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THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF CAMP 99
of Camp in the disorganization or collapse of the commonly purported
differences that separate and thereby define and delimit things, ideas, behaviors,
and so forth. Camp disturbs the binary logic of Western culture. Interestingly, the
term “homophobia,” which combines the prefix “homo” (meaning “same”) with
the suffix “phobia” (meaning an “irrational or illogical fear”), names a fear of
sameness, a fear of that which undermines difference. Thus the term both names
and describes the prejudice frequently held against the practice and practitioners
of Camp.
Following Sontag’s model, “gay sensibility” theories of Camp tend to fix upon
projects that would either bolster Sontag’s notion of “camp-as-sensibility” (while
simultaneously countering Sontag by insisting upon its “gayness”) and/or work
to establish a definition along an aesthetic continuum including Camp, kitsch,
and high art (another Sontagian strategy). The common objective for both of
these projects is an interest in situating Camp within gay (and sometimes
lesbians’) subculture. 15 Significantly, both the “sensibility” argument that
attempts to position Camp as a historical category (differentiating it from, for
example, nineteenth-century dandyism), and the “aesthetic” argument that works
to separate Camp from kitsch and high art, operate within logics that seek to
stabilize, and thus reveal, the “presence” of Camp in the representational field.
Given my earlier arguments about irony and queer subjectivity, the notion of
Camp as a queer strategy or activity in the production of “presence” is highly
problematic.
The tension from which the “gay sensibility” debate seems to have emerged,
the historical moment when lesbians and gay men began to assert themselves in
post-McCarthy America, remains highly significant. 16 For what is at stake in this
debate is more than a problem with discourse. The “gay sensibility” debate
emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, before and after Stonewall, reflecting the
lesbian and gay political movement’s claim for cultural, political, discursive, and
legislative representation. Interestingly, Sontag’s “Notes” make evident, in part,
the political stakes addressed by the “gay sensibility” debate.
While on the one hand discounting a totalizing homosexual claim to Camp,
Sontag also observes that “Homosexuals have pinned their integration into
society on promoting the aesthetic sense” (118). She imagines that this claim
results from the use of Camp as “a solvent of morality. It neutralizes moral
indignation, sponsors playfulness” (118). Central to Sontag’s claim is the
presumption that Camp is a discursive mode offered to heterosexuals as a means
for homosexuals to gain acceptance. What is entirely excluded from her analysis
is the possibility that Camp might be a discursive mode which enables
homosexuals to adapt to the conditions of heterosexual homophobia. By
discounting a specific homosexual claim upon Camp, Sontag avoids exploring in
depth what she terms “the peculiar relation between Camp taste and
homosexuality” (117). Indeed, by calling Camp a “taste,” she makes Camp into a
“preference.” This suggests that personal volition determines one’s choice to
engage Camp. The danger of the concept of “preference” for lesbians and gay