The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World

Character of Conflict
“…Defenses cannot achieve perfect safety…Just increasing the attackers’ odds of failure
may make the difference between a plan attempted or a plan discarded. The enemy also
may have to develop more elaborate plans, thereby increasing the danger of exposure or
defeat.” 19
Within this context, conflict and war are likely to occur as adversaries become increasingly capable
and willing to encroach, erode, or otherwise disregard U.S. sovereignty and the freedom and
autonomy of its citizens. Today, defense of the homeland focuses on placing military capabilities
as far forward as possible to reassure allies, providing a layered defense of the United States,
monitoring the aerospace and maritime approaches to North America, and establishing credible
nuclear deterrence capabilities to dissuade attacks. Furthermore, it also includes support to civil
authorities for domestic disaster response operations and potential support to law enforcement to
repel VEO attacks within the U.S.
The United States faces a future security environment in which it must maintain the capacity to do
these things while also preparing for adversaries that will develop more numerous and varied
capabilities to hold U.S. citizens and global commitments at risk. Within this context, the United
States must simultaneously protect against an increasing range of foreign threats to its homeland
while encouraging the greatest degree of autonomy within the international system where the
freedom and autonomy of others are often perceived as an existential threat.
Individual American citizens to include key political, economic, or military figures will be subject
to information warfare reinforced by violence, focused on influencing broad public opinion or
manipulating their decision calculus. Often, these coercive tactics will be difficult to distinguish
from criminality because the same globalized world that empowers the United States also blurs
the line between criminal entities and terrorist groups. Opportunities to partner between a widerange
of unlawful organizations will continue to complicate and confuse the distinction between
law enforcement and military action within the United States, particularly when these networks
cross borders.
Nature of Potential Adversaries
The future Joint Force will confront a range of adversaries attempting to breach U.S. borders. Over
the next two decades, there will be a significant evolution in long-range strike weapons capable of
ranging the U.S. homeland. Russia will modernize its land, air, and sea-based intercontinental
nuclear forces. China’s recent industrial and economic growth combined with its desire to once
again be a regional hegemon and global power may result in new nuclear doctrine emphasizing
first use and a counter force approach, versus its current counter value doctrine and capabilities.
Future delivery mechanisms might include hypersonic missiles, long-range cruise missiles, and
ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads, all designed to penetrate U.S. defensive systems.
The purpose of state adversary investments in global strike assets capable of reaching North
America is to threaten key targets within the United States during a conflict. Although the risk of
19
911 Commission Report, p. 383
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