historical context in the Greater Levant—Iraq, Syria,
and to some degree Lebanon—and connected to the present to demonstrate
that some military officer, intelligence officer or administrator for more than
five centuries has been trying to quell the chaos between Beirut and Basra.
In every case, the effort has proven to be enormously costly and in the end
impossible. The British, the French, the Israelis, and the United States have
all attempted to pacify the region to no avail. Even the Ottomans, who could
take any action they choose, found they had the resources to deal with the
big issues and left the everyday administration to local leaders and their
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