The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World

direct assault on the U.S. homeland by traditionally organized, equipped, and commanded military
forces operating at the direction of a national political authority is probably far lower than most
other threats, it has not gone away. Foreign powers may focus strikes or raids on targets which
result in larger systemic effects against U.S. economic or power projection capabilities.
Some sub- or transnational groups see the United States as underwriting world order and believe
that delivering catastrophic damage to the U.S. homeland will serve to divert U.S. military power
from interdicting them overseas. VEO and irregular/special operations forces (SOF) networks are
likely to have the capacity to organize, train, and equip within the U.S. itself. These non-state
actors may launch attacks within the homeland to prevent the United States from interfering with
their goals and objectives. Although this strategy has historically failed, its frequent appearance
suggests that weaker adversaries still believe they can deliver a blow against the homeland that
may keep the United States from engaging.
Military Competitive Space
“…we can expect that future attacks will aim at both large-scale casualties and symbolic
targets…[they seek] high body counts, go after iconic targets, and cause economic
damage. The terrorists will continue to demonstrate tactical adaptability, which will make
it difficult to plan security measures around past threats or a few threat scenarios.
Terrorists innovate.” 20
Military competition within this context will revolve around the ability of adversaries to influence,
deter, and coerce the United States through the credible threat of violence against its homeland
and citizens. The frequency and array of adversary deterrent operations are likely to increase, to
include snap nuclear exercises, bomber flights, and strategic reconnaissance overflights into U.S.
ADIZs as typically conducted by Russia. China may conduct similar global deterrent operations
through maritime presence operations near U.S. territories and bases throughout the Pacific. From
time to time, even smaller regional powers such as Iran and North Korea may attempt deterrent
missions.
The Joint Force will need an array of capabilities to complicate or defeat the deterrent strategies
of adversaries. These will include aerospace awareness sensors and layered antiballistic missile
systems, but also maritime capabilities to counter patrols by adversary submarines and long-range
unmanned submersibles used against underwater infrastructure in U.S. territorial waters and
Exclusive Economic Zones. Creating these capabilities will naturally increase the incentives for
the United States to divert already scarce defense resources away from its own global power
projection capabilities to focus more on homeland defense measures.
Adversaries may also attempt to disrupt the ability of the United States to conduct overseas military
operations through attacks on major nodes of the global trade and logistics network such as large
container ports or major airports. Some adversaries might also attempt to attack military bases and
facilities to disproportionately degrade the ability of the United States to generate, deploy, and
maintain the Joint Force. The development of small, smart, cheap, autonomous, long-range, and
highly-capable systems operating in the air, land, sea, and undersea environments may further
20
RAND Corporation, The Lessons of Mumbai, (2009), p. 21
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